In a dramatic turn of events in Syria, December 2024 marked the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime after years of bloody conflict. As Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies advanced towards the capital, Damascus, the former president fled with his family to Russia, seeking asylum, leaving behind a legacy of victims, detainees, systemic corruption, and financial and administrative collapse. Upon entering Damascus, HTS forces announced the formation of a provisional government, aiming to establish a new governance model stretching from Idlib to the heart of Syria. This development signalled the beginning of a new chapter in the country’s turbulent history.
Accompanying this unexpected turn of events were significant shifts in HTS’ rhetoric. Its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, sought to project a more moderate image. He issued messages of reassurance to Syria’s minorities and pledged to include all segments of Syrian society in shaping the nation’s future. These gestures sparked widespread debate regarding the authenticity of this transformation, with many questioning whether it represented a genuine strategic shift or a calculated political maneuver to secure broader local and international acceptance.
These developments have intensified questions about HTS’ ability to transition from an armed organization into a political actor capable of governing an entire state. This shift brings renewed focus to HTS’ governance model in Idlib, examined here to assess its strategies for building authority, managing crises, and maintaining influence in a landscape beset by internal and regional challenges.
In northwestern Syria, particularly in Idlib, HTS has emerged as one of the most prominent Islamist groups, consolidating control and asserting significant influence over the region. Over recent years, HTS has bolstered its dominance both militarily and politically, establishing itself as the most powerful actor in the area. As the Syrian conflict reached a relative stalemate, HTS endeavored to develop civilian governance mechanisms through the “Salvation Government.” This initiative aimed to transform its control into a prototype of self-governance within a volatile environment marked by ongoing conflicts and external interventions.
Despite the limited scope of its governance in terms of geographic reach and timeframe, HTS’ experience raises fundamental questions about the capacity of Islamist armed groups to govern and maintain authority in the absence of stability. It also sparks broader discussions about whether this governance model could extend to all of Syria or inspire similar frameworks in other parts of the Arab world, particularly given the region’s political and security challenges. HTS has successfully maintained control over Idlib, but it faces continuous pressure from local rivals, as well as regional and international actors closely monitoring its actions. These pressures highlight the significant challenges that armed groups encounter when transitioning from opposition to governance, particularly in a complex environment like Syria.
Reorganization
Unlike ISIS, which enforced strict and repressive policies in the areas it controlled, HTS has adopted a more gradual and flexible approach to consolidating its authority. It has employed administrative tools to gain local legitimacy and incrementally expand its influence. Since establishing the “Salvation Government” in 2017, HTS has prioritized the reorganization of civil institutions and the management of essential sectors such as education, healthcare, municipalities, transportation, local markets, and security. This experience distinguishes itself from similar attempts by other Islamist groups through its relatively greater maturity. HTS has sought to balance its strict religious rhetoric with the practical needs of the local population, allowing it to adapt more effectively to the social environment it governs. HTS administration operates through a compact bureaucratic system, primarily managed by individuals affiliated with or loyal to the group. While the local community is granted limited participation in decision-making processes, access to critical decision-making positions remains restricted. This strategy solidifies HTS’s control while providing the community with a symbolic, albeit limited, sense of involvement.
A notable feature of HTS’s governance is its ability to integrate its military and civilian operations. While the group’s military leadership retains ultimate authority in Idlib, the establishment of a civilian government offers political and administrative legitimacy, reducing friction with the local population. Within this framework, HTS created a local police force, the “General Security Apparatus,” tasked with maintaining order and addressing violations. Despite its civilian facade, this apparatus is directly subordinate to HTS’s military leadership, ensuring organizational cohesion and centralized decision-making authority. In the judicial sphere, HTS reactivated Sharia courts, adopting a more flexible approach to implementing rulings compared to other Islamist groups. This strategy helped ease tensions with the local population, fostering relative stability in Idlib compared to other conflict zones across Syria. Logistics have proven critical in determining the success or failure of any governing authority in complex conflicts. In this area, HTS has demonstrated significant superiority over other Islamist groups. Despite the siege imposed by the Syrian regime and Russian forces on Idlib, HTS successfully established smuggling networks and operated trade crossings that connect the region with Turkey and other northern Syrian areas. These crossings, both official and unofficial, serve as key revenue streams, maintaining essential supply lines for food, medicine, and other vital goods, which has reinforced Idlib’s resilience under siege.
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Moreover, HTS developed an effective system for managing humanitarian aid from international organizations. The group often controls the distribution of aid to align with its political and military objectives. For example, HTS ensured the uninterrupted flow of essential goods through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, despite political pressures and the Syrian regime’s efforts to disrupt this flow by closing crossings between Idlib and other regions. This efficient management of resources and aid has bolstered HTS’s influence in the area and secured the continuity of its control on the ground. Despite its logistical successes, HTS faces profound economic challenges. Idlib suffers from limited natural resources and relies heavily on a parallel economy, smuggling, and external aid. HTS funds its operations primarily through taxes on traders and farmers, as well as fees collected at trade crossings. In some cases, it confiscates property or imposes fines on residents and traders who violate its regulations to supplement its financial resources. However, this economic model lacks the foundations for sustainable development, leaving the region highly vulnerable to severe economic crises should external support diminish or the siege tighten.
Idlib’s economy grapples with fundamental issues, chief among them the absence of developmental infrastructure and a near-total reliance on unstable resources such as smuggling and humanitarian aid.
Furthermore, HTS faces a critical challenge in its lack of international recognition, as it is designated a terrorist organization by several countries, including the United States, Turkey, and Russia. This classification presents a significant obstacle to attracting foreign investment or securing long-term developmental assistance. As a result, Idlib remains heavily dependent on humanitarian aid, further exacerbating its economic fragility and deepening the hardships faced by its local population. HTS employs a religious discourse focused on combating corruption, a narrative that resonates with many residents who have endured years of governance under corrupt regimes. The group has achieved some success in addressing specific forms of corruption, bolstering its image as a reform-oriented actor. However, it has not eliminated corruption entirely and faces persistent allegations of internal misconduct, particularly in resource management, aid distribution, and monopolizing lucrative economic sectors for the benefit of its leadership.
Israeli escalation
When comparing HTS’s experience with other Islamist groups, its approach stands out for combining flexibility with administrative discipline, enabling it to adapt more effectively to conflict environments. For example, Hamas in Gaza represents a more established model, administering the Gaza Strip for years through a government supported by substantial regional financial and political backing, far exceeding HTS’s resources. Similarly, Hezbollah in Lebanon has developed deep political expertise and extensive economic and social networks in southern Lebanon, solidifying its status as a powerful and influential regional actor. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, despite ascending to power, struggled with governance due to its lack of political and economic experience, leading to its rapid fall.
HTS’ experience in Idlib provides a relative example of how Islamist groups can manage conflict zones effectively. However, this model is shaped by unique circumstances, including ongoing conflict, a fragile economy, and international isolation. While HTS has managed to implement an administrative system that ensures a baseline level of stability in Idlib, the sustainability of this success heavily relies on the persistence of the conflict. HTS remains a component of the war dynamic in Syria rather than a developmental initiative focused on establishing enduring stability or a robust economic foundation.
Building on the aforementioned developments, as HTS consolidates its control over all Syrian territories previously held by the regime, the group faces significant challenges requiring fundamental shifts in its policies and political discourse. In the next phase, HTS must expand the scope of the “Salvation Government” into an inclusive national government, offering meaningful guarantees to minorities to foster social cohesion and enhance stability. However, the lack of international recognition remains the primary obstacle to HTS’s political and economic prospects. Overcoming this hurdle necessitates adopting a unified national discourse free from sectarian and religious divides, coupled with efforts to rebuild the economy and repair the war-ravaged infrastructure.
Additionally, HTS must address an escalating threat from Israeli incursions into Syrian territories, particularly in Daraa and Quneitra provinces. Reports suggest Israel controls 95% of Quneitra and has advanced into rural Daraa, posing substantial security and political challenges. These developments require bolstering border defenses and enhancing security capabilities to manage potential escalations. Politically, Israeli actions may further hinder HTS’s pursuit of international recognition, as the occupation could use these incursions to justify its continued control over the Golan Heights.
Economically, transitioning from dependence on smuggling and humanitarian aid to establishing a sustainable economy remains a pressing priority. The absence of international recognition continues to block foreign investment and the launch of long-term developmental initiatives. HTS must also extend robust community support to local populations impacted by Israeli incursions to sustain internal stability in border regions. The experiences of other groups, such as Hamas in Gaza and the Taliban in Afghanistan, offer valuable lessons for HTS. However, the group’s ongoing success depends on its capacity to adapt to both local and international dynamics while developing a governance model capable of delivering stability and development beyond the conditions of war and armed conflict.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
