Bush ‘thought he was on mission from God’ in Iraq

A senior US official warned that George W Bush believed he was on a “mission from God” to crush insurgents during the second Iraq war, newly released Government files reveal.

Richard Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state, told the British ambassador that the US president needed a “dose of reality” after demanding US forces “kick ass” against rising Iraqi resistance.

Mr Armitage also dismissed claims by the US commander in Iraq that he could put down a major uprising in the city of Fallujah within days as “bullshit” and “politically crass”.

Papers released to the National Archives after 20 years show Mr Armitage appealed to Sir Tony Blair, then prime minister and not yet knighted. He asked Sir Tony to persuade Mr Bush that a wider “political process” would be needed to restore order in Iraq.

In May 2003, Mr Bush declared “mission accomplished”, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the dictator, by US and British coalition forces.

Less than one year later, much of the country was in the grip of violent insurgency, with US troops engaged in a bloody battle in Fallujah where militants had ambushed and killed four private military contractors.

After their burned and mutilated bodies were displayed hanging from a bridge over the Euphrates river, the US launched Operation Vigilant Resolve to regain control.

Within one week, US troops had taken around a third of the city, but their tactics caused dismay among politicians on the Iraq Governing Council (IGC), which was set up by the coalition following the fall of Hussein.

In a private meeting with Sir David Manning, then the British ambassador, on April 14 2004, Mr Armitage said that Mr Bush had initially “wanted to kick ass” with US marines occupying the entire city.

However he was warned by Paul Bremer, the leader of the coalition provisional authority, that such a course of action would lead to the collapse of the IGC, damaging hopes of an independent Iraqi administration.

“Faced with this ‘dose of reality’, Bush backed off,” Sir David reported.

“Rich [Armitage] summed it all up by saying that Bush still thought he was on some sort of a mission from God, but that recent events had made him ‘rather more sober’.”

Mr Armitage was scathing about Gen John Abizaid, the overall US commander, who claimed there were around 1,000 insurgents in Fallujah still to be “dealt with” after his forces detained 200 Iraqis and 100 foreigners.

He had told Mr Bush that he could finish the job “in two or three days” if he was authorised to use “precision attacks” followed by marines conducting house-to-house searches and the imposition of martial law.

“Rich said Abizaid had been talking bullshit. He could not possibly know how many insurgents were in Fallujah nor how to find them,” Sir David wrote. “Ideas for precision targeting and marine occupation were politically crass.”

Overall, Sir David said Mr Armitage believed the US was “gradually losing on the battlefield” and it was “inevitable” the administration would have to send more troops, which would be “politically ugly” for Mr Bush.

He said the president had come to accept that the UN and Lakhdar Brahimi, its envoy, now offered the only “exit strategy” for the US, despite Mr Bush being subjected to “constant argument” from Dick Cheney, his vice-president, that the UN was “contributing to the problems”.

“Rich said it followed that he hoped the prime minister would urge Bush to deal with Fallujah as part of a carefully judged political process, and that he would also underline the critical importance for all of us of Brahimi and the UN,” Sir David noted.

Two weeks after their meeting, the US, under pressure from the IGC, finally called off the offensive in Fallujah.

The US lost 27 troops, while around 200 insurgents and some 600 Iraqi civilians were thought to have been killed.

Coalition forces took the city in a second offensive launched in November 2004 – and American troops remained in Iraq until 2011.

Other documents relating to the Iraq war made public after two decades reveal that ministers thought France wanted to become a “rival pole of power to the United States” by threatening to veto a UN Security Council resolution.

Jack Straw, then foreign secretary, told a cabinet meeting that France had “torpedoed the whole process”.

In a briefing paper, an official warned Sir Tony of “clumsy US handling” and “disproportionate military tactics” over Fallujah.