Washington
D.C., November 24, 2006 - On November
25, 1986, the biggest political and constitutional scandal since
Watergate exploded in Washington when President Ronald Reagan
told a packed White House news conference that funds derived
from covert arms deals with the Islamic Republic of Iran had
been diverted to buy weapons for the U.S.-backed Contra rebels
in Nicaragua.
In the weeks leading up to this shocking admission, news reports
had exposed the U.S. role in both the Iran deals and the secret
support for the Contras, but Reagan's announcement, in which
he named two subordinates -- National Security Advisor John
M. Poindexter and NSC staffer Oliver L. North -- as the responsible
parties, was the first to link the two operations.
The scandal was almost the undoing of the Teflon President.
Of all the revelations that emerged, the most galling for the
American public was the president's abandonment of the long-standing
policy against dealing with terrorists, which Reagan repeatedly
denied doing in spite of overwhelming evidence that made it
appear he was simply lying to cover up the story.
Despite the damage to his image, the president arguably got
off easy, escaping the ultimate political sanction of impeachment.
From what is now known from documents and testimony -- but perhaps
not widely appreciated -- while Reagan may not have known about
the diversion or certain other details of the operations being
carried out in his name, he directed that both support for the
Contras (whom he ordered to be kept together "body and
soul") and the arms-for-hostages deals go forward, and
was at least privy to other actions that were no less significant.
In this connection, it is worth noting that Poindexter, although
he refused to implicate Reagan by testifying that he had told
him about the diversion, declared that if he had informed the
president he was sure Reagan would have approved. Reagan's success
in avoiding a harsher political penalty was due to a great extent
to Poindexter's testimony (which left many observers deeply
skeptical about its plausibility). But it was also due in large
part to a tactic developed mainly by Attorney General Edwin
Meese, which was to keep congressional and public attention
tightly focused on the diversion. By spotlighting that single
episode, which they felt sure Reagan could credibly deny, his
aides managed to minimize public scrutiny of the president's
other questionable actions, some of which even he understood
might be illegal.
Twenty years later, the Iran-Contra affair continues to resonate
on many levels, especially as Washington gears up for a new
season of political inquiry with the pending inauguration of
the 110th Congress and the seeming inevitability of hearings
into a range of Bush administration policies.
For at its heart Iran-Contra was a battle over presidential
power dating back directly to the Richard Nixon era of Watergate,
Vietnam and CIA dirty tricks. That clash continues under the
presidency of George W. Bush, which has come under frequent
fire for the controversial efforts of the president, as well
as Vice President Richard Cheney, to expand Executive Branch
authority over numerous areas of public life.
Iran-Contra also echoes in the re-emergence of several prominent
public figures who played a part in, or were touched by, the
scandal. The most recent is Robert M. Gates, President Bush's
nominee to replace Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense (see
below and the documents
in this compilation for more on Gates' role).
This sampling of some of the most revealing documentation (Note
1) to come out of the affair gives a clear indication of
how deeply involved the president was in terms of personally
directing or approving different aspects of the affair. The
list of other officials who also played significant parts, despite
their later denials, includes Vice President George H.W. Bush,
Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger, CIA Director William J. Casey, White House Chief
of Staff Donald T. Regan, and numerous other senior and mid-level
officials, making this a far broader scandal than the White
House portrayed it at the time.
In that connection, what follows is a partial list of some
of the more prominent individuals who were either directly a
part of the Iran-Contra events or figured in some other way
during the affair or its aftermath:
- Elliott Abrams - currently deputy assistant
to President Bush and deputy national security advisor for
global democracy strategy, Abrams was one of the Reagan administration's
most controversial figures as the senior State Department
official for Latin America in the mid-1980s. He entered into
a plea bargain in federal court after being indicted for providing
false testimony about his fund-raising activities on behalf
of the Contras, although he later accused the independent
counsel's office of forcing him to accept guilt on two counts.
President George H. W. Bush later pardoned him.
- David Addington - now Vice President Cheney's
chief of staff, and by numerous press accounts a stanch advocate
of expanded presidential power, Addington was a congressional
staffer during the joint select committee hearings in 1986
who worked closely with Cheney.
- John Bolton - the controversial U.N. ambassador
whose recess appointment by President Bush is now in jeopardy
was a senior Justice Department official who participated
in meetings with Attorney General Edwin Meese on how to handle
the burgeoning Iran-Contra political and legal scandal in
late November 1986. There is little indication of his precise
role at the time.
- Richard Cheney - now the vice president,
he played a prominent part as a member of the joint congressional
Iran-Contra inquiry of 1986, taking the position that Congress
deserved major blame for asserting itself unjustifiably onto
presidential turf. He later pointed to the committees' Minority
Report as an important statement on the proper roles of the
Executive and Legislative branches of government.
- Robert M. Gates - President Bush's nominee
to succeed Donald Rumsfeld, Gates nearly saw his career go
up in flames over charges that he knew more about Iran-Contra
while it was underway than he admitted once the scandal broke.
He was forced to give up his bid to head the CIA in early
1987 because of suspicions about his role but managed to attain
the position when he was re-nominated in 1991. (See
previous Electronic Briefing Book)
- Manuchehr Ghorbanifar - the quintessential
middleman, who helped broker the arms deals involving the
United States, Israel and Iran ostensibly to bring about the
release of American hostages being held in Lebanon, Ghorbanifar
was almost universally discredited for misrepresenting all
sides' goals and interests. Even before the Iran deals got
underway, the CIA had ruled Ghorbanifar off-limits for purveying
bad information to U.S. intelligence. Yet, in 2006 his name
has resurfaced as an important source for the Pentagon on
current Iranian affairs, again over CIA objections.
- Michael Ledeen - a neo-conservative who
is vocal on the subject of regime change in Iran, Ledeen helped
bring together the main players in what developed into the
Iran arms-for-hostages deals in 1985 before being relegated
to a bit part. He reportedly reprised his role shortly after
9/11, introducing Ghorbanifar to Pentagon officials interested
in exploring contacts inside Iran.
- Edwin Meese - currently a member of the
blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group headed by James Baker and Lee
Hamilton, he was Ronald Reagan's controversial attorney general
who spearheaded an internal administration probe into the
Iran-Contra connection in November 1986 that was widely criticized
as a political exercise in protecting the president rather
than a genuine inquiry by the nation's top law enforcement
officer.
- John Negroponte - the career diplomat who
worked quietly to boost the U.S. military and intelligence
presence in Central America as ambassador to Honduras, he
also participated in efforts to get the Honduran government
to support the Contras after Congress banned direct U.S. aid
to the rebels. Negroponte's profile has risen spectacularly
with his appointments as ambassador to Iraq in 2004 and director
of national intelligence in 2005. (See
previous Electronic Briefing Book)
- Oliver L. North - now a radio talk show
host and columnist, he was at the center of the Iran-Contra
spotlight as the point man for both covert activities. A Marine
serving on the NSC staff, he steadfastly maintained that he
received high-level approval for everything he did, and that
"the diversion was a diversion." He was found guilty
on three counts at a criminal trial but had those verdicts
overturned on the grounds that his protected congressional
testimony might have influenced his trial. He ran unsuccessfully
for the U.S. Senate from Virginia in 1996. (See
previous Electronic Briefing Book)
- Daniel Ortega - the newly elected president
of Nicaragua was the principal target of several years of
covert warfare by the United States in the 1980s as the leader
of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front. His democratic
election in November 2006 was not the only irony -- it's been
suggested by one of Oliver North's former colleagues in the
Reagan administration that North's public statements in Nicaragua
in late October 2006 may have taken votes away from the candidate
preferred by the Bush administration and thus helped Ortega
at the polls.
- John Poindexter - who found a niche deep
in the U.S. government's post-9/11 security bureaucracy as
head of the Pentagon's Total Information Awareness program
(formally disbanded by Congress in 2003), was Oliver North's
superior during the Iran-Contra period and personally approved
or directed many of his activities. His assertion that he
never told President Reagan about the diversion of Iranian
funds to the Contras ensured Reagan would not face impeachment.
- Otto Reich - President George W. Bush's
one-time assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Reich
ran a covert public diplomacy operation designed to build
support for Ronald Reagan's Contra policies. A U.S. comptroller-general
investigation concluded the program amounted to "prohibited,
covert propaganda activities," although no charges were
ever filed against him. Reich paid a price in terms of congressional
opposition to his nomination to run Latin America policy,
resulting in a recess appointment in 2002 that lasted less
than a year. (See previous
Electronic Briefing Book)
Documents
Note:
The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
THE
CONTRAS
Document
1: White House, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations
in Nicaragua (with
attached Scope Note), SECRET, September 19, 1983
On December 1, 1981, President Reagan signed an initial, one-paragraph
"Finding" authorizing the CIA's paramilitary war against
Nicaragua. A signed Finding confirms that the president has
personally authorized a covert action, "finding" it
to be in the national security interests of the United States.
In this second Finding on covert action in Nicaragua, Reagan
responds to mounting political pressure from Congress to halt
U.S. efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government. This document
defines CIA support for the Contras as a broad "interdiction"
operation, rather than an explicit counter-revolution. The language,
however, is deliberately vague enough to justify violent actions
by the Contras and the CIA and to enable the CIA to work with
other nations such as Honduras in the effort to undermine the
Nicaraguan government.
Document
2: NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject:
Central America," SECRET, June 25, 1984
At a pivotal meeting of the highest officials in the Reagan
Administration, the President and Vice President and their top
aides discuss how to sustain the Contra war in the face of mounting
Congressional opposition. The discussion focuses on asking third
countries to fund and maintain the effort, circumventing Congressional
power to curtail the CIA's paramilitary operations. In a remarkable
passage, Secretary of State George P. Shultz warns the president
that White House adviser James Baker has said that "if
we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an
impeachable offense." But Vice President George Bush argues
the contrary: "How can anyone object to the US encouraging
third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas…?
The only problem that might come up is if the United States
were to promise to give these third parties something in return
so that some people could interpret this as some kind of exchange."
Later, Bush participated in arranging a quid pro quo
deal with Honduras in which the U.S. did provide substantial
overt and covert aid to the Honduran military in return for
Honduran support of the Contra war effort.
Document
3: CIA, Memorandum from DDI Robert M. Gates to DCI William
J. Casey, "Nicaragua," SECRET, December 14, 1984
In a "straight talk" memorandum to Casey, Robert
Gates concedes that the CIA's paramilitary force, the Contras,
cannot overthrow the Sandinista government. Invoking the Monroe
Doctrine and the U.S. loss in Vietnam, Gates argues that the
CIA-run Contra war is "an essentially half-hearted policy."
He recommends that the Reagan administration initiate a "comprehensive
campaign openly aimed at bringing down the regime," including
"the use of air strikes" against Nicaraguan military
targets. "The fact is that the Western Hemisphere is the
sphere of influence of the United States," Gates advises.
"If we have decided totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine
… then we ought to save political capital in Washington,
acknowledge our helplessness and stop wasting everybody's time."
Document
4: NSC, Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane,
"Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," TOP
SECRET, March 16, 1985 (with
version altered by North in November 1986)
In a comprehensive memo to National Security Advisor Robert
C. McFarlane, Oliver North describes a plan to sustain the Contra
war if Congress refuses to vote more funds. The plan calls for
approaching key donor nations, such as Saudi Arabia, for more
funds and having Honduras play a key support role. A year later,
when Congress began to investigate illegal Contra support operations,
North attempted to cover up these activities by drafting altered
versions of certain memos, including this one, for Congressional
investigators.
Document
5: NSC, Memorandum from Robert C. McFarlane to the President,
"Recommended Telephone Call," SECRET, April 25, 1985
To convince the Honduran government to not to shut down Contra
bases in Honduras after Congress refused further appropriations,
Robert McFarlane had President Reagan personally call President
Roberto Suazo Cordova. "It is imperative … that you
make clear the Executive Branch's political commitment to maintaining
pressure on the Sandinistas, regardless of what action Congress
takes," McFarlane advises in this briefing paper for the
call. At the end of the call Reagan added some notes at the
end of the document indicating that Suazo "pledged we must
continue to support the friends in Nicaragua."
Documents
6 a-c: Documents relating to Robert Gates' awareness of North's
Contra Activities:
Document
6a: NSC, Memorandum from Vincent M. Cannistraro to John
M. Poindexter, "Agenda for Your Weekly Meeting with the
DCI, Thursday, May 15, 1986," TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE, May
14, 1986
Document
6b: NSC, PROFS Note, Oliver L. North to John M. Poindexter,
"Private Blank Check," July 24, 1986
Document
6c: NSC, PROFS Note, John M. Poindexter to Oliver L. North
, "Private Blank Check," July 24, 1986
Robert Gates faced intense investigative scrutiny in the aftermath
of Iran-Contra over his knowledge of, and forthrightness about,
North's role in the Contra resupply effort. Gates has maintained
that he was unaware of the NSC aide's operational activities
in support of the rebels. However, two of his former colleagues
believe that he was aware, according to the Iran-Contra independent
counsel's final report, which notes several pieces of evidence
that appear to support that conclusion. Among them are these
three documents, which relate to North's campaign to get the
CIA to buy various assets his "Enterprise" had acquired
in the course of working with the Contras.
The first document, from Vincent Cannistraro, a career CIA
official then on the NSC staff, specifically mentions "Ollie's
ship," a vessel North and his associates used to ferry
arms to the rebels, and indicates the subject will come up at
Poindexter's next meeting with CIA Director Casey and DDCI Gates.
Cannistraro later concluded from the discussion that followed
that Gates was aware of the ship's use in the resupply operations
and of North's connection to it.
The second and third documents are e-mails between North and
Poindexter. In his note, North says it appears the NSC (and
possibly Poindexter himself) has instructed the CIA not to buy
"Project Democracy's" assets. Poindexter's response,
which is difficult to read, states: "I did not give Casey
any such guidance. I did tell Gates that I thought the private
effort should be phased out. Please talk to Casey about this.
I agree with you."
Document
7: NSC, Diagram of "Enterprise" for Contra Support,
July 1986
Oliver North sketched this organizational flow chart of the
private sector entities that he had organized to provide ongoing
support for the Contra war, after Congress terminated official
assistance. The diagram identifies the complex covert "off-the-shelf"
resource management, financial accounting, and armaments and
paramilitary operational structures that the NSC created to
illicitly sustain the Contra campaign in Nicaragua.
Document
8: U.S. Embassy Brunei, Cables, "Brunei Project,"
SECRET, August 2, 1986 & September
16, 1986
In preparation for a secret mission by an emissary -- Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin America Elliott Abrams - to seek
secret funds for the Contra war from the Sultan of Brunei, the
U.S. Ambassador in Brunei sent a cable stating that a meeting
time had been organized during the Sultan's upcoming trip to
London. Abrams used the alias "Mr. Kenilworth" in
his meetings, and arranged for the Sultan to secretly transfer
$10 million into a bank account controlled by Oliver North.
"I said that we deeply appreciate his understanding our
needs and his valuable assistance," Abrams cabled on September
16th, after the secret meeting. (The Sultan was given a private
tour of the USS Vinson as a token of appreciation.)
The funds were lost, however, because the account number Abrams
provided was incorrect. Eventually Abrams was forced to plead
guilty to charges of misleading Congress after testimony such
as: "We're not, you know, we're not in the fund-raising
business."
Document
9: NSC, Diaries, North Notebook Entries on Manuel Noriega,
August 24 & September
22, 1986
In one of the most controversial efforts to enlist third country
support for the Contra war, Oliver North arranged to meet Panamanian
dictator Manuel Noriega in a London hotel in September 1986.
In return for ending U.S. pressure on Panama for Noriega's drug
smuggling operations and helping to "clean up" his
image, Noriega proposed to engage in efforts to assassinate
the Sandinista leadership. With authorization from National
Security Advisor John Poindexter, North met with Noriega in
a London hotel on September 22 and discussed how Panama could
help with sophisticated sabotage operations against Nicaraguan
targets, including the airport, oil refinery and port facilities.
According to notes taken by North at the meeting, they also
discussed setting up training camps in Panama for Contra operatives.
Document
10: CIA, Memorandum for the record from Robert M. Gates,
"Lunch with Ollie North," TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY, October
10, 1986
Robert Gates faced additional criticism for attempting to avoid
hearing about the Iran and Contra operations as they were unfolding,
instead of taking a more active role in stopping them. As Gates
testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee in October 1986,
his approach was to keep the agency's distance from the so-called
private Contra resupply operation. "... [W]e have, I think,
conscientiously tried to avoid knowing what is going on in terms
of any of this private funding ... we will say I don't want
to hear anything about it." In this memo for the record,
Gates, clearly continuing to protect the CIA, relates that North
told him the "CIA is completely clean" on the private
resupply matter. The independent counsel's report later commented
that "Gates recorded North's purportedly exculpatory statement
uncritically, even though he was by then clearly aware of the
possible diversion of U.S. funds through the 'private benefactors.'"
Document
11: Independent Counsel, Court Record, "U.S. Government
Stipulation on Quid Pro Quos with Other Governments as Part
of Contra Operation," April 6, 1989
The most secret part of the Iran-Contra operations were the
quid pro quo arrangements the White House made with
countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Saudi Arabia,
Israel and other governments who were enlisted to support the
Contra war. As part of his defense, Oliver North attempted to
"grey mail" the U.S. government by insisting that
all top secret documents on the quid pro quos should
be declassified for trial. Instead, the government agreed to
the "stipulation" - a summary of the evidence in the
documents -- presented here.
This comprehensive synopsis reveals the approaches to, and
arrangements with, numerous other governments made by the CIA
and NSC in an effort to acquire funding, arms, logistics and
strategic support for the Contra war. The effort ranged from
CIA acquisitions of PLO arms seized by Israel, to Oliver North's
secret effort to trade favors with Panamanian dictator Manuel
Noriega. In the case of Saudi Arabia, President Reagan personally
urged King Fahd to replace funds cut by the U.S. Congress. In
the end, the Saudis contributed $32 million dollars to finance
the Contra war campaign.
IRAN
ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES
Document
12: CIA, Memorandum, "Subject: Fabricator Notice -
Manuchehr ((Gorbanifar))," SECRET, July 25, 1984
One of the key figures in the disastrous arms-for-hostages
deals with Iran was weapons broker Manuchehr Ghorbanifar. Despite
the CIA's dismissal of him as a "fabricator," by 1985
Ghorbanifar managed to persuade senior officials in three governments
-- the United States, Iran and Israel -- to utilize him as their
middleman. The parallels with Iraq in 2003 are apparent: American
officials (in this case) lacking a fundamental understanding
of, information about, or contacts in the country in question
allowed themselves to rely on individuals whose motives and
qualifications required far greater scrutiny. Ironically, press
reports featuring interviews with former officials indicate
that Ghorbanifar has met with Pentagon representatives interested
in his take on current Iranian politics. (See also the reference
to Ghorbanifar in the Introduction to this briefing book.)
Document
13: CIA, Draft Presidential Finding, "Scope: Hostage
Rescue - Middle East," (with cover note from William J.
Casey), November 26, 1985
Of the six covert transactions with Iran in 1985-1986, the
most controversial was a shipment of 18 HAWK (Homing-All-the-Way-Killer)
anti-aircraft missiles in November 1985. Not only did the delivery
run afoul -- for which the American operatives blamed their
Israeli counterparts -- but it took place without the required
written presidential authorization. The CIA drafted this document
only after Deputy Director John McMahon discovered that one
had not been prepared prior to the shipment. It was considered
so sensitive that once Reagan signed off retroactively on December
5, John Poindexter kept it in his office safe until the scandal
erupted a year later -- then tore it up, as he acknowledged,
in order to spare the president "political embarrassment."
The version presented here is a draft of the one Poindexter
destroyed.
Document
14: Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985
The disastrous November HAWK shipment prompted U.S. officials
to take direct control of the arms deals with Iran. Until then,
Israel had been responsible for making the deliveries, for which
the U.S. agreed to replenish their stocks of American weapons.
Before making this important decision, President Reagan convened
an extraordinary meeting of several top advisers in the White
House family quarters on December 7, 1985, to discuss the issue.
Among those attending were Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary
of Defense Weinberger. Both men objected vehemently to the idea
of shipping arms to Iran, which the U.S. had declared a sponsor
of international terrorism. But in this remarkable set of notes,
Weinberger captures the president's determination to move ahead
regardless of the obstacles, legal or otherwise: "President
sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer
charge that 'big strong President Reagan passed up chance to
free hostages.'"
Document
15: White House, John M. Poindexter Memorandum to President
Reagan, "Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran," (with
attached presidential finding), January 17, 1986
While the Finding Reagan signed retroactively to cover the
November 1985 HAWK shipment was destroyed, this Finding and
cover memo from which Reagan received a briefing on the status
of the Iran operation survived intact. It reflects the president's
personal authorization for direct U.S. arms sales to Iran, a
directive that remained in force until the arms deals were exposed
in November 1986.
Document
16: NSC, Oliver L. North Memorandum, "Release of American
Hostages in Beirut," (so-called "Diversion Memo"),
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE, April 4, 1986
At the center of the public's perception of the scandal was
the revelation that the two previously unconnected covert activities
-- trading arms for hostages with Iran and backing the Nicaraguan
Contras against congressional prohibitions -- had become joined.
This memo from Oliver North is the main piece of evidence to
survive which spells out the plan to use "residuals"
from the arms deals to fund the rebels. Justice Department investigators
discovered it in North's NSC files in late November 1986. For
unknown reasons it escaped North's notorious document "shredding
party" which took place after the scandal became public.
Document
17: White House, Draft National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD), "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," TOP SECRET, (with
cover memo from Robert C. McFarlane to George P. Shultz and
Caspar W. Weinberger), June 17, 1985
The secret deals with Iran were mainly aimed at freeing American
hostages who were being held in Lebanon by forces linked to
the Tehran regime. But there was another, subsidiary motivation
on the part of some officials, which was to press for renewed
ties with the Islamic Republic. One of the proponents of this
controversial idea was National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane,
who eventually took the lead on the U.S. side in the arms-for-hostages
deals until his resignation in December 1985. This draft of
a National Security Decision Directive, prepared at his behest
by NSC and CIA staff, puts forward the argument for developing
ties with Iran based on the traditional Cold War concern that
isolating the Khomeini regime could open the way for Moscow
to assert its influence in a strategically vital part of the
world. To counter that possibility, the document proposes allowing
limited amounts of arms to be supplied to the Iranians. The
idea did not get far, as the next document testifies.
Document
18: Defense Department, Handwritten Notes, Caspar W. Weinberger
Reaction to Draft NSDD on Iran (with attached note and transcription
by Colin Powell), June 18, 1985
While CIA Director William J. Casey, for one, supported McFarlane's
idea of reaching out to Iran through limited supplies of arms,
among other approaches, President Reagan's two senior foreign
policy advisers strongly opposed the notion. In this scrawled
note to his military assistant, Colin Powell, Weinberger belittles
the proposal as "almost too absurd to comment on ... It's
like asking Qadhafi to Washington for a cozy chat." Richard
Armitage, who is mentioned in Powell's note to his boss, was
an assistant secretary of defense at the time and later became
deputy secretary of state under Powell.
Document
19: George H. W. Bush Diary, November 4-5, 1986
Then-Vice President George H.W. Bush became entangled in controversy
over his knowledge of Iran-Contra. Although he asserted publicly
that he was "out of the loop -- no operational role,"
he was well informed of events, particularly the Iran deals,
as evidenced in part by this diary excerpt just after the Iran
operation was exposed: "I'm one of the few people that
know fully the details ..." The problem for Bush was greatly
magnified because he was preparing to run for president just
as the scandal burst. He managed to escape significant blame
-- ultimately winning the 1988 election -- but he came under
fire later for repeatedly failing to disclose the existence
of his diary to investigators and then for pardoning several
Iran-Contra figures, including former Defense Secretary Weinberger
just days before his trial was set to begin. As a result of
the pardons, the independent counsel's final report pointedly
noted: "The criminal investigation of Bush was regrettably
incomplete."
Document
20: Caspar W. Weinberger Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting
... with the President ... in the Oval Office," November
10, 1986
This memo is one of several documents relating to the Reagan
administration's attempts to produce a unified response to the
growing scandal. The session Weinberger memorializes here was
the first that included all the relevant senior officials and
it is notable as much for what it omits as for what it describes.
For example, there is no mention of the most damaging episode
of the Iran initiative -- the November 1985 HAWK missile shipment
-- and the absence of an advance presidential finding to make
it legal. This issue was at the center of administration political
concerns since it, along with the matter of the "diversion,"
were the most likely to raise the prospect of impeachment.
Note
1. For more complete collections of primary documents, see
Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, The
Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, (New
York: The New Press, 1993), and the National Security Archive's
major microfiche set, The
Iran-Contra Affair: The Making of a Scandal, 1983-1988 (Alexandria,
VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1989), now available on-line as part of
the "Digital
National Security Archive" through ProQuest Information
and Learning.
