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The day after: How Hamas envisions the future of Gaza

As hopes for a ceasefire draw closer, plans for the “day after” in Gaza are being debated. In interviews with Mondoweiss, Hamas representatives lay out their visions for reconstruction and post-war governance, and the obstacles that lie in their way.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas carried out operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” targeting the Israeli military positions surrounding Gaza, and the Israeli towns adjacent to the Strip. In the words of Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing the Qassam Brigades, the Al-Aqsa Flood operation was aimed at eliminating the Israeli army’s Gaza Division. In Deif’s words, it was also meant to mark the beginning of the battle for “the Great Liberation” — to restore all occupied Palestinian territories that were settled in 1948. 

Since then, Israel has claimed to have killed Deif, and a number of Hamas leaders. It has regained control of the areas surrounding the Gaza Strip, and waged a ferocious war on Gaza in a military operation called “Swords of Iron,” killing tens of thousands of Palestinians. All the while, it has imposed an even more stringent blockade on the Gaza Strip, denying the small Palestinian territory access to water, food, and electricity.

Since the beginning of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, Israel and its allies have sought to both “eliminate Hamas” and to change the political reality in Gaza. The Israeli visions of “the day after” the war have been amply covered in international media, with complete disregard for the Palestinian view, or at least Hamas’ view as the ruling power in Gaza for the past 17 years.

Recently, Egypt has been playing a significant role in hosting ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, as well as reconciliation talks between Hamas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the occupied West Bank. A source in Hamas, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Mondoweiss that they were in contact with “influential countries” that could help reach a ceasefire agreement, but that some ceasefire proposals, such as the one presented by Russia, focused more on the exchange of captives than the long-term future of Gaza.

Though numerous rounds of ceasefire negotiations have fallen apart over the past year, the latest talks in Egypt are reportedly closer to fruition than ever before. With the prospect of a deal on the horizon, the question of ‘what happens after a ceasefire’ has come to the fore once again. 

Based on interviews conducted with Hamas officials — some of whom requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of their role — this article lays out the possible visions of what “the day after” the war might look like, assessing the likelihood and feasibility of each proposal in a moment wrought with uncertainty.

Israel’s post-war scenarios for Gaza

Officially, Israel has no actual plan for the Gaza Strip after the war — however, three visions from Israeli government officials and non-governmental actors, who represent trends within Israeli society, have gained traction in public discourse.

The first is that of the far-right in Israel, which seeks to resettle in the Gaza Strip, not only returning to the settlements that existed in Gaza prior to 2005 but to resettle in new areas of Gaza. While ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have led the call for the full reoccupation of Gaza, this view does not have the full support of other members of the government and has been criticized even by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration.

Yoav Gallant, who served as Israel’s defense minister until November 2024, had meanwhile called for the formation of an international force overseeing security in the Gaza Strip to be headed by the United States and a “moderate” Arab state such as Jordan, Morocco, or the United Arab Emirates. However, the majority of these “moderate” countries have refused to participate in such a plan, aside from Saudi Arabia, whose Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan said in July that Riyadh would back the deployment of international forces in Gaza, but only under a UN mandate. Hamas has rejected the entry of any forces to Gaza, whether Arab or international, and said they would treat these as “occupying” forces.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, has called for the establishment of a “buffer zone” within the Gaza Strip near Israeli towns, continued Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor — the area along Gaza’s border with Egypt — the permanent closure of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, continued freedom of movement for Israeli forces anywhere in Gaza without a specified end in sight, as well as the permanent closure of UNRWA. Despite these strict demands, Netanyahu has yet to suggest any vision for who or what would govern the Gaza Strip should he achieve his stated goal of eradicating Hamas.

The Egyptian proposal: A Palestinian Authority takeover

Egypt has meanwhile proposed creating a committee to manage the Gaza Strip under the financial and administrative supervision of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA), either under PA Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa or a new Palestinian national government that would be created with this aim in mind.

Khalil Al-Hayyah, the acting head of Hamas’ political bureau, has publicly stated that Hamas would work towards this goal.

Basem Naim, a member of Hamas’ politburo in Qatar, criticized the Egyptian proposal, telling Mondoweiss that it lacked clarity regarding its administrative structure, legal framework, and what agreements, if any, it might involve regarding security coordination with Israel or Palestinian resistance movements.

A source inside Hamas involved in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and the Egypt-led intra-Palestinian talks told Mondoweiss that both Hamas and PA delegations to Egypt were on the same page and favorable to this proposed committee, but that Hamas had asked for assurance of the approval of PA President Mahmoud Abbas himself, given the historically fraught relationship between the two parties and the failure of previous talks on the matter.

“We learned the lesson from meetings with the PA in Moscow and Beijing, the final call for anything related to the PA is in Abbas’ hands and not the delegation that the PA sent,” the source said. “We can figure out whether Abbas is serious about the agreement through the personnel he sends as the head of the delegation.”

On December 8, leading Fatah figure Abdullah Abdullah officially expressed to Egypt the party’s reservations over what it deemed “insufficient guarantees” of national unity, suggesting that the committee fall under the aegis of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rather than the PA.

Despite nominal support from negotiating Palestinian factions, none of the meetings held in the past year have so far resulted in any announcement from Hamas and the PA regarding the establishment of such a committee or any decision that would effectively lead to Palestinian political reunification or pave the way to addressing the needs of the people of Gaza.

One of the Hamas sources nonetheless told Mondoweiss that Hamas prefers to go with the committee solution proposed by Egypt, as it no longer has the capacity to rule Gaza alone.

How Hamas views the ‘day after’ in Gaza

Amid all the debates about the future of Gaza, “Hamas sees the ‘day after’ as a purely national Palestinian matter, with neither intervention nor guardianship from anyone, and the outcome must be reassuring to the region and satisfactory to the international arena,” Naim told Mondoweiss, emphasizing the importance of maintaining geographical unity between Gaza and the West Bank, which have effectively been operating as two separate political entities — one under Hamas governance, the other under the Fatah-led PA — since 2007.

Speaking with Hamas officials in Doha, the movement envisages three possible scenarios for the day after the war in Gaza. 

Option 1: A unity government

The first option, which is the one favored by Hamas, is the creation of a technocratic unity government bringing together all Palestinian factions, including Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 

“Hamas will try to reach this option as it’s the best option for them and the Palestinian people,” Naim said. 

But even within the movement, this scenario is seen as unlikely however. Hossam Badran, Hamas’ media spokesman in Qatar, told Mondoweiss, alluding to Abbas and his entourage: “It’s probably not going to happen, because of the intransigence of the Palestinian National Authority [PA], whose decision has become dependent on certain political figures.”

Badran’s skepticism surrounding the likelihood of Abbas and the PA agreeing to a technocratic unity government in Gaza does not appear to be unfounded. On December 19, The Washington Post quoted Mahmoud Habbash, a senior adviser to Abbas, as saying “I don’t trust Netanyahu’s intentions and I don’t trust Hamas’s intentions.”

Upon returning from a meeting with Abbas in Cairo, Habbash further equated Israel and Hamas, saying both are concerned with staying in power while people in Gaza suffer. And though it remains to be seen whether Abbas will agree to a technocratic unity government, Habbash’s statements provide little hope for this option to come to fruition. 

Option 2: A local administration

Hamas’s second option, if the first one fails, is to form a local administration with technocrats from the Gaza Strip, whose main role would revolve around the reconstruction of Gaza and reorganization of civilian life, independently from Palestinian political factions.

The likelihood of this scenario also appears slim, however, as it is difficult to imagine how this administration could gain legitimacy in the absence of a national consensus and a continued rift between Hamas and the PA. For some Palestinian and international parties, such an administration formed by Hamas alone would be regarded as a de facto continuation of the movement’s rule in Gaza since 2007, and not as an expression of Palestinian political consensus. As such, it would likely face difficulties in obtaining the international aid necessary for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. 

Meanwhile, after the war, the people of Gaza will most likely be focused on demanding an improvement in their catastrophic living conditions and the provision of basic services. If the population considers such a government to be without genuine independence from Hamas, it could also lose popular support.

In response to these concerns, Naim simply said that such a scenario would be formed in a way that would be both “reassuring to the region and satisfactory to the international arena.”

Option 3: Back to the status quo

The third scenario, should Hamas still stand after the war, would be a return to the status quo on October 6, 2023, when Hamas led a local government on its own in Gaza. “This option would come by default after the end of the war if Hamas doesn’t reach a persuasive agreement for governance after the war,” Naim said.

According to Badran, given the current context, in the event of Israeli forces withdrawing from any area of the Gaza Strip, “those who reclaim the area and conduct civilian and bureaucratic life for the people in the area are governmental representatives” — meaning that those most likely to be able to reorganize Gaza in the aftermath of the war would be those with prior experience of running governmental institutions in the small Palestinian territory. 

However, this is not the movement’s preferred option, both Badran and Naim said, and seems particularly unlikely given Israel’s refusal to end the war with Hamas still in power. Israel has insisted that any future body governing Gaza would have to agree never to attack Israel, something Hamas would likely never agree to so long as a Palestinian state is not established. 

Like option two, Hamas’ return to power could harm the likelihood of Gaza being rebuilt and receiving the essential humanitarian aid its residents need, as international aid could be conditioned on it not reaching Hamas. If Hamas failed to provide prompt and effective solutions to Gaza’s emergency humanitarian and reconstruction crises, it could lose public support, which would further complicate the political and humanitarian landscape of Hamas and the Palestinian people in Gaza.

Plans for humanitarian recovery

Illustrations provided by a source within Hamas who is responsible for post-war housing reconstruction plans showing one vision for what post-war housing may look like in Gaza.

Amid uncertainty over the political and administrative future of the Gaza Strip, reconstruction remains a top priority.

A source within Hamas responsible for housing reconstruction as part of wider post-war planning told Mondoweiss on condition of anonymity that the concept of “the day after” will have to contend with Israel seeking to undermine any Palestinian attempt at political or civil authority in Gaza. According to this source, “the Rafah crossing will be representative of the ‘day after’ the war in Gaza, and whoever controls the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi axis will become the Gaza Strip’s de facto ruler” and determine what aid and material is able to enter the small enclave.

According to a September report from the United Nations Satellite Centre, an estimated 66% of Gaza’s structures have been damaged or destroyed since October 7, 2023. The U.N. estimates there are some 40 million tons of debris and rubble in Gaza, which could take up to 15 years and nearly $650 million to clear it all away. 

Nevertheless, as for shelter and relief in the “day after” scenario, the source said Hamas had a full five-year vision to rebuild Gaza. “The first two years would be focused on cities made of ‘caravans’ for families that have completely lost their homes. Whoever lost his house partially will be offered a ‘tent’ of the highest specifications. Regarding minor damage not exceeding $10,000, the sheltering committee will hand over the amounts these families need to restore their homes,” the source said.

According to the source’s estimates, plans for five “caravan cities” across the Gaza Strip to provide temporary shelter would require $1 billion, while the full reconstruction process could amount to nearly $40 billion. He added that “reconstruction would be in the hands of the citizens of Gaza and reconstruction financing would be from international and regional parties.”

While all scenarios envisaged by Hamas are highly dependent on when and on which note the war will one day end, short of reaching an agreement with other Palestinian political factions, Hamas may continue to be the de facto authority managing the daily and civil affairs in Gaza in the foreseeable future, even if acting behind the scenes.

Nevertheless, whichever scenario does come to fruition, one thing is certain: in the wake of the mass destruction caused by Israel, the task of rebuilding Gaza and providing essential humanitarian relief is too monumental a task to be handled by Hamas alone. 


Jamil Mazen Shaqura
Jamil Mazen Shaqura is a Palestinian political researcher.

Saif Alislam Eid
Saif Alislam Eid is an Egyptian political researcher.

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The issue of double standards in how we discuss Israel and the Palestinians – how people tend to give Israel an infinite amount of slack and how they tend give Palestinians zero slack – is an old one. But it’s not exhausted yet! Let’s talk about slack:

It’s not hard to find people, including Jews, including Israeli Jews, who will say that Israel is committing human rights violations**, and who still describe themselves as pro-Israel. In fact, you can find Israeli Jews who will tell you that Israel is committing genocide, but who still describe themselves as pro-Israel. The framing usually goes like this: Israel has fallen but it’s not the real Israel, we just need to get Israel back to its old self. (which is entirely mythological, but that’s another story).

Well, I’m pro-Hamas. I support Hamas. I condemn their attacks on civilians on Oct 7.
Is there a problem with that position?

** for example “Settler extremism threatens to undo Israel — and Jews worldwide must take responsibility”:
https://forward.com/opinion/683236/west-bank-settlers-israel-jewish-extremism/

“We’re watching Israel self-destruct — at the hands of its own leaders and citizens”

https://forward.com/opinion/680662/israel-netanyahu-future-west-bank-gaza-haredi/

The scholar Vijay Prashad talks to the Palestine Deep Dive channel, I would also recommend Laith Marouf of the Free Palestine tv site, knowing the actual history of European and American imperialism and on going criminality is sobering, Americans learn geography through war, what will they learn from, by my count, the 4th American genocidal assault on the Arab world in the last 30 odd years, Iraqi sanctions, Iraq invasion, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, despite American nihilism it is a fact that no one ever gets away with anything, do you not see that you and your societies are paying a very heavy price for the corruption of all international and national fora and institutions, Prashad is infinitely preferable to either Gandhi or MLK as they died last century and if have not studied the European empires and their successor American empire you run the risk of not knowing what the fuck you are talking about, Arabs do not need any lectures from any Americans, who are god bless you incapable of shame for what your government does and population accepts.

“This is not just an Israeli genocide – this is an Israeli, European and US genocide!”

Vijay Prashad exposes the moral decline of the global north in the age of hyper-Imperialism and its continued war against “defiance” found in the global south.

In a recent report published by Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research titled Hyper-Imperialism: A Dangerous Decadent New Stage, Prashad argues the global north has heightened its reliance upon force to insist on obedience. 

https://youtu.be/MYaZbRnAj2g?si=ew1etzXYPciw2sGq&t=1

Seems clear the major impediment to both peace and post-war planning is the very existence of Hamas.

In an ideal world, the best outcome for both Israelis and Palestinians would be the eradication of Hamas: all of them either dead or in custody. All decent, moral, people can agree on that goal. However, we don’t live in an ideal world. We need to bring home the kidnapped hostages, our brothers and sisters, still being held in Gaza in horrible conditions. To achieve that, we need to reach an agreement with Hamas. So, right now, freeing our hostages takes precedence over eradicating Hamas.