Defence Industry

The South African Defence Technology and Industrial Sector (SA DTIS) can be considered central to the defence and security complex, economic growth, new technology development and foreign policy of South Africa.  Yet, the SA DTIS is in disrepair due to economic pressure and global defence technology and industrial market dynamics, fuelling perceptions that the SA DTIS (typically the State Owned Enterprises) is an economic, defence and security liability.  Reversing this situation, from a BRICS perspective, requires a detailed understanding of the prevailing strategic defence technology and industrial business environment, policy approaches and strategic business levers used and preferred internationally and amongst the BRICS States to unlock relationship building and capability development thrust.  As such, the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 called for research on BRICS partnership building. Thus, this thesis focuses on BRICS DTIS bilateral relations, specifically - which strategic business levers are prudent to establish bilateral defence technology and industrial partnerships between South Africa and the BRIC States?  A qualitative research methodology and case study research approach/design, calibrated by a relativist worldview and social constructivist paradigm, was used to render rich description.  Using questionnaires (open-ended inquiry) allowed eighteen DTIS-related experts participation in the study and rigour to the findings of the thesis.
The SA DTIS role in the BRICS DTIS ecosystem is described as being a gateway to the African DTIS market segments and a possible collaboration - and supply chain partner for niche technologies-, product systems- and integration services development.  Bilateral collaboration was found to be the preferred level of inclusion, based on the discretionary and securitised nature of each DTIS.  In the quest for self-sufficiency and/or domination, the strategic motive for bilateral DTIS collaboration is to attain competitive/comparative advantage within a competitive timeframe.  The crystallisation of bilateral DTIS partnerships from multilateral alliances such as BRICS is calibrated significantly by the level of asymmetry between prospective partners, national interest, the quest for foreign policy flexibility and military autonomy, national DTIS policy objectives, technology and products niches, and preference for strategic business levers.  BRICS States were found to all subscribe to liberal (at least a hybrid) DTIS development approach that allows for a dynamic mix of the facets mentioned above. 
Within these dynamics possible drivers of bilateral partnerships are the adoption of an idealist approach and liberal/hybrid DTIS policy, continuous investment in the DTIS and militaries, nurturing Tier 1 and/or 2 industrial capabilities, promoting the use of strategic business levers (joint ventures (JVs), technology transfer, foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions), recognising the role of Government in developing the DTIS, overlapping market segments, respect for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), amongst others.  BRICS DTISs share the ambition to be self-sufficient.  Some are ambitious to be dominant also.  These drivers and ambitions provide short- to medium-term SA DTIS collaboration development opportunities in the quest for BRIC self-sufficiency/dominance ambitions.  Bilateral partnerships barriers relates to asymmetry, differences in approaches to arms control and associated governance, funding asymmetries, a gradually deteriorating SA DTIS contrasted by a rapidly developing BRIC DTISs, divergent national policy frameworks, the short-term nature of SA DTIS opportunities, abuses of IPR (typically China) – all problematic considering the current state of the South African economy and its DTIS. 
In the short- to medium-term JVs attracted preference as a strategic business lever for bilateral BRICS DTIS partnerships - primarily with Brazil and India. This said, it should not be assumed that bilateral DTIS partnerships between South Africa and the individual BRIC States will be mutually beneficial, no matter the strategic business levers employed, due to the complexity of international DTIS collaboration. 

Key Words:  BRICS, South African Defence Industry, Defence Industry.

В монографии разрабатывается система моделей и методик оценки стоимости элементов интеллектуального капитала предприятий ОПК и на ее основе проводится обоснование перспективных направлений реализации инновационно-ориентированного управления ОПК.
Для научных работников, руководителей компаний, специалистов в области управления и оценки, преподавателей.

Australia has long built warships and submarines, albeit on a stop-go basis. However, the shipyard infrastructures for each new build and the associated skills developed during the construction phase have generally dissipated after the project finishes and the ships delivered. No more. The Australian government is determined to create an enduring naval shipbuilding industry, by developing a detailed shipbuilding plan and allocating considerable funding to achieve its goal.

RUSI and the RAF convened two workshops to look at the evolving relationship between the RAF and industry in the light of the new structural changes within the UK Ministry of Defence, and the implications of the US Joint Operational Access Concept – and associated Air-Sea Battle and Joint Forced Entry Concepts – for the UK and other forces.

This paper, looking at cross-domain capabilities and interoperability, is the result of the second workshop and explores some of the concepts, capabilities and force structures that might be adopted. The recent US Joint Operation Access Concept outlines requirements for high-end contingent capabilities networked across multiple domains to meet emerging anti-access and area-denial threats.

There are both risks and benefits to smaller nations adopting such an approach. Most obviously, in an era of financial uncertainty, there is the risk of overstretch if nations try to do too much with limited resources; however, this approach also presents an opportunity to find greater effectiveness through crossdomain operations and closer integration with regional partners.

Since 2004, the European Union has spent approximately 3.5 billion Euros on security research. Yet, scholars of security have seldom been on the receiving end of these monies. The present article aims to make sense of this apparent paradox. To this end, it brings under examination the so-called high-level public-private dialogue on security that the European Commission sponsored between 2003 and 2009. Social scientists were excluded from this process at the beginning. Thus, the forum imposed the idea that security problems have technical solutions if the EU is willing to pay for them. Social scientists could then be-reincluded and enrolled under the banner of societal security. It falls to them to numb the general public into acceptance of security technologies. The paradox, then, is complete.

"The aim of this monograph is to present the European Defence Agency (EDA), an institution of the European Union, established in July 2004. The author focuses on the description of the Agency as such, analyzes its activities until 2011, as well as presents possible scenarios of its development, especially on the basis of current predictions of future international security environment. This publication is a complex scientific description of the European Defence Agency subject and its transfer on the ground of polish science which until now had no monograph on this matter.

The first chapter characterises EDA, historical context and reasons behind its establishment. Author describes and analyzes Agencies’ legal basis and its functioning, as well as outlines its internal structure. Moreover, he pictures Agency relations with other institutions within the European Union institutional framework and with these outside the EU, having an influence on EDA’s functions and tasks.

Chapter II depicts activities of the European Defence Agency in the years 2004 – 2011. Author characterises Agencies’ and its member state’s struggle with the realization of four main goals for which EDA has been established. He presents its previous successes in the field of creation of military capabilities and points out magnitude of work still to be done.

Third and final chapter tries to anticipate the future of the European Defence Agency. Author illustrates respectively: security challenges for Europe yet to come; future of Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU and implications for the development of defence capabilities; as well as the most important external and internal factors, which will have an influence on EDA in the second decade of XXI century and more distant future.

Conclusions of the monograph allow to place the thesis that European Defence Agency is already an important part of the European defence capabilities creation landscape. Despite uncertain future and dependency on the good will of its member
states, EDA has the potential to become one of the main pillars of European defence."

“If everyone is a product of this society, who will say the things that need to be said, and do the things that need to be done, without compromise? Truth will never start out popular in a world more concerned with marketability than righteousness. It will initially suffer ridicule and even violence- yet ultimately it is undeniable. All of humanity is living in a dream world, but suffering real consequences.” Lauryn Hill.
As I begin this excursion I am motivated by the countless patriots of this great country who believe in the rule of law and its enforcement, especially those who are open- minded and keep pushing for a better way to implement different faucets of defense and security.

The complexity and uncertainty of contemporary society are influenced by globalisation, which pushes technological innovations to keep up with today’s ambiguity. This aspect of globalisation forces businesses and industries to develop innovative technologies to gain a competitive advantage in the global market. Market competition is the key motivating factor pushing industries to adopt the culture of innovation, so to find better solutions to existing and emerging problems (Lele, 2019 pg. 18,19). The European Union and key NATO allies are considering prioritising disruptive innovation to boost their economy and defence sector through rigorous training for multi-domain operations. Innovation is the process of researching, experimenting and developing original ideas into practical and useful techniques or products. Industries and institutions pull in human and financial resources in support of innovation projects, thus improving and enhancing the processes, products and services offered (Ibid, pg.19). Disruptive innovation radically changes operability and significantly impacts how armed forces operate (Kikiras, 2017).

Mobilisation occurs during all conflicts with just the degree of mobilisation varying. Surprisingly then, most mobilisation thinking, doctrine and processes focus almost entirely on pre-war mobilisation activities, aiming to ensure that a nation is adequately prepared for an anticipated future war. In reality, this is an overly ambitious undertaking. Wars often arrive unexpectedly, their nature and scope are rarely understood before they start, their duration is unknown, and even the full list of participants is generally in doubt. Deep uncertainty inevitably frustrates thinking about mobilisation.

This paper aims to provide a structured way of thinking about mobilisation policymaking and planning that takes this inherent uncertainty into account. It uses two approaches: alternative futures and historical case studies. By projecting the known past into the uncertain future, the paper generates key insights on national mobilisation issues relevant to defence strategic thinking, doctrine and processes across a range of strategic circumstances.

This article presents a critical view on the current situation with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW). It analyzes a set of official documents in an attempt to empathize the reason behind the existing lack of field operationally useful NLW. On the one hand, it points at the significant necessity for less-lethal capabilities formulated by the official vision on future security environment. On the other, it claims that the definition of requirements from current, developing and future NLW misleads military industrial complex from developing NLW that will answer this emerging necessity. The article argues that the current detrimental situation with NLW is not a result of an enormous technological gap, but rather an outcome of the mis-definition of NLW requirements that fail to correspond with defined future threats.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions, include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing information needed by national security decision makers and military commanders, thus forming the principal elements of defense capabilities of any country. ISR systems range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range of analytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are "national" systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to the Intelligence agencies; others are "tactical" systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Shoghi's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) products and programs (sensors, platforms, systems and services) are designed and developed for our Intelligence customers, to provide them with auto processed Intelligence feed. Shoghi has considerable years of experience providing pre-integrated or site installable Intelligence collection and Automated Signal processing systems to our military and defence customers. Shoghi's solutions for Communication Surveillance and Intelligence include communication intercept and collection systems, signal analysis and processing tools and high end stand-alone decoding and demodulation systems which can be integrated into customer's existing intelligence systems. Shoghi provides a total turnkey solution that can be installed at the customer site. This includes all related civil works, antenna installation, equipment integration, on-site customer extensive training and lifelong maintenance programs. Get more Information's Download brochures

Industri pertahanan Indonesia dituntut untuk dapat berkembang agar dapat mencapai kemandirian industri pertahanannya dan hal ini sesuai dengan program pengembangan industri pertahanan dalam negeri Indonesia. Untuk mencapai kemandirian industri pertahanan, Indonesia tentunya harus memiliki strategi agar dapat tercapai tujuan tersebut sehingga kebutuhan vital Indonesia dalam memodernisasi teknologi terbarunya khususnya dalam bidang pertahanan dapat terpenuhi yang mana ini ditujukan untuk keamanan nasioal dan kepentingan nasional. Dalam tulisan ini menganalisis strategi industri pertahanan yang dilakukan Indonesia dalam memenuhi kebutuhannya agar tercapainya kemandirian industri pertahanan.

INDONESIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY STRATEGY TO REACH THE INDEPENDENCE OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Indonesian defense industry is required develop to reach the independence of its defense industry and this is due with Indonesia's domestic defense industry development program. To reach the independence of the defense industry, Indonesia certainly must have a strategy in order to achieve these, so Indonesia's vital needs in modernizing latest technology, especially in the field of defense can be fulfilled and which is for national security and national interests. In this paper, to disscus the defense industry strategy by Indonesia its needs to reach the independence of the defense industry.

Cyber-deterrence has become a fashionable concept, and there has been a wealth of literature and polemic produced which seeks to simplify it, sell it as an applicable theory and fight for its insertion into national security strategies; most zealously in the United States. It is a grafting of the theory of nuclear deterrence which underpinned and ‘stabilised’ the Cold War. In the modern era of ‘new security challenges’, especially those threats posed through the cyber-domain (cyber-espionage, cyber-warfare, cyber-attacks, computer network exploits/ attacks, hacking and cyber-vandalism, theft of industrial/ state secrets, and so on) deterrence has enjoyed a renaissance.

The argument is that deterrence by punishment as a theory worked under the auspices of the Cold War - when applied to cyber-warfare and the cyber-realm it becomes unfeasible, and in practice its ability to navigate and function within the virtual terrain is restricted. Its linearity and determinism mean that the underpinning assumptions of state-centrism, US/ Western state forms of rationality, and the omniscience implicit in ‘knowing your enemy’ do not, in the cyber-realm, fit (through the plurality of actors, range of targets and space for irrational actions or vandalism or folly) and therefore, centrally, the foundations which allow the theory to operate in reality cannot gain traction or make headway. As such, the theory is stranded.

PhD thesis (2011)

Transatlantic Defence Industry Integration
– discourse and action in the organizational field of the defence market

The integration of defence companies in Europe and the U.S. has in the defence market’s environment for a long time received considerable interest. Companies see business opportunities and attractive technology on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Governments advocate in a public discourse that transatlantic defence industry integration is highly desirable and that it would benefit all concerned. This supportive discourse is compared to the action; the corporate integration that has occurred. The aim of the thesis is to understand and explain the level and nature of the transatlantic defence industry integration and its driving forces and inhibitors. A combination of three focal theoretical concepts has been used: integration, discourse and organizational field. The thesis shows that there is a marked discrepancy between the discourse for and the actual extent of transatlantic defence industry integration. This discrepancy and the nature of the corporate integration is analyzed and explained through the combination of discourse and integration within an organizational field.
The thesis shows that defence companies’ in transatlantic acquisitions achieve very limited influence over the acquired company’s strategy and operations, and that synergies and rationalization are strongly disencouraged by governments. The processual integration within trans-national groups and in transatlantic defence materiel collaboration is highly restricted by governments. The thesis also shows that the defence innovation largely is separated between the U.S. and Europe. The defence market is an example of a political market showing a very different corporate rationality compared to ideal models of corporate rationality as the SCP paradigm. The findings suggest that defence companies’ strategy and integration appear non-rational in isolation, but become rational when understood through the lens of the defence market seen as an organizational field – a perspective that emphasizes the influence of the government field.
If you want to understand, analyze or engage in transatlantic defence industry integration, you should benefit from this study. It should be of interest to researchers who study the defence industry, defence procurement, political markets, organizational fields, regulatory governance and corporate integration. It should be of interest to policymakers and others engaged in the discourse that concerns reforms of political markets in general, and of the defence market in particular.

Martin Lundmark is a researcher at the Center for Marketing, Distribution and Industry Dynamics at the Stockholm School of Economics. His research focuses on the defence market, defence procurement, Europeanization and the transformation within political markets. Martin also works as defence market and defence procurement analyst and deputy research director at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Greece yearly allocates a substantial part of its national income to defence. Its defence burden is the highest among EU and NATO members. Greek military spending has continuously exhibited a steady upward trend. During the post-bipolar era, while most countries have reduced their defence budgets, Greek military spending has grown in real terms by about 35% while, the corresponding change for total EU and NATO military expenditure was –12% and –23.4% respectively. For military hardware, Greece relies almost exclusively on imports. According to SIPRI data during 1996-2000 Greece ranked as the seventh importer of major conventional weapons in the world. Its total imports for this period amounted to about $3665 millions. In the past the development of an indigenous arms production capability was seen as an important step towards achieving a minimum degree military of self sufficiency and thus reduce its dependence on external suppliers of military hardware. The driving forces behind this policy of import substitution were a) the arms embargo during the military dictatorship and b) the fact that Greek defence planners felt that in case of an arms confrontation with Turkey (its mainly rival but at the same time NATO ally) Greece could not rely on its arms suppliers (mainly the USA and West European countries) and that it could be faced with a slow down in equipment and spare parts thus hindering its military effort. A number of industries were thus set up. They were mostly joint ventures between the Greek state and foreign arms producing companies. Most prominent cases were the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB), the Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO), the Hellenic Vehicle Industry (ELBO). About three decades after the original ambitious plans, Greece has achieved a limited degree of import substitution in weapons requirements in such areas as ammunition, portable infantry weapons, jeeps and trucks, APCs and IFVs, and in airplane and helicopter maintenance. These however represent only a small proportion of the needs in military hardware. The majority of weapons systems are still imported including fighter planes, MBTs, helicopters, naval units, electronic equipment etc. All of which are of crucial determinants of the fighting capability of the Greek armed forces. Similarly, plans for extensive co-production agreements have not fully materialized while export performance has at best been limited. Currently the Greek defence industry is comprised of about 80 companies with a yearly turnover of more than 1,4 bn.€ and employing more than 16200 people. Most of the major indigenous military producers have for a number of years been facing important problems, of both financial and technological nature.
This paper attempts to address some important questions concerning the Greek arms industry. For example, why has Greece, despite its importance as a major importer and, until recently, the favourable conditions in the global defence market (the huge downturn that has however started to reverse during the last two years) not been able to succeed in its import substitution policy in defence procurement and thus effectively supporting the indigenous defence industry? Why do foreign firms have to look for capable local partners each time a Greek defence program is executed, and not vice versa? That is, why are Greek firms not capable of searching for, and assembling, industrial groups of local and foreign firms, in order to pursue the opportunities that appear in the local defence market? The paper surveys the Greek defence industry and its development over the last decades and discusses the options available to it in order to overcome its current problems. Emphasis is placed upon the technological capabilities of the local firms and upon the role that the defence procurement process can possibly play in augmenting these, so as to embed Greece in the current techno – economic paradigm.

She is also the Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the RSIS. Prof. Caballero-Anthony's research interests include regionalism and multilateralism in Asia-Pacific, global governance, human security, and nuclear security.

The Russian government has launched a new state armament program for the period 2011–2020 in a decisive effort to bring the Russian Armed Forces into the twenty-first century. This article investigates the prerequisites for the successful fulfillment of this program and assesses the industry’s ability to meet the program’s demands. The main findings are that the costs of the program are unrealistically high and that deficiencies in the procurement system and in the technologies and performance of the industry present serious challenges and obstacles that will hinder the fulfillment of the program.

Different kinds of conflicts are increasing day by day in the world. The
increase of disputes and mutual conflicts cause countries continue to
devote high amounts of resources to the defence industry for national
security. In order to obtain the maximum benefit from defence spending,
the defence industry needs to be based on science and technology.
Developed countries trying to build an effective defence industrial strategy
based on science and technology to stay in peace. As a result of strategic
management of science and technology based defence industry; faster,
more talented, distinctive and unique defence systems and equipment
production have gained importance. The ability for the production of
defence systems and equipment needs to produce knowledge in different
scientific fields and that knowledge requires to be converted into the
application by research and development. It has high potential to provide
technological progress and development in the long run, when getting into
account the high amount of defence spending. Developed countries such
as US, managing their defence industries based on science and
technology to develop technological infrastructure, improving the level of
industrialization, developing education in basic sciences and developing
research and development in applied sciences. The literature about
defence spending generally discusses the amount of defence budget but
the way of spending the budget is also very important. In this context, the
objective of the research is to discuss the importance and impact of
science and technology among the strategic management of defence
industry under the different practices of US, the world’s most defence
spending country. The other objective is to help for further studies putting
forward a new science and technology based defence industry model. By
this way the research will improve the current literature about the way and
importance of defence budget spending.

This study is part of a private research project on the history of defence related  industry in Greece, covering the period from the establishment of the Greek state, to about the middle of the 20th century. Obviously this project is very much a long term WIP project, as it intends to elucidate on all aspects of military technology, whether imported from abroad or produced locally.

L`Harmattan - Paris  ; Questions contemporaines , "Cet ouvrage étudie l’évolution récente de la politique étrangère et de défense de l’Union européenne dans sa complexité historique. Peut-elle jouer un rôle important ou reste ballotée entre les acteurs. La construction européenne a garanti, soixante années durant, la paix et la stabilité sur notre continent. Cette situation a permis à l’Europe de renaître des cendres et de construire une zone de prospérité et de bien-être, avec un modèle social unique.
L’Europe n’est pas une forteresse et ne saurait se satisfaire d’un monde où subsistent tant de déséquilibres. L’objectif de l’Union est de donner aux pays et populations défavorisés les moyens de se développer, autrement dit s’attaquer aux sources mêmes de la pauvreté et de la vulnérabilité. Cette action suppose la mise en œuvre de politiques qui permettent de contribuer à consolider la démocratie, l’État de droit, la bonne gestion des affaires publiques et le respect des droits de l’homme. Car le développement ne va pas sans la démocratie et cet ouvrage montre que les droits de l’homme restent une exigence majeure pour l’Union qui joue un rôle moteur dans ce domaine.
La question principale à laquelle l‘auteur cherche la réponse, c’est dans quelle mesure l’Union peut-elle devenir un acteur international. Comment l’Union peut-elle transformer sa puissance économique en une puissance politique dans le système international du XXIème siècle. Comment concevons nous la coopération entre les institutions de l’Union européenne et celles de l’OTAN ?

Ancien visiting fellow de l’EUISS et de la Commission de Défense de l’Assemblée de l’UEO, András István Türke est docteur de Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle. Il a effectué sa thèse sur l’évolution de la défense européenne et travaille aujourd’hui comme consultant pour les questions internationales et de défense. Il est chercheur associé de plusieurs instituts de recherche en France et en Hongrie.

296 p.



TABLES DES MATIERES

INTRODUCTION

PREMIERE PARTIE – L’EMERGENCE D’UNE POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE COMMUNE EN MATIERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, DE SECURITE ET DE DEFENSE (1947-1998)

CHAPITRE I. L’architecture européenne de sécurité et le développement de l’idée d’une défense commune dans l’espace transatlantique
/Du traité de Dunkerque en 1947 jusqu’à la mise en place de l’Union de l’Europe occidentale en 1954/

CHAPITRE II. La défense européenne entre l’architecture européenne de sécurité et le développement de l’idée d’une défense commune
/Du traité de Rome en 1957 jusqu’à l’Acte final d’Helsinki en 1975/

CHAPITRE III. La sécurité et la défense européenne de la réactivation de l’Union de l’Europe occidentale jusqu'à la mise en place de l’EUROCORPS (1979-1991)

CHAPITRE IV. La mise en place de la politique étrangère et de sécurité, et la défense européenne (1991-1998)
/Le deuxième pilier de l’Union européenne ou le pilier européen de l’Organisation de traité de l’Atlantique Nord?/

CHAPITRE V. L’élargissement de l’espace de sécurité vers l’Europe orientale
/Études de cas : La Hongrie, la Pologne et la République tchèque/ 7

DEUXIEME PARTIE – L’EVOLUTION INSTITUTIONNELLE JURIDIQUE ET STRATEGIQUE DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DE SECURITE ET DE DEFENSE (1999-2009)

CHAPITRE I. Les grands débats autour du développement de la PESD

CHAPITRE II. L’évolution institutionnelle et juridique

CHAPITRE III. Capacités, armements, financement

Conclusion générale

Bibliographie

Europa Varietas Institute - http://www.europavarietas.org
András István Türke - http://andrasistvanturke.blogspot.ch

This essay explores the possibilities of Biomimicry and how it can be harnessed by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The usage of metallurgy in modern militaries appears to be devoid of a central essence and is often more a means to an end. Metallurgy works in binary terms; they either destroy or are destroyed, which does not reflect reality and nature’s principles of growth and self-healing. However, the pursuit of biomimicry utilises innovative materials that injects life-like qualities into a weapon. This evolutionary bio-design is present in nature, not as a collection of parts but as a synthesis of a whole. As such, biomimicry may be a paradigm shift after metallurgy, in line with the humanity’s quest of zealous discovery and technological advancement.

Large, imposing warships always capture the mass media's attention. Less in the public spotlight is the accelerating rise of unmanned naval vessels. These are the result more of push factors, the militarisation of commercially devel­oped information technology, rather than pull factor responses to well-defined military needs. Modern naval unmanned vessel de­velopment, then, is somewhat erratic, with much experimentation underway to try to work out what it all means.
(This is just my article in the April 2022 Maritime Defence Monitor, the full edition is at https://lnkd.in/gkizZstc)

On dokuzuncu yüzyılda baş döndürücü bir hızla gelişen global silah teknolojisi dünya ülkeleri arasında yaşanan askerî rekabetin bir sonucuydu. En etkili silahlara sahip olmanın savaşı kazanmadaki etkisini artırması, kendisi de bölgesel bir güç olan Osmanlı Devleti’ni yakından ilgilendirmiş ve yeni silah teknolojileri geliştiği bölge ile eş zamanlı olarak yöneticilerce tedarik edilmişti. Bu kitap; büyük oranda bugünkü şeklini alan silah ve mühimmatın gelişim sürecini ele almakla birlikte Osmanlı Devleti’nin I. Cihan Harbi öncesinde yeni silah teknolojilerine ne oranda sahip olduğunu açıklamayı denemektedir.

Submission that feeds into the report of UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries to the UN Human Rights Council on the ‘Impact of the use of private military and security services in immigration and border management on the protection of the rights of all migrants’ (A/HRC/45/9), published on 21 August 2020.
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/Callroleprivatemilitary.aspx.

This study aims at analysing the developments regarding key military capabilities of 31 European countries in four specific areas: Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Space-based capabilities for security and defence, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the maritime domain. A chapter is dedicated to each area, by focusing on estimated expenditures, capability development, and cooperation among the considered countries. In doing so, it takes into account the developments occurred in the timeframe going from September 2017 until early May 2018. The study is based on the compilation and analysis of open source information conducted as part of the project “Permanent Monitoring and Analysis of military capabilities and defence sector trends” (PMA), managed by a consortium of European think tanks and funded by the European Defence Agency (EDA).

O objetivo da pesquisa é compreender os motivos que levaram a paralisação do programa para a produção do Avião de Treinamento Primário Básico Unasul I, que se desenvolveu sob a coordenação do Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano (CDS), em um consórcio integrado por quatro países: Argentina, Brasil, Equador e Venezuela. A pesquisa enfatizou os processos históricos e econômicos que dificultam a possibilidade de ampliar a autonomia e a integração regional no campo da produção de armamentos, especialmente a dependência de fornecedores externos, infraestrutura tecnológica insuficiente e o baixo investimento em P&D. A análise dos documentos dos Comitês Consultivo e Técnico do programa do avião de treinamento, identificou uma correlação entre a paralisação do projeto e os dois principais objetivos do CDS para a produção colaborativa de armamentos: a integração regional e a busca por maior autonomia no desenho, desenvolvimento e produção de sistemas de armas. Até a sua paralisação, duas vertentes com interesses distintos buscaram espaço no programa Unasul I: a de integração autonomista, coerente com os princípios da iniciativa do CDS e constituída por países com baixa capacitação tecnológica e industrial no setor aeronáutico; e a assimétrica, representada por países com maior capacitação na indústria de defesa e no setor aeronáutico. Não obstante a distância tecnológica que separa os países sul-americanos dos principais fabricantes mundiais de armamentos, há ainda uma notável assimetria entre o Brasil, único país que possui um parque industrial de defesa na região, e os seus parceiros sul-americanos, o que teve peso decisivo no processo de produção colaborativa coordenado pelo CDS. Nesse sentido, o modelo de produção colaborativa proposto pelos quatro países membros do CDS, se mostrou disfuncional, caracterizado pelo desequilíbrio na divisão de atribuições entre os parceiros no desenvolvimento e fabricação do avião sul-americano, o que levou a paralisação do programa.

Palavras-chave: Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano. Colaboração Internacional na Produção de Armamentos. América do Sul.  Indústria de Defesa. Defesa e Integração Regional.

The first issue of the 2020 Euro-Atlantic Focus begins, as usual, with an analysis of the state of play in the transatlantic relationship (supplemented by a number of graphs in the appendix). US domestic politics has been in turmoil following the impeachment of President Trump. The European countries have been horrified by the possibility that tensions between the US and Iran reach a point of no return and trigger an uncontrollable escalation. In the first essay of this Focus, Karolina Muti carries out an analysis of the latest developments concerning the European Defence Fund (EDF). Muti expects a tough negotiation over the final amount of the EDF’s budget. For Italy, the EDF represents an opportunity to strengthen its military research capacity and generate economic benefits for small and medium enterprises. The second essay focuses on transatlantic climate diplomacy. Margherita Bianchi and Nicolò Sartori illustrate the challenges to US-European cooperation in the fight against global warming, due in particular to US President Trump’s lack of interest in the issue. Recently the EU has increasingly relied on cooperation with sub-federal public authorities – states and even municipalities (as well as private actors). In the third essay, Ettore Greco delves into the transatlantic dimension of Brexit. Greco warns that EU and UK negotiators will soon face the almost impossible task of striking a new free trade agreement before the post-Brexit transition period ends in December 2020. The pressure from the US for the UK to ease regulations will make things even more complicated, as US demands are incompatible with EU rules.

Russia intends to increase its conventional military capability and correspondingly plans to increase its defence budget in both relative and absolute terms. If the Russian political and military leadership is successful in this ambition, the overall military capability of Russia could increase significantly as early as in 2020. The Armed Forces that emerge at the other end of this process will look radically different compared to the military that Russia sent to war in Georgia in 2008. Russia has started to abandon an army based on mobilisation in favour of a military organisation that is smaller but better able to respond quickly to the military challenges that Russia might expect. Russia's development of its military capability will, however, not be dependent only on the military reform process and goals set by the military leadership. Economic, political, demographic and industry-related factors will decide how quickly and how successfully Russia can push forward towards creating a stronger and more modern military.

There is an increasing demand for the EU to become a ‘Security Provider’. This demand comes from Europe’s best ally, namely the U.S., but also from Member States themselves. For the first time ever the defence solidarity clause of article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union was invoked in November 2015. Ultimately the demand to put ‘more defence in the Union’ comes from European citizens who wonder why Europe does not protect them in the current turmoil. From the answer to this question depends not only Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’, but possibly the future of the whole European project.
Several steps have already been initiated to answer the call for more defence in Europe. Since the beginning of his mandate, President Juncker has declared defence a ‘priority’, called for the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and reiterated the long term vision of a ’European army’. In June 2016, a ‘global strategy’ will be issued and a Commission Defence Action Plan should follow by the end of 2016. A ‘Pilot Project’, adopted by the European Parliament in autumn 2014, has been launched and should open the path to a ‘Preparatory Action on Defence Research’ that may be voted in 2016 for the 2017- 2020 budgets.

A natural underpinning of those efforts should be the undertaking of a full-fledged Union programme in defence research. The size, the shape and the steps to be taken towards setting it up are the subject of the present report.

In September 2021, Australia’s Prime Minster startled almost everyone by declaring the replacement submarine for the nation’s COLLINS class boats would now be nuclear-powered. The United States and United Kingdom had just agreed to share nuclear propulsion technology with Australia to allow eight nuclear-powered submarines to be acquired. Moreover, these would be built in Australia with the first boat delivered by 2040. [Please click here to read the full “Australia’s nuclear submarine surprise (https://msd-mag.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/MSD_5_2021.pdf)” article published in Maritime Security and Defence December 2021 issue (pp 7-12).]

For decades, successive Philippine administrations have attempted to spur the growth of Philippine defense industries to achieve self-reliance in defense equipment, only to be stifled by various issues affecting the entire defense enterprise. The lack of political will, limited financial resources, technological deficiencies and tedious bureaucracy were identified in the available literature as the underlying reasons why previous attempts to develop the Philippine defense industries have not advanced. There is also a dearth of studies examining such a topic from a political-economy and macro-economic lens. This paper seeks to fill in such a research gap. This paper is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of the global defense industrial market, its structure, and recent developments. The second section will elucidate the previous and current Philippine efforts to create a defense industry. The third section will tackle the issues and challenges hounding the Philippine defense industrial development, namely, a stagnant domestic demand, gaps in Philippine understanding of defense economics regarding complex weapons, and an overreliance on real estate-based and private sector-driven solutions. The last section will consider the prospects for growth and identify some policy recommendations toward crafting a more coherent defense industrial policy and strategy.