The field of economic sanctions in the past several years has been characterised by dynamic and rapid growth and development, particularly with respect to the Russia and Iran sanctions programmes, among other countries, industries and policy initiatives, including legislation and regulations directed at China, Venezuela, the fintech/virtual currency, shipping and transportation industries, the area of cybersecurity, and a long-standing commitment to counter global human rights violations.
Domestically, the US has focused on greater co-ordination across government, with a number of joint advisories involving one or more of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), together with relevant personnel from the Department of State and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The level of cross-border co-ordination has also advanced substantially, as multiple national and supra-national bodies (notably the UK and the EU, among others) have focused on aligning and harmonising their enforcement efforts.
One of the most notable trends in the field of economic sanctions over the past year is a significant expansion of secondary sanctions authorities in order to counter Russian aggression.
For example, OFAC has advised that foreign financial institutions (FFIs) that conduct or facilitate significant transactions or provide any service involving Russia’s military-industrial base run the risk of being sanctioned by OFAC; as of June 2024, OFAC has revised the definition of “Russia’s military-industrial base” to include all persons blocked under Executive Order 14024, the foundational order establishing the Russian Foreign Harmful Activities Sanctions programme. Accordingly, FFIs that maintain accounts, transfer funds or provide other financial services, such as payment processing, trade finance or insurance-related services, for any persons that are blocked by OFAC or who otherwise support Russia’s military-industrial base would thus be exposed to secondary sanctions risk.
Furthermore, activities deemed to constitute the facilitation of specified critical items to Russian importers or other third-country companies shipping items to Russia, or providing other forms of assistance to persons seeking to evade US sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base, may also be captured and subject FFIs to sanctions risk. OFAC has provided a series of advisories to FFIs, recommending that affected persons and entities seek to implement compliance controls commensurate with their risk profile and current exposure to Russia’s military-industrial base and its supporters.
OFAC’s imposition of new secondary sanctions authorities – creating designation risks against foreign persons such as FFIs engaged in high-risk business sectors – is in addition to OFAC’s ongoing enforcement actions against FFIs and other foreign persons whose activities have “caused” US persons to violate sanctions, or otherwise engaged in violative conduct. This includes, for example, a circumstance where a person routes a prohibited transaction through the United States or the US financial system, thereby “causing” a US financial institution to process the payment in violation of OFAC sanctions. These enforcement activities continue to expand in intensity and duration, and also with respect to the size of resultant penalties imposed.
Finally, it bears noting that there are also recent legislative efforts to enhance US sanctions authorities, with the passage in April 2024 of a number of new sanctions and national security-related provisions, including:
The economic and trade sanctions programmes administered and enforced by OFAC are driven by US national security and foreign policy goals and objectives. In that respect, it bears noting that all individuals and entities subject to US jurisdiction, as well as foreign persons that conduct business in or with the United States or US persons, or using US-origin goods or services, are impacted by US sanctions laws and regulations.
Organisations would therefore be well advised to conduct a routine and, if appropriate, ongoing or periodic risk assessment to identify potential OFAC issues they may encounter, including by making reference to OFAC’s current or emerging enforcement and compliance priorities. These risks could arise from an organisation’s clients and customers, products, services, supply chain, intermediaries, counterparties, transactions or geographic locations, depending on the nature of the organisation.
That said and as a general matter, sectors that are particularly affected by sanctions regulations and enforcement activity include banking and financial services, energy, technology, shipping and transportation (particularly with respect to the transportation of oil or other petroleum products) and the virtual currency sector.
Numerous forms of sanctions are implemented under US law, including asset and property blocking sanctions, investment restrictions, export or import restrictions, visa or travel restrictions, foreign exchange prohibitions and prohibitions relating to the activities of financial institutions.
US sanctions apply primarily to “US persons”, which is typically defined as including US citizens, permanent resident aliens, entities organised under the laws of the US or any jurisdiction within the US (including foreign branches), or any person located in the US.
Each US sanctions programme defines the scope of its application, and therefore there is a degree of variation in their scope. For example, some sanctions regimes, like the Cuba and Iran programmes, also apply to foreign entities that are “owned or controlled” by US persons.
Non-US persons must comply with US sanctions with respect to transactions with a US nexus, namely:
Non-US persons can be held liable for “causing” a US person to violate sanctions.
The US also has “secondary sanctions” that seek to deter certain activities by non-US persons regardless of whether there is a US nexus. Non-US persons risk being sanctioned if they engage in these activities. As just one example, Executive Order 14024 authorises OFAC to impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate any significant transactions or transactions for or on behalf of persons connected to Russia’s military-industrial base.
Although US sanctions are primarily implemented unilaterally at the domestic level, the US has enacted legislation – namely the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (UNPA) – that permits the US to implement and enforce sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.
OFAC is the primary agency responsible for administering and enforcing US sanctions. The DOJ has authority to investigate and prosecute criminal violations of certain US sanctions programmes. BIS administers and enforces the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which are the primary export control regulations in the US.
The US State Department is also responsible for administering certain economic sanctions and export controls. For example, the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs implements the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act.
OFAC is responsible for investigating and enforcing civil violations of US sanctions, and the DOJ has authority to investigate and enforce criminal violations.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), the DOJ also has authority to seize and subject to civil forfeiture assets involved in or relating to IEEPA violations located within the United States. Through co-operation with international allies or pursuant to certain statutory authorities, as the case may be, the United States may also seize and subject to civil forfeiture such assets or property located on the high seas or abroad.
Violations of US economic sanctions laws and regulations are primarily civil offences, but there can be criminal penalties for wilful violations.
For example, under IEEPA it is unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate or cause a violation of any licence, order, regulation or prohibition issued under IEEPA. The penalties for such violations include imprisonment for up to 20 years and a fine of up to USD1 million.
OFAC’s Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide for numerous factors that OFAC can consider when determining the appropriate administrative response to apparent violations of US sanctions by a person who is obliged to comply with such sanctions (a “Subject Person”), including whether any mitigation should be applied to avoid or lessen the base civil penalty amount, and whether a violation should be deemed “egregious” or “non-egregious”. This includes a procedure in appropriate circumstances to provide voluntary self-disclosure to OFAC.
The enforcement factors in play include:
OFAC can impose civil penalties for sanctions violations even where the person had no knowledge or reason to know they were engaging in a sanctions violation. In practice, OFAC takes into consideration the facts and circumstances surrounding an apparent violation when determining the appropriate enforcement response, including various aggravating or mitigating factors.
OFAC issues both “general” and “specific” licences that permit persons to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. General licences provide blanket authorisation for certain enumerated transactions for a class of persons without the need for a licence application. A specific licence, on the other hand, is a written document issued by OFAC in response to a licence application and authorises certain activities of specific “licensees” on a case-by-case basis.
OFAC cautions that persons engaging in transactions pursuant to general or specific licences must ensure that all conditions of the licences are strictly observed. Those applying for a specific licence should ensure that the request includes all necessary information as required in the application guidelines or the regulations pertaining to the particular sanctions programme.
When applying for a licence, the applicant should provide a detailed description of the proposed transaction and the names and addresses of any persons or entities involved, and should ensure that a request is supported by sufficient documentation. Applications should also consider including a discussion establishing why approval of the requested licence will not interfere with the policy goals underlying the relevant prohibition(s).
There is not a catch-all general licence that permits all provisions of legal services to designated persons. In a release on 12 January 2017 entitled “Guidance on the Provision of Certain Services Relating to the Requirements of U.S. Sanctions Laws”, OFAC clarified that providing information or advice regarding the requirements of US sanctions laws and opining on the legality of specific transactions under US sanctions laws is permitted. However, such services can only be provided to persons other than those whose property and interests are blocked by OFAC (including persons listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List) or to whom a US person is prohibited from exporting or importing services.
Notwithstanding this guidance, OFAC has issued general licences authorising the provision of certain legal services to SDNs, including the representation of SDNs in connection with delisting requests. If the regulations for the specific programme under which a person was designated do not contain such a general licence, an attorney must apply for a specific licence from OFAC in order to provide services.
In some instances, OFAC permits the provision of legal services in jurisdictions with territory-wide sanctions. For instance, in connection with OFAC sanctions targeting Russia, OFAC permits the provision of legal services to or on behalf of a person in the Crimea region of Ukraine; see 31 C.F.R. § 589.506. OFAC also permits the provision of legal services in connection with its Iran and Cuba sanctions regimes; see 31 C.F.R. § 560.525; 31 CFR § 515.512.
US persons (and those subject to US jurisdiction) who are in possession or control of blocked property must file a Report on Blocked Property with OFAC within ten business days of the date that the property becomes blocked. Forms for the reporting of blocked property, whether “Financial” or for “Tangible/Real/other Non-Financial Property”, are available on OFAC’s website and commonly used by reporting persons. Persons holding blocked property must also file an Annual Report on Blocked Property by September 30th, reflecting all blocked property held as of June 30th of the current year. US persons (and those subject to US jurisdiction) must also file a Report of Rejected Transactions within ten business days of the rejection of a transaction that was not blocked, but where processing or engaging in the transaction would nonetheless violate applicable US sanctions.
US persons participating in litigation, arbitration or other binding alternative dispute resolution on behalf of or against persons whose property or interests in property are blocked or retained under applicable law, or when the outcome of any proceeding may affect blocked property or retained funds, must provide notice of such proceedings and submit copies of certain documents submitted and orders or opinions rendered by the court or other adjudicatory body, as well as reports of hearings or status conferences where it appears the court may issue an order or judgment or is considering or may decide any pending dispositive motion on the merits of the proceeding or any claim raised therein, as further detailed in OFAC’s regulations.
Persons subject to OFAC record-keeping requirements (ie, by engaging in a transaction pursuant to an OFAC licence) or reporting requirements with respect to blocked property are to retain records of such transactions for five years after the date of such transaction, or for the period of time such property is blocked, and for at least five years after the date such property is unblocked.
The most significant developments related to sanctions in the past three years include the following.
Given that decisions concerning sanctions are often driven primarily by US national security and foreign policy considerations, the US finds itself in a consequential election year that could significantly impact shifts in policy with respect to China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela or other notable sanctions regimes. A change in administration could also affect the tone, tenor or intensity of sanctions designations and lead to new policy initiatives.
One notable administrative change is also rapidly approaching, in that OFAC has issued a final rule amending various reporting, procedures and penalties regulations, which becomes effective on 8 August 2024. In the new rule, filers are generally required to use the electronic OFAC Reporting System (ORS) for submission to OFAC of initial reports of blocked property and Annual Reports of Blocked Property pursuant to § 501.603(d), and reports of rejected transactions pursuant to § 501.604(d), among other changes seeking to streamline reporting requirements and require filings to be made via email rather than mail or facsimile transmission.
OFAC explains that “the power and integrity of” its “sanctions derive not only from [OFAC’s] ability to designate and add persons to sanctions lists, including the [SDN List], but also from [OFAC’s] willingness to remove persons from such lists consistent with the law”. Accordingly, OFAC regularly receives and considers challenges to sanctions designations.
Delisting is possible in a host of circumstances, such as:
The delisting petition procedures are set forth at 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.
Persons seeking to challenge a designation must submit a written request for removal (referred to as a “petition” or “request for consideration”). The petition should include:
If a petition is denied by OFAC, the petitioner may challenge that determination under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in federal court or file another administrative petition. Under the APA, courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”. However, because courts are to defer to and to presume the validity of OFAC’s determination, meeting this standard is typically difficult.
Should a petitioner successfully bring a delisting challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, the available remedy would be the delisting itself. The APA can be enforced only through equitable, injunctive relief, and does not permit plaintiffs to obtain damages against a federal agency, such as OFAC; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (prohibiting the award of money damages for violations of the APA).
Because each application is considered on a case-by-case basis, there is no fixed time within which OFAC provides delisting determinations. Generally, the review process can be lengthy. OFAC advises that its review timing depends upon a range of factors, including:
When more information is needed, OFAC will send the petitioner questionnaires identifying the additional information or clarification needed from the petitioner. OFAC states that it “endeavors to send the first questionnaire within 90 days from the date the petition is received by OFAC”. It is not uncommon for OFAC to send one or more follow-up questionnaires and to engage in additional research to verify claims made by a petitioner.
OFAC implements sanctions that prohibit the export or import of services to or from other countries.
For example, under the Russia sanctions programme, pursuant to Executive Order 14071, the US prohibits the exportation, re-exportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a United States person of a wide array of services, including:
OFAC implements sanctions that prohibit the export or import of goods to or from other countries.
For example, under the Russia sanctions programme, pursuant to Executive Order 14066, the US prohibits the importation of the following products of Russian Federation origin into the US:
Executive Order 14068 likewise prohibits the importation of fish, seafood, alcoholic beverages and non-industrial diamonds of Russian Federation origin into the United States.
In the United States, whether compliance with sanctions will be viewed as a bar to performance of a party’s contractual obligations is a fact-specific inquiry that will largely depend upon the terms of the applicable contract.
Parties will typically raise defences relating to non-performance – namely, impossibility, illegality, force majeure or frustration of purpose. In evaluating these defences, US courts will look to a variety of factors, including:
Where a sanctioned party seeks relief from its contractual obligations, US courts have also considered the foreseeability of such sanctions and the efforts of parties to otherwise comply with the terms of the contract, and have conducted a close review of what the sanctions at issue expressly prohibit in practice.
In dealing with the enforcement of judgments when sanctions issues arise, US courts generally adhere to OFAC’s requirement that the judicial disposition of blocked property is prohibited unless authorised by OFAC through either a specific or general licence.
A narrow exception exists where a party holds a judgment against a “terrorist party” (including foreign states designated as state sponsors of terrorism) within the meaning of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) (28 U.S.C.S. § 1610 note). The TRIA permits such parties to seek the attachment and execution of blocked assets where doing so would otherwise satisfy the requirements of applicable law. Courts have held that, in these circumstances, such attachment and execution may proceed without a separate requirement to obtain a licence from OFAC.
Depending on the underlying authority used to designate a person for sanctions, different US government agencies may have the lead with respect to designation decisions. The US Department of the Treasury is in charge of publishing and administering the SDN list, and is typically the primary authority in charge of designation decisions. That said, many programmes call for designations to be made by Treasury, in consultation with other parts of the US government such as the Department of State and the US Attorney General. Other programmes will give the Department of State or other US agencies (often in consultation with the Department of the Treasury) the authority to designate persons for sanctions.
Pursuant to OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule, the property and interests in property of entities directly or indirectly owned 50% or more, whether individually or in the aggregate, by one or more blocked persons are themselves considered blocked. Therefore, if one or more sanctioned persons owns an entity, and their collective ownership stake is 50% or higher, then that entity and its property will also be sanctioned.
US sanctions capture not only primary violations but also transactions that evade or avoid, have the purpose of evading or avoiding, cause a violation of, or attempt to violate prohibitions imposed by OFAC under various sanctions authorities. Persons that provide financial, material or technological support for or to a designated person may also be designated by OFAC under the relevant sanctions authority.
Although violations of OFAC sanctions can result in civil liability, wilful violations – including wilful efforts to evade or avoid sanctions, or to facilitate prohibited transactions – can lead to criminal charges brought by the DOJ under IEEPA. Should OFAC believe that a particular case might warrant criminal penalties, it may refer the case to DOJ. Under IEEPA, violators can face criminal fines of up to USD1 million or up to 20 years’ imprisonment for wilful sanctions violations.
1 Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY
10004
USA
212 574 1200
212 480 8421
[email protected] www.sewkis.comThe Sanctions Regime in the USA: an Introduction
The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) manages almost 40 separate economic and trade sanctions programmes that target specified foreign governments, together with thousands of individuals, groups and entities, driven by national security and foreign policy goals and objectives. Changes to the list of sanctioned parties are now made on a near-daily basis. In 2021 (prior to the most recent wave of sanctions designations following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), the Treasury Department had estimated that US sanctions grew by more than 900% over the past 20 years, and well over 10,000 additional sanctions designations have been made since 2022.
Given the raft of new sanctions designations imposed throughout 2022 and 2023, the overarching focus appears to be on enhancing enforcement of the laws and regulations in place, including by implementing additional secondary sanctions authorities, seeking to penalise those who would seek to evade or avoid the sanctions in place, and increasing enforcement co-ordination across different government agencies and with international partners, such as the UK and the EU. The trend for 2024 has reflected an increase in enforcement everywhere and a tightening of previously imposed sanctions regulations.
Because sanctions regulations are applicable to all organisations subject to US jurisdiction, as well as foreign entities that conduct business in or with the United States, US persons or persons using US-origin goods or services, sanctions and export control compliance is a mission-critical matter for organisations of all shapes and sizes.
In severe circumstances, knowing or wilful violations of sanctions regulations often brought under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) can carry steep civil and criminal penalties, of up to USD1 million per violation and up to 20 years’ imprisonment. But even routine compliance lapses can result in civil monetary penalties being imposed on a strict liability basis for each violation. The focus on compliance spans a number of sectors, including banking, transportation and shipping, and the virtual currency sector.
The dynamics in this field require companies to be nimble and responsive to new compliance challenges. In that regard, some notable developments and trends over the past year are discussed below.
Russia: foreign financial institutions subjected to new secondary sanctions risks
Foreign financial institutions (FFIs), in particular, should ensure that they are diligently screening new and current customers or clients, as they risk being subject to secondary sanctions for conducting or facilitating significant transactions or providing services involving Russia’s military-industrial base, pursuant to Executive Order 14114, issued on 22 December 2023, which amended Executive Order 14024. As of June 2024, OFAC has revised the definition of “Russia’s military-industrial base” to include all persons blocked under Executive Order 14024, the foundational order establishing the Russian Foreign Harmful Activities Sanctions programme. Accordingly, FFIs that maintain accounts, transfer funds or provide other financial services, such as payment processing, trade finance or insurance-related services, for any persons that are blocked by OFAC or who otherwise support Russia’s military-industrial base would thus be exposed to secondary sanctions risk.
Transportation and shipping: price cap analysis demonstrates impact on Russian oil revenue and emphasises ongoing enforcement
In the transportation industry, which has recently been under a great deal of scrutiny, the Treasury Department released a price cap analysis showing that Russian oil prices experienced a marked decline following the implementation of the second phase of the Russian Oil Price Cap in October 2023. Reiterating prior guidance, OFAC stated:
“The price cap has two goals: to reduce Russia’s ability to finance its war and to maintain energy market supply. The price cap’s ideal outcome is a market in which Russia supplies as much energy as possible to emerging market consumers and businesses who need it most, but at the most heavily discounted price, to limit Putin’s profits: maintaining the volume of energy supplied, while minimizing the profit earned from it.”
Since then, the US has rolled out successive rounds of price cap enforcement actions, designating vessel owners, shipping companies and an oil trader that used prohibited services to trade above the cap, as well as identifying vessels as blocked property of these companies. These actions included designating supply chain intermediaries, such as oil traders, from various third-party countries, including Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates.
Moreover, OFAC’s recent pronouncements concerning the oil price cap reflect a tightening of the requirements for US service providers to qualify for the safe harbour for providing covered services where Russian crude oil or other petroleum products are purchased at or below the relevant price cap. Generally speaking, those requirements include:
Cryptocurrency: customer screening and focus on compliance
In the virtual currency industry, OFAC is scrutinising compliance programmes to ensure that firms that facilitate or engage in online commerce or process transactions using digital currency are not engaging in dealings with blocked persons or property, nor engaging in prohibited trade or investment-related transactions. Operators of cryptocurrency mixing services continue to face OFAC sanctions designations, civil penalties and criminal prosecutions arising from charges of money laundering and US sanctions violations.
2023’s largest enforcement action in this space notably involved Binance Holdings Ltd. (Binance). Binance settled 1,667,153 apparent violations of multiple sanctions programmes for more than USD968 million in penalties – and its possible maximum statutory exposure was more than USD592 billion. Binance’s settlement with OFAC was only one component of a co-ordinated multibillion-dollar resolution along with other agencies, including DOJ, OFAC, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Among other things, Binance was ordered to retain a compliance monitor to revamp its sanctions compliance procedures over a five-year term, and to implement a number of best practices, including:
Financial services and asset management: focus on AML and customer screening
In the financial services and investment management industries, investor and investment screening continues to be of crucial importance. As of 1 January 2024, for example, the Corporate Transparency Act requires many organisations doing business in the US to report beneficial ownership information to FinCEN, and there is an ongoing regulatory focus on anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the finance of terrorism (CFT) risk controls. To the extent organisations identify any “blocked persons” in connection with their due diligence, US persons have reporting and compliance obligations under the applicable OFAC regulations.
In this area, opening a brokerage account for, or executing a trade involving, a blocked person or a person in a country subject to comprehensive sanctions could violate applicable OFAC sanctions, unless doing so is authorised by OFAC or exempt. Other violations could include:
Revamped voluntary self-disclosure policy guidance
In July 2023, the Commerce, Treasury and Justice Departments released a Tri-Seal Compliance Note (Compliance Note) encouraging voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) of potential violations of sanctions, export controls and other national security laws.
The Compliance Note is just one of a string of releases made in 2023 and 2024 seeking to raise private sector awareness of the importance of compliance with sanctions, export controls and other national security laws. In remarks cited in the Compliance Note, for example, DOJ has announced that its National Security Division would be adding 25 new prosecutors to investigate and prosecute sanctions evasion, export control violations and similar economic crimes. The Compliance Note also provides information on FinCEN's whistleblower programme, which provides monetary rewards for reporting violations of US trade and economic sanctions, and notes that FinCEN is “currently accepting whistleblower tips”.
Updated agency guidance
Each agency involved in the release provides updated and co-ordinated policy guidance as to the significant benefits that a company can realise in connection with disclosing potential violations of these laws in accordance with each agency’s own VSD policy.
April 2024 sanctions legislation
In April 2024, the US passed the “21st Century Peace Through Strength Act”, which included a number of important sanctions and national security-related provisions that are now enshrined into law, and are thus more difficult to reverse as a matter of policy than authorities enacted solely by executive order. The notable provisions include the following.
Doubled statute of limitations
The statute of limitations for any action, suit or proceeding to enforce any civil or criminal penalty under IEEPA and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) has doubled in length, from five to ten years – giving the government more time to investigate and enforce against apparent violations of those laws and regulations.
Harmonisation of allied sanctions
Within 90 days following the enactment of April’s legislation, the President has been tasked with preparing a report to Congress identifying foreign persons subject to applicable Russian sanctions imposed by the EU or the UK, and such persons that also meet the criteria for the imposition of sanctions by the United States under either the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016 or one or more of Executive Orders 14024, 14068 and 14071 (three of the foundational executive orders under the Russian Foreign Harmful Activities Sanctions programme). Upon identification of those persons, the President “shall” impose sanctions against any identified person who is not already subject to sanctions under relevant provisions of US law.
SHIP Act and Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act provisions
Notable provisions within the legislation include new provisions styled as the “SHIP” Act with respect to Iran, subjecting owners or operators of foreign ports or refineries, and vessel owners, to sanctions designation risks where (among other things) they engage in significant transactions in Iranian-origin petroleum or petrochemical products. Elsewhere in the legislation, within the “Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act”, Chinese and foreign financial institutions are also subjected to sanctions designations risks with respect to “significant financial transactions” involving either the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran or the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – ie, drones), UAV parts or related systems.
1 Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY
10004
USA
212 574 1200
212 480 8421
[email protected] www.sewkis.com