Dr. Henkin teaches military history at the IDF Command and Staff College, and is a reservist with the IDF history department. He is the author of Either We Win or We Perish: A History of the First Chechen War, 1994-1996 (Hebrew, 2007); The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East: Exodus in Reverse (2015); and the forthcoming Like Fish in the Bush: Rhodesia at War, 1965-1980 (Hebrew, 2017). He also published Uneasy Red, a guide to the Omaha Beach battle site in Normandy (2014), and co-authored (with Jaacob Saar) the Israel National Trail Guide (3rd Edition, 2016).
Reliable deterrence is a vital interest of the West, and developing a strategy for reliable deterrence without escalation is also essential. The West could prevent escalation if it manages it carefully and with determination and credibility.
The IDF, police, and other security forces must grasp that modern conflicts lack a distinct frontier. The frontline may simultaneously be inside and outside the country.
The virus crisis will lead to protectionism, skepticism of international institutions, narrow immigration policies, and other signposts of nationalism; thereby rolling-back policies that characterized the liberal and globalist democratic order.
In addition to the familiar military doctrine that was mainly crafted to meet the challenge of enemy states, Israel has an additional policy regarding threats that do not fit the full-scale war rubric: harassments inflicted by hostile non-state actors.
The ongoing Egyptian military buildup is an enigma. It is an impressive effort in terms of budget, acquisition of modern weaponry, and training. But why is Egypt investing so heavily in its military? Israel has to be wary, even though a military confrontation with Egypt is not expected.
