Key Developments
The market in Belgium has been affected by EU sanctions developments in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Between June 2023 and June 2024, the EU published eight new sanctions packages impacting Russia alone. The 14th sanctions package targeting Russia was published on 24 June 2024. There are also EU sanctions developments in relation to the conflict in the Middle East.
The latest Russia package includes asset freeze measures targeting state actors, private companies, and individuals linked to Russia and Belarus. It also involves sectoral sanctions measures targeting critical sectors such as LNG and oil, significantly reducing Russian oil and gas exports via the EU. The authors also notice increased restrictions on technology and dual-use goods exports to hinder military and technological advancements.
Impact on European Companies
European companies are facing higher compliance costs, operational challenges, disrupted supply chains, and significant financial losses from operations in Russia and Belarus.
Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Sanctions Sector
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have an effect on the sanctions sector in Belgium, in the following ways.
Increased Use of Targeted Sanctions
Belgium supports sanctions adopted at the EU level. There is a significant shift towards more precise and focused sanctions targeting specific individuals, entities and sectors. This aims to reduce unintended humanitarian impact and adverse effects, while exerting maximum pressure on the designated targets.
Co-ordination With International Partners
The EU has increasingly aligned its sanctions efforts with international partners, particularly the USA, the UK, and other G7 nations. This enhanced co-ordination is designed to boost the effectiveness of sanctions and limit the scope for sanctions evasion.
Use of Sanctions for Human Rights Violations
Sanctions are being applied more frequently to combat human rights violations. The EU has utilised its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime – also known as the “EU Magnitsky Act” – to sanction individuals and entities responsible for severe human rights abuses.
Technological and Cyber Sanctions
In response to the growing cyber-threat landscape, the EU has introduced sanctions targeting cyber-attacks and the improper use of digital technologies. These measures are designed to deter both state and non-state actors from engaging in harmful cyber-activities.
With Belgium being the centre of the EU, its jurisdiction has numerous sectors strongly affected by sanctions regulations. These include:
Belgium was particularly affected by the financial sanctions, owing to the presence of world-leading securities depository Euroclear. The EU’s maximum oil price and ports ban affected the ports of the North Sea. The EU diamond ban affected the Antwerp diamond industry hub.
Belgium supports and implements UN- and G7-agreed sanctions, as well as EU autonomous designations. These include, broadly speaking:
As regards Russia, Belgium and the EU have implemented individual sanctions on natural and legal persons. Belgium has also implemented sectoral sanctions, such as trade restrictions on several types of transactions, as well as prohibitions of certain professional services. In addition, Belgium has reinforced its export control regulations on the export of dual-use goods or defence-related goods to Russia and Belarus.
Public authorities, financial institutions, corporations, and private individuals within this scope must apply EU sanctions.
Generally, EU sanctions apply broadly to all individuals or entities within the territory of the EU. They have a wide reach and also apply:
However, authorities in the EU take a view that EU regulations do not provide for extraterritorial reach. By way of example, the recent 14th Russia sanctions package provides for the responsibility of EU parent companies for activities of their subsidiaries in third countries.
Belgium predominantly implements sanctions that are adopted by the UN and by the EU. Some international sanctions are adopted by the United Nations Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. States must then enact the UN sanctions in their national law. Belgium has adopted a national law (Law of 11 May 1995 on the implementation of UN sanctions) providing for a legal basis in Belgian law to implement UN sanctions. Today, there are 14 ongoing UN sanctions regimes that are implemented by Belgium (eg, in respect of Yemen and South Sudan) and which focus on supporting political settlement of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism.
As an EU member state, Belgium also implements EU sanctions decisions and regulations adopted by the Council of the European Union in the context of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. EU Regulations containing economic restrictive measures are directly applicable without the need for a national transposition. Member states are empowered to carry out the enforcement of sanctions domestically. Belgium has adopted a Law of 13 May 2003 to provide for a legal basis in Belgian law to enforce EU sanctions and impose criminal penalties on violations.
Nevertheless, EU member states are not prevented from imposing additional sanctions measures against individuals. As such, for instance, Belgium has designated distinct individuals or entities in its national lists of asset freezes. Those designations and measures apply in addition to the EU regulations.
In Belgium, the key national competent authorities are the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Economy.
However, the competences for specific sanctions-related issues or licences are fragmented among several authorities – each with their own scopes of competences, listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Among others, these include:
Depending on the regions of Belgium in which the EU operator is active or the transaction takes place (Flemish Region, Brussels Capital Region, and Walloon Region), authorities may further vary and share competence.
Enforcement of sanctions regulations is shared between many different competent authorities within their respective competences. Each of those administrations monitors the enforcement of sanctions within its scope of competences, may impose licence conditions to ensure enforcement, and may actively detect violations. The federal ministry competent for the type of sanctions violation may impose an administrative penalty.
Additionally, sanctions violations are considered criminal offences. As such, they may be investigated and prosecuted through the ordinary criminal enforcement framework involving the police authorities, the public prosecutor’s office, and/or investigative judges.
Sanctions violations are a criminal offence under Belgian law. The legal basis of such penalties may be found in various laws adopted to ensure the implementation of UN and EU sanctions regimes in Belgium, such as:
The provisions of the Belgian Penal Code are generally applicable to these offences – meaning that one may be prosecuted as an accomplice to a sanctions violation for (unsuccessful) attempts to violate sanctions. Funds or assets considered to be illegal proceeds from sanctions violations may be confiscated, notwithstanding any imposed criminal penalties.
Infringements of EU sanctions are punishable by eight days’ to five years’ imprisonment and by a fine of EUR200 to EUR200,000. An administrative fine of EUR2,000 to EUR20 million may also be imposed.
It is important to note that the recent Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the harmonisation of definitions and penalties for sanctions violations has been adopted in April 2024 and must be transposed in the national legislation of all EU member states by 20 May 2025. This directive, once transposed, may significantly alter (and increase) criminal liability for sanctions violations.
The prosecution of sanctions violations in Belgium is subject to administrative procedures or judicial criminal procedures. There is no explicit national law framework for aggravating or mitigating circumstances for criminal liability of sanctions violations, other than the applicable EU regulatory framework.
Unlike the USA (and especially unlike the Office of Foreign Assets Controls), the EU does not have a clear framework for mitigating (nor aggravating) factors. It is up to each EU member state’s prosecution authority to decide whether one’s actions are sufficient to avoid or lessen the penalty. The EC provides general and situation-specific guidance for EU operators (eg, importance of internal compliance programmes, as well as performing adequate due diligence in respect of KYC/Know Your Transaction). In Belgium, as in most EU member states, the existence of a robust internal compliance programme could be an argument in favour of mitigating the liability of a company being prosecuted; however, there is no general rule guaranteeing reduction of the penalty.
In Belgium, the application of strict liability in the context of sanctions is less prominent than in some other jurisdictions, such as the UK. Belgian legislation and enforcement are more focused on specific cases of negligent or intentional violations of sanctions rules.
However, compliance with EU sanctions is mandatory. As such, any violation can lead to legal consequences, including fines and criminal prosecution.
The EU’s sanctions regulations provide for general and special licences/derogations as well. The exact grounds are provided in the respective sanctions regulations (eg, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014). In Belgium, the Ministry of Finance issues derogations where applicants meet the required circumstances.
In Belgium as well as in the EU, the provision of legal services to designated persons or entities is generally prohibited ‒ as are payments for such services from such persons and entities. Although there is no applicable general licence, EU regulations generally provide that national competent authorities may allow the release of funds or the making available of certain frozen funds or economic resources to or from designated persons for reasonable legal expenses.
Accordingly, a licence allowing the compensation of legal services is required on a case-by-case basis. However, note that – under EU sanctions against Russia – it is now prohibited to provide legal services to legal entities in Russia, as an exception from the general freedom of services applicable in Belgium.
Nonetheless, there is an exemption for services that are strictly necessary for the exercise of the right of defence in judicial proceedings and the right to an effective legal remedy under Article 5n (5) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Additionally, Article 5n (6) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 states that the prohibition shall not apply to the provision of services that are strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in an EU member state, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in an EU member state – provided that such provision of services is consistent with the objectives of this EU regulation and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.
Therefore, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 excludes certain specific services from that prohibition, such that those services are not covered by the prohibition in this EU regulation. Consequently, in principle, it is not necessary to obtain a licence to perform such services ‒ provided that they remain within the scope of those exemptions. In practice, however, obtaining a licence is advisable to facilitate the co-operation from intervening banks to receive payment for such services. As such, it is often advisable to seek regulatory licences for such services early on upon opening a client matter.
In Belgium, financial institutions must report immediately to the Ministry of Finance’s Treasury Department the persons or entities detected that are subject to asset freeze measures. The National Bank of Belgium recommends that this reporting be made by the AML Compliance Officer (AMLCO). In such case, the AMLCO provides the General Administration of the Treasury with all the information at its disposal in order to enable the Treasury to carry out the necessary verifications ‒ for example, a copy of the identity card or passport of the person concerned, as well as a reference to the regulation or decision that imposes the sanction and which includes the name of the person or entity that is subject to the sanction.
Besides the asset-freezing measure and its notification to the Ministry of Finance’s Treasury Department, it may also be necessary to make a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the authority in charge of AML ‒ namely, the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières/Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking, or CTIF-CFI).
Court Decisions
The Belgian courts generally adhere to the provisions of EU law and EU guidelines issued by the European Commission regarding the implementation and enforcement of EU restrictive measures and may refer preliminary references to the ECJ when in doubt on the proper interpretation of the provisions of EU restrictive measures.
Despite several projects to increase the publication and dissemination of Belgian court’s case-law, there is generally little publicly accessible case law on EU restrictive measures and export controls by the civil and administrative courts. As a general rule, disputes involving the impact of sanctions on a business transaction may be litigated before competent civil courts. Infringements are prosecuted before criminal courts, and decisions on licences issued by the national competent authorities, often either the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Finance, may be challenged at the highest administrative court (the Council of State).
Notable case law includes a widely reported conviction on appeal in 2020 of three Belgian companies and their directors for the export of large quantities of a chemical compound “isopropanol” between 2014-16 without having obtained the required export licences under the Syrian export controls regulation of 2012. In that case, two directors were ultimately convicted to partially effective prison sentences, fines and asset confiscations. The case is not published, but is reported to also have clarified that the competent authority to criminally prosecute export licence infringements remains the public prosecutor’s office and not the custom’s authority.
There is only limited case law publicly available from the Council of State on appeals against negative licence decisions to release frozen assets, due to a practice of the Belgian Ministry of Finance to exploit a procedural mechanism in the appeal process which removes cases from the purview of the Council of State before it has an opportunity to review the appeal grounds.
Recent reports indicate that the Belgian Ministry of Finance appears to systematically exercise the option to retroactively "retract" decisions against which an appeal before the Council of State is filed. Consequently, the appeal procedure becomes "without object" and the Council of State must end the procedure without substantive review of the appeal grounds against the contested decision. Once the Ministry retracts such a decision, it should in principle render a new decision as if it were in the condition applicable at the time of making the original decision. However, the practice seems to be that the Ministry does not make a new decision unless it is forced to do so by a specific procedure, at which stage it may again retract that new decision if that decision is appealed against, such that its decisions are de facto never subjected to the jurisdictional review of the Council of State.
It is therefore to advised to carefully consider with an experienced counsel whether this practice will still impact a case at the time of appeal, and whether other procedural options are available to trigger effective jurisdictional review against unfavourable licence decisions to release frozen assets issued by the Belgian Ministry of Finance.
Legal Developments
EU regulation on the treatment of frozen assets is of particular importance to Belgian practice because one of the world-leading central security depositories, Euroclear, is based in Belgium. On 21 May 2024, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) No 2024/1469, allowing net profits generated from the frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia held in EU Central Security Depositories (CSDs) to support Ukraine. This regulation amends Article 5a of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and introduces a new annex (“Annex XLI”) to the regulation. Owing to EU sanctions, more than EUR200 billion worth of Russian Central Bank assets are frozen in CSDs such as Euroclear and Clearstream, with reinvestments generating more than EUR5 billion in profits. As of 15 February 2024, CSDs have been required to segregate these profits and are now mandated to transfer 99.7% of the net profits, after costs and taxes, to the EU budget to support Ukraine. These funds will be used for the EU’s Ukraine Facility, aimed at Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, with up to 10% potentially redirected to EU programmes supporting Ukraine’s defence industry. Payments will be made bi-annually for as long as the sanctions are in place, with annual reviews of the allocation.
Additionally, on 24 April 2024, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673. The new EU rules harmonising criminal offences and penalties for violating EU restrictive measures are in effect as of 19 May 2024. These rules ensure that violations – such as failing to freeze assets, breaching travel bans, and circumventing services and goods bans ‒ can be criminally investigated and prosecuted across all EU member states. They establish common standards for penalties for both individuals and entities, enhancing deterrence and closing legal loopholes. The rules also strengthen the freezing and confiscation of sanctioned assets and improve co-operation and communication between authorities within and among EU member states.
Legal Developments
On 24 June 2024, the EC welcomed the Council of the European Union’s adoption of the 14th package of sanctions against Russia, aimed at reducing Russia’s revenue sources and war capabilities. This package includes measures such as prohibiting investments in and exports to Russian LNG projects, banning Russian LNG transshipment in EU ports, and targeting vessels that support Russia’s war efforts. Additionally, 116 individuals and entities have been listed for asset freezes and travel bans, and a new ban on using Russia’s financial messaging system SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) has been introduced.
The new 14th package restricts exports of dual-use and advanced technology items and imposes stricter export controls on entities associated with Russia’s military. New measures also address sanctions circumvention, reinforce the import ban on Russian diamonds, and strengthen transport restrictions.
Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the harmonisation of definitions and penalties for sanctions violations has been adopted in April 2024 and must be transposed in the national legislation of all EU member states, including Belgium, by 20 May 2025. This directive, once transposed, may significantly alter (and increase) criminal liability for sanctions violations.
Administrative Review by the Council of the European Union
The individual or entity designated under EU sanctions may ‒ within a time-limit determined by the Council of the European Union – submit observations to the Council of the European Union, asking for a review or removal of their listing. Those observations are submitted only once and could include detailed reasons and supporting evidence explaining why the listing is no longer justified or why the circumstances have changed.
The Council of the European reviews the observations and considers the evidence provided as part of a general review for all listed persons from the same third country. If the Council of the European Union finds the arguments justified, it may decide to remove the individual or entity from the sanctions list. If the Council of the European Union rejects the request, the individual or entity remains on the sanctions list.
The Council of the European Union must provide sufficient and concrete reasons for each (re-)listing decision.
Judicial Review by the CJEU
The individual or entity can bring an action for annulment before the EU’s General Court in accordance with Articles 263, paragraph 4 and Article 275, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The applicant must argue that the listing is unlawful, presenting grounds such as violations of fundamental rights, lack of sufficient Council of the European Union evidence, procedural errors, or errors of assessment.
If the General Court finds the listing unlawful, it annuls the individual listing, which – in principle – should result in the individual’s or entity’s removal from the sanctions list. However, the Council of the European Union may find new reasons for maintaining the listing of the successful applicant. If the General Court upholds the listing, the individual or entity remains on the list with the same or updated reasons. Belgian courts follow the judgments of the EU courts.
Compensation of Damages
Alongside or following the annulment action, the individual or entity can file a claim for damages before the CJEU. The claim must demonstrate that the wrongful listing caused financial loss or other harm and establish a causal link between the listing and the damages. If the court finds in favour of the applicant, it awards damages to compensate for the financial and non-material harm suffered. If the court rejects the claim, no compensation is awarded.
In the context of EU law, which is relevant for Belgian law, a de-listing challenge can achieve several significant outcomes.
First, an individual or entity may be delisted by the Council of the European Union. This occurs when the Council of the European Union reviews evidence and decides to remove the individual or entity from the list, finding that the original reasons for listing are no longer valid or were incorrect.
Second, the EU’s General Court may annul the individual listing, which can lead to delisting. If an individual or entity brings an action before the General Court, and the latter finds that the listing is unlawful, it can annul it. This annulment results in the individual or entity being delisted.
Lastly, an individual may file an action for damages to the EU’s General Court. If the General Court determines that the listing was unlawful and caused harm, it can award damages to compensate for the financial loss and other harm suffered due to the wrongful listing. Such damages have rarely been awarded, owing to the difficulty meeting the legal tests for damages suffered and causality.
In the EU legal system, which is relevant for Belgium, the minimum period in which delisting can occur is six to 12 months from the date of initial listing – something that is relevant for sanctions against Russia and Belarus. This may extend to several years in cases where the individual’s/entity’s listing is renewed at regular reviews and/or is challenged in the EU’s General Court.
Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 imposes several service-related bans aimed at restricting trade and economic interactions with Russia. These bans, alongside legal and other professional services prohibitions, include the following.
Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 imposes restrictions on the export and import of several goods to and from Russia. These bans include the following.
Belgian courts may consider compliance with sanctions as a case of force majeure. This means that companies may be able invoke force majeure clauses in their contracts to suspend or terminate performance of obligations as a result of sanctions against Russia. If the performance of a contract becomes illegal owing to the sanctions imposed, Belgian courts may rule that the contract cannot be performed. This can lead to the application of the doctrine of “frustration”, whereby a contract is rescinded because it has become impossible to perform it without breaking the law.
Belgian courts handle the enforcement of judgments involving sanctions by carefully adhering to both domestic law and EU regulations.
Under EU law, judgments rendered by courts in other EU member states generally enjoy automatic recognition and enforcement within all EU member states. It is not required to obtain a prior recognition and enforcement by a Belgian court.
However, in practice, EU operators may still refuse enforcement if circumstances that appear to be a violation of EU sanctions become known during enforcement efforts. This is particularly true if they were not addressed by an EU court judgment or if the activity required by the EU operator is subject to licence requirements (such as release of funds by a bank).
In such cases, parties involved may request required domestic licences based on the judgment or address the issue to a specific instance called the Attachment Judge (beslagrechter or juge des saisies), who is competent for disputes arising from conservatory or executionary attachment of assets or the enforcement of judgments on Belgian territory.
Judgments rendered by courts outside the EU can be enforced in Belgium under the rules of the Belgian Code of Private International Law but need to obtain an exequatur. The exequatur is essentially a judgment confirming recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment on Belgian territory. This is an ex parte procedure within which the Belgian court reviews the outcome of a foreign judgment for compliance with, inter alia, EU sanctions.
Compliance with EU sanctions is considered to fall under the public order exceptions that may lead to non-recognition or non-enforcement of foreign judgments.
The Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of EU member states, adopts legal acts imposing restrictive measures (sanctions) through decisions and regulations. These decisions are typically based on proposals from individual member states, the EC and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Such decisions are binding on EU member states, including Belgium.
Belgian law and its courts generally adhere to the “owned or controlled” criteria set out in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (individual listings of Russian persons and entities) and the EC and Council of the European Union guidance and best practices. Some confusion may arise in Belgium because of the minor grammatical differences and terminology used in the different language versions of provisions in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.
Under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, if a designated person or entity owns more than 50% of a legal person or entity, that entity – as a result of the majority ownership – is considered to be owned by the designated person or entity. Additionally, even if a directly sanctioned person or entity does not own a majority of the shares in that entity, it may still be considered to be “controlled” by a directly sanctioned entity if the latter is able to exert a decisive influence on the management or policy of the entity through other means than a majority participation in its capital.
The criteria to be taken into account when assessing whether a legal person or entity is controlled by a designated person or entity ‒ alone or pursuant to an agreement with another shareholder or other third party – could include:
If any of these criteria are satisfied, it is considered that the legal person or entity is controlled by a designated person or entity, unless the contrary can be established on a case-by-case basis.
It should be noted that slight grammatical discrepancies between the English and Dutch versions of provisions in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 have been known to cause confusion in (particularly lower) domestic courts relating to the interpretation of these “owned or controlled” rules.
The Dutch language version of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 refers to verbonden ondernemingen (“connected enterprises”), which is a defined term in the Belgian Code on Companies and Associations. The Belgian Code on Companies and Associations distinguishes between various types of company relations, including “enterprises connected to” and “enterprises associated with”. Connected enterprises are those sets of enterprises that are controlled by, or exercise control over, that other company or with whom those companies are in a consortium. The Belgian Code on Companies and Associations also defines control as the “de facto or legal power to exercise a decisive influence on the appointment of the majority of its directors or on the direction of its management”.
Control is irrefutably presumed by law if it results from:
Assessing whether a sanctioned person or entity has a power of control over an entity through shareholder participation must cumulate the percentage in participations through several shareholders to take into account the consolidated power of control resulting from different participations.
By contrast, the French-language version of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 refers to the word associé (“associated with”). Under Article 1:21 of the Belgian Code on Companies and Associations, an associated company may be interpreted as any entity linked to the other by virtue of a notable or significant (but not “decisive” and thus “controlling”) influence in the other company. This influence is presumed, but rebuttable, as of a 20% shareholding.
The difference between these equally authoritative versions in the official languages of Belgium has been known to cause some confusion ‒ particularly in courts with less experience of the application of sanctions ‒ when it comes to how to interpret these rules. However, it should be stressed that these terms relating to ownership or control by a directly sanctioned entity in EU regulations should be interpreted autonomously and uniformly throughout the EU member states. Provisions of an EU regulation must be interpreted uniformly in line with their systemic and teleologic meaning within the EU regulation, for which the EC’s FAQs and the Council of the European Union guidance can provide meaningful reference.
There are no specific provisions in Belgian law relating to circumvention because the EU’s sanctions regulations are as a matter of EU law directly applicable in Belgium. However, violations of EU sanctions – including the provisions prohibiting circumvention of EU sanctions – fall under the criminal penalties for violations of EU restrictive measures imposed by the Law of 13 May 2003 (as consolidated after legislative adjustments in 2019).
The EU has provisions prohibiting the circumvention of sanctions, ensuring entities and individuals do not undermine sanctions’ effectiveness. By way of example, in the EU regulations targeting Russia:
Other general anti-circumvention provisions are present in many EU regulations, forbidding activities that directly or indirectly bypass sanctions. Compliance with anti-circumventing measures is enforced by EU member states, with penalties for violations.
As per the breach of other EU sanction prohibitions, circumventing EU sanctions can be a criminal offence, with penalties determined by the national laws of EU member states (including fines and imprisonment).
As stated in 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions, the provisions of the Belgian Penal Code are generally applicable to these offences, meaning that one may be prosecuted as an accomplice to a sanctions violation for (unsuccessful) attempts to violate or circumvent sanctions. Funds or assets considered to be illegal proceeds from sanctions violations ‒ including circumvention ‒ may be confiscated, notwithstanding any imposed criminal penalties.
Infringements of EU sanctions anti-circumvention provisions are equally punishable by imprisonment of eight days to five years and by a fine of EUR200 to EUR200,000. An administrative fine of EUR2,000 to EUR20 million may also be imposed. These severe penalties aim to deter violations and ensure compliance with EU sanctions regimes.
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In the past few years, restrictive measures (sanctions) have assumed a central role in countries’ foreign policy toolkits, owing to escalating geopolitical tensions, rising trade protectionism, and regional conflicts. They have been deployed to influence the behaviour of nations, organisations, and individuals. Sanctions became even more prominent after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which marked a significant shift towards employing and enforcing sanctions at the national, supranational and intergovernmental levels. Along with the US and other G7 countries, the EU has implemented comprehensive sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
This summary provides an overview of the development and trends in EU sanctions law from 2022 to 2024, with particular focus on the EU bloc’s Russia sanctions regime.
Overview of Sanctions Law
Sanctions law encompasses measures imposed by countries or international organisations to achieve foreign policy and security objectives. These measures can include economic and financial sanctions (trade restrictions, asset freezes, and restrictions on the financial sector), travel bans, and arms and dual-use embargoes. The legal foundations for the adoption of sanctions within the EU framework are in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), along with specific country-specific regulations and decisions adopted by the Council of the EU within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
EU Sanctions on Russia
The EU’s sanctions on Russia have evolved significantly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, the most substantial and comprehensive measures were introduced in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the two years that have followed. These sanctions have aimed to weaken Russia’s economic base, limit its access to crucial technologies, and exert pressure upon it to abandon its military goals.
Key developments (2022‒24)
Between February 2022 to June 2024, the EU imposed 14 sanctions packages against Russia, encompassing a diverse range of measures such as financial restrictions, trade embargoes, technology transfer bans, and the designations of more than 2,100 individuals and entities from Russia and third countries. The key elements of those packages are detailed here.
Initial response to the invasion of Ukraine
Immediately following the invasion in February 2022, the EU imposed a series of sanctions targeting key sectors of the Russian economy. These sanctions encompassed:
Sectoral sanctions and energy restrictions
As the conflict continued, the EU expanded its sanctions to include broader sectoral measures, such as:
Humanitarian and economic impact considerations
The EU has also considered the humanitarian and economic impacts of its sanctions regime by providing:
Legal challenges and compliance issues
Sanctions regimes have often faced legal challenges and compliance issues, as follows.
Trends in EU Sanctions Law (2022‒24)
Increased use of targeted sanctions
There is a trend towards more precise and targeted sanctions, focusing on specific individuals, entities and sectors. This approach aims to minimise unintended humanitarian consequences while maximising pressure on the intended targets. The concept of targeted sanctions also avoids comprehensive trade embargoes by imposing sanctions on specific sectors and often only on specific enterprises within a sector.
Co-ordination with international partners
The EU has increasingly co-ordinated its sanctions efforts with international partners, particularly the USA, the UK, and other G7 nations. This co-ordination enhances the effectiveness of sanctions and reduces the opportunities for sanctions evasion. There is an increasing trend towards international co-operation and shared intelligence on the effective application of extraterritorial aspects of national sanctions.
Use of sanctions for human rights violations
Sanctions are being used more frequently to address human rights violations. The EU has employed its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (also known as the “EU Magnitsky Act”) to target individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses. Although the primary targets of this regime are crimes against humanity (eg, genocide, extrajudicial killings, torture, slavery), sanctions adopted under this regime can also have wider foreign policy objectives towards individuals in third counties.
Technological and cyber sanctions
With the rise of cyberthreats and illegal activities in the open digital space, the EU has also developed sanctions targeting cyber-attacks and the misuse of digital technologies. These measures aim to deter state and non-state actors from engaging in malicious cyber-activities.
The typical targets of technological and cyber sanctions are cyber-attacking/hacking, especially against critical infrastructure and government systems, IP theft, cyber-espionage, and the misuse of technologies for harmful purposes.
Impact and Effectiveness of EU Sanctions on Russia
Economic impact on Russia
The co-ordinated EU/G7 sanctions have significantly impacted the Russian economy, leading to a contraction in GDP, a devaluation of the Russian ruble, and a decrease in foreign investment. The energy sector and its exports ‒ a crucial part of Russia’s economy ‒ have been affected. Despite the redirection of oil and gas exports to China and India, Russia has not been able to re-establish the export volumes previously sold to the EU.
Technological isolation
Restrictions on technology exports have hampered Russia’s technological advancements, affecting its military capabilities and industrial output. The lack of access to Western technology has forced Russia to rely on outdated equipment and seek alternatives from non-Western sources.
Political and diplomatic pressure
The sanctions have increased political and diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin from the G7 and many third countries. Although the primary goal of ending the conflict has not yet been achieved, the sustained economic and political pressure aims to bring Russia to the negotiating table and obtain tangible concessions, regardless of the state of military operations on the ground in Ukraine.
Humanitarian considerations
Despite efforts to include humanitarian exemptions, there are concerns about the broader impact of sanctions on the Russian population. The EU continues to monitor and adjust its sanctions to balance pressure on the Russian government with the need to avoid undue suffering among civilians. Moreover, the EU has always supported the civil society and progressive non-governmental organisations in Russia, which should be shielded from negative effects of sanctions.
Critical assessment
Despite co-ordinated G7 sanctions, the Russian economy has done better than expected ‒ mainly owing to substantial state military spending, accumulated fiscal buffers, high energy prices, and the reorientation of trade with the Middle East and Asia (China, India, UAE, Türkiye), along with suspected circumvention routes into Russia via third countries. Moreover, the financial and asset management systems in Russia have gradually disconnected themselves from the US dollar and the Euro, relying mostly on Russian, Chinese and other regional currencies instead.
New Developments: Proposed Sanctions on Georgia
Recent discussions within the EU have focused on the possibility of imposing sanctions on former Soviet state Georgia in response to the controversial “foreign agents” law passed by the Georgian Parliament. This law mandates that organisations receiving more than 20% of their funding from foreign sources must register as “foreign agents” ‒ a move reminiscent of similar legislation in Russia.
Several EU countries, including Estonia, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Sweden, are leading the call for sanctions. These proposed measures could include the suspension of visa-free travel for Georgian citizens, targeted sanctions against specific Georgian officials, and the freezing of EU funds allocated to Georgia. These steps are intended to pressure the Georgian government to repeal the law and realign with the democratic standards necessary for its EU accession process.
Critics of the “foreign agents” law argue that the law undermines democratic institutions and hinders Georgia’s ambitions for closer integration with the EU. The EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, stated that the passage of this law contradicted Georgia’s commitments under its EU candidate status and could severely impact its future in the EU accession process.
As the situation evolves, EU foreign ministers are expected to convene to discuss the imposition of these sanctions. The outcome of these discussions will be crucial in determining Georgia’s political trajectory and its future relationship with the EU.
Future Directions and Challenges
Adapting to evolving geopolitical contexts
The EU will need to adapt its sanctions regimes to evolving geopolitical contexts, including potential shifts in alliances and the emergence of new global challenges. This requires a flexible and responsive approach to sanctions policy. The EU is called upon by various stakeholders to improve the legal safeguards for affected individuals in relisting and delisting procedures, as this would promote the effectiveness of sanctions while safeguarding the fundamental rights of the individuals.
Enhancing legal frameworks
Strengthening the legal frameworks governing sanctions within the EU is crucial to ensure their effectiveness and resilience against legal challenges. This includes improving mechanisms for compliance, monitoring and enforcement. The available sanctions guidance by the EC has been welcomed by stakeholders in the EU; however, uncertainties in the interpretation and application of sanctions provisions remain. The EU needs to continue improving and codifying the existing sanctions framework as well as expanding the informal guidance, as this would greatly facilitate compliance across the EU.
Balancing economic and humanitarian impacts
A key challenge will be balancing the economic impact of sanctions on target states with the potential humanitarian consequences. The EU must continue to refine its sanctions to minimise unintended negative effects while maintaining pressure on target regimes. A notable example has been the impact of sanctions on supplies of food and fertiliser to poor countries ‒ notably, in Africa.
Leveraging technological advancements
As technology continues to evolve, the EU will need to leverage advancements in digital and cyber technologies in order to enhance its sanctions regimes. This includes developing new tools for monitoring and enforcement, as well as addressing emerging threats such as cyber-attacks. The EU is engaging cybersecurity experts and their services for the promotion of these capabilities.
Conclusion
The evolving landscape of sanctions during the past two years highlights the EU’s strategic use of sanctions as a tool to address geopolitical tensions and conflicts, with the specific example of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The EU’s sanctions regime has seen substantial developments, reflecting a multifaceted approach that balances economic pressure, humanitarian considerations, and international collaboration.
The EU’s sanctions on Russia have progressively developed. Politically, the sanctions have increased diplomatic pressure on Russia, aiming to bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table ‒ although the primary goal of ending the conflict remains unmet.
Looking ahead, the EU faces several challenges in maintaining the effectiveness of its sanctions regime. Adapting to evolving geopolitical contexts, such as shifts in alliances and emerging global challenges, requires a flexible and responsive approach. Strengthening legal frameworks in order to enhance compliance monitoring and enforcement is crucial to ensure sanctions’ effectiveness and resilience against legal challenges.
Balancing the economic impact of sanctions with potential humanitarian consequences remains a critical consideration, necessitating continuous refinement of sanctions policies. Leveraging technological advancements for monitoring and enforcement, especially in the face of cyberthreats, will be essential to maintain robust sanctions regimes.
The EU’s consideration of possible sanctions on Georgia illustrates the broader application of its sanctions policy to address foreign policy objectives. The outcome of these discussions will be pivotal in determining Georgia’s political trajectory and its relationship with the EU.
In conclusion, the EU’s approach to sanctions during the past two years reflects a sophisticated and dynamic strategy aimed at addressing complex geopolitical challenges. Through employing targeted measures, international collaboration, and continuously adapting its policies, the EU should seek to uphold international law, support shared values, and achieve its foreign policy and security objectives.