Internet-Draft | Client ID Scheme | November 2024 |
Parecki, et al. | Expires 10 May 2025 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- Web Authorization Protocol
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-scheme-00
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Informational
- Expires:
OAuth 2.0 Client ID Scheme
Abstract
This specification defines the concept of a Client Identifier Scheme to enable Authorization Servers and Clients to use more than one mechanism to obtain and validate Client metadata.¶
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://drafts.aaronpk.com/oauth-client-id-scheme/draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-scheme.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-scheme/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:[email protected]), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/aaronpk/oauth-client-id-scheme.¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 May 2025.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
1. Introduction
A Client Identifier is used by an OAuth 2.0 Client to identify itself to an Authorization Server. The Client Identifier is used in the Authorization Request and various other places throughout OAuth flows. In ecosystems where more than one method of obtaining and validating Client metadata is used, it is necessary to indicate unambiguously which method is used. This specification defines a structure for Client Identifiers that includes a prefix indicating the Client Identifier Scheme.¶
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
3. Client Identifier Scheme
This specification defines the concept of a Client Identifier Scheme that indicates how an Authorization Server is supposed to interpret the Client Identifier and associated data in the process of Client identification, authentication, and authorization. The Client Identifier Scheme enables deployments of this specification to use different mechanisms to obtain and validate metadata of the Client beyond the scope of [RFC6749].¶
The Client Identifier Scheme is a string that MAY be communicated by the Client in a prefix within the client_id
parameter in the Authorization Request. A fallback to pre-registered Clients as in [RFC6749] remains in place as a default mechanism in case no Client Identifier Scheme was provided. A certain Client Identifier Scheme may require the Client to sign the Authorization Request as means of authentication and/or pass additional parameters and require the Authorization Server to process them.¶
3.1. Syntax
In the client_id
Authorization Request parameter and other places where the Client Identifier is used, the Client Identifier Schemes are prefixed to the usual Client Identifier, separated by a :
(colon) character:¶
<client_id_scheme>:<orig_client_id>¶
Here, <client_id_scheme>
is the Client Identifier Scheme and <orig_client_id>
is an identifier for the Client within the namespace of that scheme. See Section 3.4 for Client Identifier Schemes defined by this specification.¶
Authorization Servers MUST use the presence of a :
(colon) character to determine whether a Client Identifier Scheme is used. If a :
character is present, the Authorization Server MUST interpret the Client Identifier according to the Client Identifier Scheme, here defined as the string before the (first) :
character. If the Authorization Server does not support the Client Identifier Scheme, the Authorization Server MUST refuse the request.¶
For example, an Authorization Request might contain client_id=client_attestation:example-client
to indicate that the client_attestation
Client Identifier Scheme is to be used and that within this scheme, the Client can be identified by the string example-client
. The presentation would contain the full client_attestation:example-client
string as the audience (intended receiver) and the same full string would be used as the Client Identifier anywhere in the OAuth flow.¶
Note that the Client needs to determine which Client Identifier Schemes the Authorization Server supports prior to sending the Authorization Request in order to choose a supported scheme.¶
3.2. Pre-Registered Clients
If a :
character is not present in the Client Identifier, the Authorization Server MUST treat the Client Identifier as referencing a pre-registered client. This is equivalent to the [RFC6749] default behavior, i.e., the Client Identifier needs to be known to the Authorization Server in advance of the Authorization Request. The Client metadata is pre-registered using [RFC7591] or through out-of-band mechanisms.¶
For example, if an Authorization Request contains client_id=example-client
, the Authorization Server would interprete the Client Identifier as referring to a pre-registered client.¶
From this definition, it follows that pre-registered clients MUST NOT contain a :
character in their Client Identifier.¶
3.3. Pre-Existing Ecosystems using https
Existing deployments that use https
URLs as client IDs and that have only one way to resolve client metadata from the URL, MAY use full https URL as the client ID. If there is only one way to resolve client metadata then there is no ambiguity.¶
For example, an authorization server using only the Client ID Metadata Document [I-D.draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-metadata-document] method to retrieve client metadata MAY accept client IDs such as:¶
https://client.example.com/metadata.json¶
This results in this non-normative example of an authorization request:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=code &client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fmetadata.json &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcallback &code_challenge=GdE4nqBrwRxQfN2Y8fq3rrYk_kkpwg6tQ74J94-2nHw &code_challenge_method=S256 &scope=write¶
3.4. Defined Client Identifier Schemes
This specification defines the following Client Identifier Schemes, followed by the examples where applicable:¶
-
redirect_uri
: This value indicates that the Client Identifier (without the prefixredirect_uri:
) is the Client's Redirect URI (or Response URI when Response Modedirect_post
is used). The Authorization Request MUST NOT be signed. The Client MAY omit theredirect_uri
Authorization Request parameter. Example Client Identifier:redirect_uri:https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
.¶ -
federation
: This value indicates that the Client Identifier is an Entity Identifier defined in OpenID Federation [OpenID.Federation]. Since the Entity Identifier is already defined to start withfederation:
, this Client Identifier Scheme MUST NOT be prefixed additionally. Processing rules given in [OpenID.Federation] MUST be followed. Automatic Registration as defined in [OpenID.Federation] MUST be used. The Authorization Request MAY also contain atrust_chain
parameter. The final Client metadata is obtained from the Trust Chain after applying the policies, according to [OpenID.Federation]. Example Client Identifier:federation:https://federation-client.example.com
.¶ -
did
: This value indicates that the Client Identifier is a DID defined in [DID-Core]. Since the DID URI is already defined to start withdid:
, this Client Identifier Scheme MUST NOT be prefixed additionally. The request MUST be signed with a private key associated with the DID. A public key to verify the signature MUST be obtained from theverificationMethod
property of a DID Document. Since DID Document may include multiple public keys, a particular public key used to sign the request in question MUST be identified by thekid
in the JOSE Header. To obtain the DID Document, the Authorization Server MUST use DID Resolution defined by the DID method used by the Client. Example Client Identifier:did:example:123#1
.¶ -
client_attestation
: This Client Identifier Scheme allows the Client to authenticate using a JWT that is bound to a certain public key as defined in (OpenID4VP: Client Attestation). When the Client Identifier Scheme isclient_attestation
, the Client Identifier MUST equal thesub
claim value in the Client attestation JWT. The request MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in thecnf
claim in the Client attestation JWT. This serves as proof of possesion of this key. The Client attestation JWT MUST be added to thejwt
JOSE Header of the request object (see (OpenID4VP: Client Attestation)). The Authorization Server MUST validate the signature on the Client attestation JWT. Theiss
claim value of the Client Attestation JWT MUST identify a party the Authorization Server trusts for issuing Client Attestation JWTs. If the Authorization Server cannot establish trust, it MUST refuse the request. If the issuer of the Client Attestation JWT adds aredirect_uris
claim to the attestation, the Authorization Server MUST ensure theredirect_uri
request parameter value exactly matches one of theredirect_uris
claim entries. Example Client Identifier:client_attestation:client.example
.¶ -
x509_san_dns
: When the Client Identifier Scheme isx509_san_dns
, the Client Identifier MUST be a DNS name and match adNSName
Subject Alternative Name (SAN) [RFC5280] entry in the leaf certificate passed with the request. The request MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the leaf X.509 certificate of the certificate chain added to the request in thex5c
JOSE header [RFC7515] of the signed request object. The Authorization Server MUST validate the signature and the trust chain of the X.509 certificate. If the Authorization Server can establish trust in the Client Identifier authenticated through the certificate, e.g. because the Client Identifier is contained in a list of trusted Client Identifiers, it may allow the client to freely choose theredirect_uri
value. If not, the FQDN of theredirect_uri
value MUST match the Client Identifier without the prefixx509_san_dns:
. Example Client Identifier:x509_san_dns:client.example.org
.¶ -
x509_san_uri
: When the Client Identifier Scheme isx509_san_uri
, the Client Identifier MUST be a URI and match auniformResourceIdentifier
Subject Alternative Name (SAN) [RFC5280] entry in the leaf certificate passed with the request. The request MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the leaf X.509 certificate of the certificate chain added to the request in thex5c
JOSE header [RFC7515] of the signed request object. The Authorization Server MUST validate the signature and the trust chain of the X.509 certificate. If the Authorization Server can establish trust in the Client Identifier authenticated through the certificate, e.g., because the Client Identifier is contained in a list of trusted Client Identifiers, it may allow the client to freely choose theredirect_uri
value. If not, theredirect_uri
value MUST match the Client Identifier without the prefixx509_san_uri:
. Example Client Identifier:x509_san_uri:https://client.example.org/cb
.¶ -
https
: This Client Identifier Scheme MUST NOT be registered.¶
4. Example
The following is a non-normative example of an authorization request with the redirect_uri
Client ID Scheme:¶
GET /authorize? response_type=code &client_id=redirect_uri:https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb &code_challenge=GdE4nqBrwRxQfN2Y8fq3rrYk_kkpwg6tQ74J94-2nHw &code_challenge_method=S256 &scope=write¶
5. Todo: Server Metadata
e.g., a client_id_schemes_supported
parameter in the Server Metadata and a client_id_scheme_default
parameter.¶
7. Security Considerations
7.1. Client Identifier Mixups
Confusing Clients using a Client Identifier Scheme with those using none can lead to attacks. Therefore, Authorization Servers MUST always use the full Client Identifier, including the prefix if provided, within the context of the Authorization Server or its responses to identify the client. This refers in particular to places where the Client Identifier is used in [RFC6749] as well as in any artifacts such as the aud
claim of JWT access tokens [RFC9068].¶
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.¶
9. References
9.1. Normative References
- [DID-Core]
- "DID Core", , <https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/>.
- [OpenID.Federation]
- Hedberg, R., Jones, M.B., Solberg, A.Å., Bradley, J., Marco, G. D., and V. Dzhuvinov, "OpenID Federation 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-federation-1_0.html>.
- [RFC2119]
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
- [RFC5280]
- Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
- [RFC6749]
- Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
- [RFC7515]
- Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
- [I-D.draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-metadata-document]
- Parecki, A. and E. Smith, "OAuth Client ID Metadata Document", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-parecki-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-01>.
- [OpenID]
- Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. de., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
- [RFC7591]
- Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7591>.
- [RFC9068]
- Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>.
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.¶