Kwok Yin-sang is the first relative of a wanted activist charged under Hong Kong's domestic security law

Originally published on Global Voices

Anna Kwok Fung-yee is on the Hong Kong Police Force's Wanted Persons list. Photo taken by Oiwan Lam.

Kwok Yin-sang, 68, father of Anna Kwok Fung Yee, an exiled activist wanted by Hong Kong police with a HKD 1 million bounty, was arrested on April 30, denied bail, and charged with “attempting to deal with, directly or indirectly, any funds or other financial assets or economic resources belonging to, or owned or controlled by, a relevant absconder,” under Article 23, the city's domestic security law. The maximum penalty for the offence is seven years’ imprisonment. 

Prosecutors shared during the High Court bail appeal hearing on May 2 that the arrest took place after AIA, a Hong Kong insurance company, notified the police that Kwok Yin-sang had attempted to change an education savings plan he had bought and been contributing to, of which Anna Kwok was also a beneficiary. While he is the plan's primary policyholder, prosecutors interpreted the act as an attempt to circumvent the financial freeze on his daughter's accounts and divert funds to her. 

The judge, Alex Lee, overrode the magistrate’s decision and granted bail on condition of HKD 200,000 in cash and another HKD 200,000 in surety from his son. The activist’s father must also surrender his travel documents, report to the police every day, stay at his reported residence, and avoid contact with prosecution witnesses and Anna Kwok. 

Collective punishment

Since Hong Kong national security police announced arrest warrants for exiled activists beginning in July 2023, relatives of these wanted individuals have become subjects of police interrogations in the name of investigations. Overseas human rights organisations condemned the move and accused Hong Kong officials of turning the activists’ loved ones back home into hostages so as to silence them. They added that the strategy is directly from China’s transnational repression playbook.

Currently, there are 19 wanted persons involved in national security cases, each with a HKD 1 million bounty. Since the passage of Article 23 in March 2024, the Secretary of Security, Chris Tang, has denounced 13 of the wanted activists as “absconders.” The legal label will prohibit any individual from having financial exchanges and dealings with them. Anna Kwok, the executive director of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, is one of the “absconders.” 

Kwok was not in Hong Kong during the 2019 anti-China extradition protests, but she was involved in the “Stand With Hong Kong” publicity campaign urging global leaders to express their support for the democratic protests at the G20 Summit. 

Kwok Yin-sang's prosecution has shocked overseas Hong Kong communities, as he was the first relative of a wanted activist charged under the security law. Yalkun Uluyol, a researcher from Human Rights Watch, highlighted the nature of “collective punishment” in the case:

HRW @YalkunUluyol: “The Chinese government has increased its appalling use of collective punishment against family members of peaceful activists from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities should immediately and unconditionally release Anna Kwok’s father and cease harassing… pic.twitter.com/PRzmfZMq5P

— 人权观察 HRW Chinese (@hrw_chinese) May 9, 2025

In China's imperial era, when an individual committed a crime, the Emperor could punish the entire family clan to warn and threaten others. 

Reporting suspicious transactions to the police

While human rights activists were despondent about the arrest, pro-Beijing influencers cheered the security police’s heavy-handed measure. For example, Andy Boreham depicted Anna Kwok as a desperate HK separatist who was broken by US President Donald Trump’s funding cuts and hence had her father and brother “secretly wire her funds” to the US. 

Such claims have been debunked by the details revealed in the High Court hearing. The defender’s lawyer told the court that Kwok Yin-sang always considered the education savings plan his own property, as he had made contributions for 21 years until 2020. He merely wanted to change the policy in order to withdraw the insured value, which is worth about HKD 90,000, back to his personal bank account.  

The lawyer also stressed that Anna Kwok had left Hong Kong to study in the US in 2014 and did not sign up to become the plan's policyholder when she reached 18 in 2015. The prosecutor also admitted to the judge that there hadn’t been any financial transactions between the father and daughter for the past few years.

Many online were outraged that Anna Kwok’s father is facing a seven-year imprisonment charge for attempting to change his savings plan, and many lashed out against the insurance company that reported Kwok Yin-sang, AIA. Chung Kim-wah, who is one of the 19 overseas persons wanted with a bounty, wrote a Facebook post urging people to boycott AIA:

呼籲大家以後不要再幫襯 AIA! 一位曾為子女未來作籌劃的父親，只是申請把自己供款的保單改名。處理有困難，向當事人說明就是！但AIA竟然向國安警舉報！效果是讓暴權政府有藉口玩株連，三個星期拘禁，還面對無理狀告！

I urge you not to buy from AIA in the future! A father who had been planning for his children's future simply applied to change the name of the insured in the policy he had contributed to. Even if they found it difficult to process the request, they could have explained the restriction. But AIA went so far as to report it to the National Security Police! The effect of this is to give the tyrannical government an excuse for collective punishment [of families]. [Kwok] was detained for three weeks and is still facing an unreasonable charge!

Many echoed Chung’s comment, asking why the insurance company didn't just freeze the account but instead let the father step into the national security trap. 

Since the enactment of Beijing-imposed National Security Law on June 30, 2020, financial institutions have been told to file suspicious transaction reports for dealings that may be violating the national security law to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit, an investigative division of the Police Force and the Customs and Excise Department.

The case of Anna Kwok's father seems to suggest that the scope of the security reportage mechanism may be more extensive than people have anticipated. 

Kwok Yin-sang will next appear in court on June 13.

Why cover up the feline's cause of death?

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot from YouTube Channel: Wukong's Adventures. Fair Use.

Wukong was a stray cat adopted by a bicycle traveller-blogger, Zhao Shuo, on October 26, 2024. After his adoption, the two travelled together throughout China's Xinjiang province, and Wukong became a popular internet celebrity with thousands of followers. However, on April 15, the cat was found dead on a road near Miran – a town in Xinjiang region, about two kilometers away from the visitor center where Zhao settled.

Upon hearing the news, Wukong’s followers were overwhelmed by grief and outraged by the “official” explanation of the cat's unnatural death.

Mysterious death

Wukong’s death was first reported on April 16 as a car accident, where the cat was crushed by a vehicle and left in the middle of the road, according to online news outlet Juipainews, a subsidiary of state-funded Changjiang News. Reportedly, the information came from the local police. The outlet added that Zhao had apparently settled the dispute with the driver.

However, the cat owner denied the claim in a video released on May 4, denouncing the report as fake news, as he himself did not know the details of Wukong's death. He recounted how he had discovered his cat's body at around 7 pm on April 15 and had, up to that point, failed in finding surveillance footage that might shed light on Wukong’s death. Zhao also raised a number of questions in the video: Why was the feline, which usually stayed within a 200-meter radius of its mobile cat house, found 2 kilometers away in the middle of the road? Why was there a 20-minute blackout on Wukong's GPS records between 4:10 and 4:30 pm? And after the blackout, why did its location suddenly change from the visitor center to the roadside?

Moreover, upon consultation with three vets, who conducted three post-mortem X-ray and CT scans, Zhao ruled out a car accident as the cat's cause of death, as its body did not have any bone fractures or external and internal wounds. The vets believed that the feline was likely killed by poisoning, as there was dark-colored blood coming out of its mouth and nose hours after its death, according to Zhao's account.

The 42-minute-long video was deleted on Chinese social media, but here is a YouTube backup with English subtitles:

Many also found it incredible that the surveillance cameras in the visitor center failed to function on April 15, as the Chinese authorities have invested a huge amount of money in surveillance technology, in particular networked CCTV, for the purpose of social stability control in the Uyghur region, and Miran is a tourist site with a heavy military presence. Here is a Weibo comment concerning the “failure” of surveillance:

就在游客中心2公里的地方 一条猫被投毒致死 结果监控全无什么也拍不到 去了就有生命危险以后谁还敢去玩啊 ​

Just two kilometers away from the visitor centre, a cat was poisoned to death, but there isn’t any surveillance footage showing how it happened. Who dares visit such a place?

With so many unanswered questions, about 3 million social media users self-mobilised to investigate the cause of the feline’s death by collecting driving records, CCTV footage, or satellite images of the museum's surrounding areas between 4:00 and 6:00 pm. Some netizens even offered cash rewards for useful footage. 

Call for legislation against animal cruelty

While the citizens’ investigations haven't revealed much, they have sparked conversations about animal rights.

Back in 2020, animal rights activists revealed the existence of an online network of cat abuse in China. From time to time, there were reports that cat abusers shared and sold cat torture videos through online chat groups. Reportedly, some members in the network even offer a cash reward of up to USD 500 for killing celebrity cats. Many, thus, believed that Wukong might have been a target of these animal cruelty groups.

In China, animal protection laws are confined to safeguarding wild animals, and no regulation prohibits cruelty against domestic or stray animals. Stray dogs and cats are often targets of poisoning and illegal trading, as the country allows the consumption of cat and dog meat and sees regular crackdowns on stray dogs as a means to maintain public hygiene and safety.

For years, the public has called for legislation against animal cruelty, but the Chinese authorities have remained in a limbo. Wukong’s death is making animal lovers more impatient, and they flooded Weibo with angry comments such as:

世界之大，却容不下一只猫，猫咪也不知道人心如此坏！《反虐动物法》该抬上来了，猫猫狗狗不能因为常见就放弃保护，肆意虐待，放纵吃…

The world is big, but it can not accommodate a cat. Cats have no idea that the human heart is so bad! The Anti-Animal Cruelty Act should be enacted, we can’t give up protecting cats and dogs just because they are common. They are being recklessly abused, tortured and eaten…

Blaming the cat and its owner

As the public resentment continued rising, suddenly, on May 9, Zhao released a video and a statement saying that, upon communication with various local authorities, including public security, propaganda, and tourism departments, they concluded that Wukong died after eating a rodent by mistake. He said:

其他的幾種死，因為車禍、投毒、虐殺都完全排除掉了。所以這樣說的話，整個悟空的死因最大的責任人就是我，我作為它的主人沒有看好它。悟空的死因和其他人完全無關，而且這個事件給當地造成了非常不好的輿論影響。在此我向所有人表示歉意。…另外再提醒所有人兩點，第一點就是永遠不要盲目的相信任何人和媒體，尤其是像九派新聞這種無良媒體。甚至也不要相信我。所有人要有自己的獨立判斷..

The other causes of death — car accidents, poisoning, and animal torture — have all been ruled out. Therefore, the person most responsible for Wukong's death is me, as its owner, I did not take care of it. The cause of Wukong's death has nothing to do with anyone else, and this incident has created a very bad public opinion about the region. I want to apologise to everyone…. I would also like to remind everyone of two more issues. The first is to never blindly trust anyone or the media, especially unscrupulous media like JiupainNews. Don't even trust me. Everyone should have their own independent judgment…

After the apology, Zhao deleted two videos about Wukong’s death on Chinese social media platforms, set his accounts to private, and stopped commenting on the incident.

Most people found such an official explanation implausible. One Weibo user mocked the local authorities:

当地各部门如果这种说法会令人更加信任你们，那么好吧，只能信了。

若羌县米兰镇有致死性啮齿类动物，不知道对当地牛羊鸡鸭鹅是什么影响，也很难不怀疑会间接伤害吃下当地牛羊鸡鸭鹅肉的人，所以会远离此地的，谢谢官方提示

If local authorities really believed their explanation was believable, then fine we will trust their story. Now that such deadly rodents exist in the Miran Town of Rouqiang county, what would be the impact on their cows, goats, chickens, ducks and geese? People can’t help but have doubts about local food security. So, thank you for the official advice in warning people to stay away from the region.

Quite a few social media users did indeed make their judgment based on the crowd-sourced investigation that Wukong’s cause of death was rat poison placed in the tourist site. However, as the authorities did not want to take responsibility for the feline’s death, they staged it as a car accident, produced fake news about it, and removed surveillance footage that could shed light on what had happened to the cat around the visitor center. In the end, Wukong had to bear the responsibility for its own death, and its owner had to apologize for causing a public stir.

However, some highlighted Zhao’s comment about “believing in no one” and stressed that Wukong’s death would remain a mystery. Yet, the “truth” was revealed in the rationality behind the cover-up — what exactly were the authorities afraid of?

Despite the current improvements, there’s still a long way to go

Originally published on Global Voices

The Alibaba headquarters in Hangzhou, China. Photo by Zhoghe Ma on Unsplash. Used under an Unsplash licence.

The winds of change are blowing through the top Chinese tech companies in 2025. According to a new report by Ranking Digital Rights (RDR), Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, three major Chinese tech companies, have all undergone major improvements in transparency. ByteDance (TikTok) was also examined for the first time, and stood out as one of the most transparent tech companies, widely respecting freedom of expression policies and practices.

The Chinese government has been cracking down on the tech sector for years, causing those companies to lose more than USD 1 trillion in market value. Following the economic stagnation after the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing tensions between the US and China, their market capitalization dropped.

If Chinese companies keep expanding transparency regarding their governance, it could profoundly transform users’ online lives for the better. Access to platform policies information can provide users with new tools to manage their data more effectively. More importantly, being more aware of how people’s social media presence is controlled by tech giants and the Chinese government, too, is crucial for their freedom. 

Despite the current improvements, Chinese companies are still ranked far below top Western tech companies, such as Microsoft, Alphabet (Google), Meta, and Apple. The report suggests more straightforward actions. There’s still a long way to go.

The report focuses on three key areas: governance, freedom of expression, and privacy. A summary of this research is presented below.

Image from RDR 2025 Ranking.

ByteDance (TikTok) 

Services evaluated: TikTok. 

ByteDance is the parent company of TikTok, a fast-growing social media platform in China and globally, with over 170 million users in the US alone.

During his first term, US President Donald Trump raised concerns about TikTok’s alleged sharing of user data with the Chinese government and accused the platform of directly influencing the US public opinion.

The company denied these accusations and implemented measures such as Project Texas, a data security initiative to store US users’ data inside the country, and opened its Transparency Centers. Additionally, the company provided an explanation of its content recommendation system and the parameters involved. 

TikTok stood out as one of the most transparent tech companies, coming second after YouTube in the freedom of expression ranking. Its parent company, ByteDance, ranked sixth overall, being more committed to protecting user privacy but not their freedom of expression. Even if there is still more to do, ByteDance had a better ranking than X at seventh place. 

According to RDR, TikTok should improve transparency in governance, offer more information about its algorithm development, and enhance clarity regarding potential data breaches. 

Read the complete report on ByteDance here.

Alibaba

Services evaluated: Taobao.com and AliGenie.

Alibaba runs Taobao, the largest e-commerce platform in China. As of November 2024, the platform registered 649 million monthly active app users in China.

Since 2020, Alibaba has faced intense government scrutiny, including antitrust fines and public criticism of Jack Ma, its co-founder. In 2022, China passed an algorithm filing regulation that forces services like Alibaba to submit to the government details about their algorithmic models. The company also shared the principles behind Taobao.com and AliGenie (its virtual assistant service).

In August 2023, the Chinese government confirmed the company’s “rectification” process had been completed.  

Today, Alibaba is aligned with international ESG standards. For the first time, the company shared a human rights commitment and pledged adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These steps forward were taken for economic purposes. The attention from the Chinese government in the past years has reduced its market value and share, and caused a drop in stock price.

According to RDR, Alibaba has demonstrated improvement across the largest number of indicators, driven particularly by its growth in governance, where it made the most progress. The company was ranked ninth, higher than its Western counterpart, Amazon, at 13th place.

Read the complete report on Alibaba here.

Baidu

Services evaluated: Baidu Search, Baidu Cloud, and Baidu PostBar.

Baidu, the dominant search engine in China, offers various services: a social media platform, cloud storage, and Baidu Search (its flagship service). In recent years, the company has advanced in the AI and autonomous driving sector. 

The company has explained how its algorithms handle prohibited content and disclose details about its content recommendations systems, but it has failed to go deep and reveal information about its targeted advertising systems or how user information is used for algorithm development.

Baidu's efforts focus on privacy policies and practices, but users have few tools to manage their information. They did not clarify the types of encryption it provided to users and disclosed limited details on how it manages its vulnerability reporting program.

A 2024 Citizen Lab report supported RDR's findings, highlighting vulnerabilities in Chinese cloud-based keyboard applications, including those developed by Baidu. While the company addressed the most critical issues, some vulnerabilities remain unresolved. 

According to RDR, Baidu ranked ninth thanks to improvements to its governance procedure, but it’s still far behind its rival Alphabet (Google), which is in second place. The company needs to be more transparent about its due diligence regarding human rights. Baidu has improved some of its privacy policies by disclosing the names of several third parties with whom it shared user data, but its overall transparency remains low due to its opacity regarding government requests for user information. 

Read the complete report on Baidu here.

Tencent 

Services evaluated: QZone, QQ, WeChat, and Tencent Cloud.

Tencent includes many services: social media, messaging, gaming, music, and cloud services. Its most popular platforms are QQ and WeChat, two widely used messaging and social media platforms in China. With 1.38 billion monthly active accounts from government agencies, businesses, media outlets, and citizens, WeChat dominates the Chinese market.

For a long time, Tencent remained a key target of the Chinese regulator. In 2023, the Cyberspace Administration of China fined it for permitting illegal and pornographic content to appear on QQ, and it received a warning about the circulation of illegal information on WeChat.

In response, Tencent outlined basic information on content moderation rules enforcement and published monthly “crackdown” reports on illegal information. However, the volume of affected content or advertisements was not specified.

For privacy and security, Tencent provides encryption protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Citizen Lab found security vulnerabilities in the encryption of WeChat and Sogou (the virtual keyboard input method). They then fixed all reported vulnerabilities for Sogou, but didn’t adopt the encryption suggestions for WeChat.

The company outlined a three-tier oversight mechanism for monitoring ESG issues. In its latest ESG report, for the first time, Tencent joined the United Nations Global Compact and pledged to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the same document, they affirmed that they will “carefully review” government demands for user information and, when laws permit, notify users about these demands. 

Tencent has significantly improved its governance processes and is recognized as one of the most transparent companies in advertising content. For example, the company prohibited certain types of advertisements that target minors.

According to RDR, Tencent ranked eleventh, very far from other rivals with similar services (WhatsApp, Instagram, and Facebook) like Meta. The report recommends that the company put more effort into expanding its human rights due diligence both in relation to targeted advertising practices and by publishing data on the account restrictions applied.

Read the complete report on Tencent here.

The 2025 RDR Index demonstrates stagnation at a critical time

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy Ranking Digital Rights

A decade after the first assessment, the 2025 Ranking Digital Rights Index: Big Tech Edition reveals a landscape of paradox. While some of the world's most influential digital platforms demonstrate incremental improvements in transparency, particularly in governance disclosures from Chinese companies like Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent, the overall picture suggests a concerning inertia. In a world grappling with rising authoritarianism, the use of AI tools, and ongoing global conflicts, the report shows that many Big Tech companies are largely continuing with “business as usual,” failing to address critical issues.

The concentration of power within Big Tech remains a central concern. The report highlights how companies like Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft have aggressively acquired competitors, consolidating their dominance in the digital landscape. This market concentration, where Alphabet, Meta, and Amazon capture two-thirds of online advertising revenue, grants them power over online access and information flows.

Despite increasing scrutiny from legal systems, evidenced by rulings against Google for illegal monopolies in search and advertising, the political influence of Big Tech appears to have increased. The symbolic image of US Big Tech CEOs in the front row of the US presidential inauguration underscores their deep connections with government bodies, potentially hindering much-needed oversight at a time when human rights and democratic structures face unprecedented challenges globally.

This dominance is further exacerbated in a context of conflict. “Alphabet, Amazon, and Microsoft have all developed tools meant for war and integration with lethal weapons. Their cloud infrastructure has powered military campaigns,” reveals the report. Ranking Digital Rights also calls attention to propaganda, especially on X and platforms owned by Meta.

Lack of transparency

While the report highlights pockets of progress, particularly among Chinese companies (Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu), showing increased transparency in governance, patterns have been spotted throughout the analysis that raise concerns. Though Meta has shown improvements in disclosing how its algorithms curate content and has enhanced security with default end-to-end encryption on some messaging services, significant shortcomings persist across the industry. A common issue is the widespread lack of transparency in how companies handle private requests for user data or content restrictions, with Samsung notably disclosing no information in this area.

Source: Ranking Digital Rights/2025.

The very engines of Big Tech's profit — algorithms and targeted advertising — remain largely opaque. Despite the known risks for democracies linked to disinformation and election interference, none of the assessed companies achieved even half the possible score in this area. Alphabet and Meta even showed slight declines in transparency related to their targeted advertising practices. Most companies fail to disclose information about advertisements removed for violating their policies or provide evidence of enforcing their ad targeting rules.

X declined significantly more than other companies analyzed. “The company’s transformation from the publicly listed Twitter to the privately held X Corp. and the elimination of its human rights team coincided with a significant drop in transparency across its governance, freedom of expression, and privacy practices,” the report emphasized. X failed to publish a transparency report in both 2022 and 2023. While a report finally surfaced in September 2024, it fell outside the assessment's cutoff. Even more troubling is the reported removal of years’ worth of transparency reports dating back to 2011.

Finally, the report points to a troubling pattern of policy evolution. Companies like Meta and YouTube have been revising their content policies in ways that have sparked widespread concern, such as Meta dismantling its third-party fact-checking program in the US and YouTube removing “gender identity” from its hate speech policy. Global Voices covered the consequences of this policy in Africa, and also how fact-checking practices are needed amidst digital authoritarianism, especially during elections, such as the case of Indonesia.

This suggests a potential shift towards justifying existing behaviors rather than upholding previously embraced principles.

The 2025 RDR Index demonstrates stagnation at a critical time. While acknowledging some positive developments, the report also calls for a renewed effort from different stakeholders, especially civil society, investors, and policymakers.

This isn't the first time a Uyghur researcher or advocate has been denied entry to Kazakhstan

Originally published on Global Voices

Qordai border control point at the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border. Photo from the Border Service of Kazakhstan. Fair use.

A Danish anthropologist, Rune Steenberg, who researches Uyghurs, was denied entry to Kazakhstan on April 12. This took place at the Kazakh-Kyrgyz land border near Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek. Despite having visited Kazakhstan many times before, the Kazakh border guards informed Steenberg that he would not be permitted to enter the country.

“I asked about the reasons. They said there was no information. I think it has to do with my research on Xinjiang,” Steenberg said.

Steenberg has been researching various Uyghur communities around the world for many years, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in China, also known as East Turkestan. Uyghurs substitute an ethnic and religious minority in China and live mainly in XUAR. Since 2014, they have been subjected to mass detention at the so-called “reeducation camps”, intensive surveillance, forced labor, and other rights abuses in the name of Chinese authorities fight against extremism.

He is currently leading an EU-funded research project at Palacky University Olomouc and is a teaching resident fellow at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek.

Initially, he was an ordinary researcher who did not set out to participate in political debates. However, since the beginning of the unprecedented political repression of Muslim and Turkic ethnic groups in XUAR, such as Uyghurs and Kazakhs, in 2014, and the introduction of widespread censorship about it, it has become impossible to be an objective Uyghur anthropologist without publicly covering this problem.

Amid this repression, he became not just a field researcher but also a publicist, political commentator, and one of the few outspoken voices on the horrors that Uyghurs were facing in China.

Perhaps that is what displeased the Kazakh authorities, who turn a blind eye to the mass illegal detentions of Uyghurs and Kazakhs in China. For example, during the visit of the Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Xinjiang in October 2023, the issue of the rights of the Kazakh population of China was not publicly raised.

This isn't the first time a Uyghur advocate has been denied entry to Kazakhstan. In 2021, Yevgeny Bunin, the creator of the largest database of victims of Xinjiang prisons and camps called Shahit.biz, was denied entry to Kazakhstan due to his work.

This can be explained by the close political and economic ties between Kazakhstan and China, evidenced by their agreement on a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. Additionally, China is Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and a major investor, having invested over USD 25 billion in Kazakhstan between 2005 and 2023.

Photo of Rune Steenberg. Used with permission.

Global Voices spoke to Rune Steenberg over email about how exactly he learned about his ban on visiting Kazakhstan, and what it’s like to be a Uyghur anthropologist without physical access to the largest Uyghur communities. The interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.

Global Voices (GV): Tell us exactly how you found out that you were banned from entering Kazakhstan.

Rune Steenberg (RN): I was on my way from Bishkek to Almaty, crossing at the Qordai-Dostuk border crossing point in the early evening of April 12, 2025. I was going to Almaty to meet friends. I passed through the Kyrgyz border control without problems. I got my exit stamp and walked along to the Kazakh side where I waited in line with everyone else.

When it was my turn, the Kazakh officer scanned my passport, asked me to remove my glasses and khuffiya, and took a picture of me with a small hand-held webcam. Then he looked closer at his screen. He called his colleague over, they discussed and then he turned to me and told me I couldn’t enter.

I asked why that was. He said there was no further information, only that I was ‘blocked.’ So I walked back to the Kyrgyz side. Thankfully, they let me in, canceled my exit stamp, and let me walk back to the bus, which I took back to Bishkek.

GV: You are suggesting that you were banned for actively studying the massive political repression among Uyghurs and Kazakhs in China and speaking out about it in the media. But you've never publicly criticized Kazakhstan itself, have you? Is the rights of national minorities in a neighboring state such a taboo topic in Kazakhstan?

RS: I do not know why I am banned. Also, I do not know for how long. I was not given any information about this yet. I went to ask at the Kazakh embassy in Bishkek and the Danish honorary consulate in Bishkek. I emailed the Danish embassy in Moscow, which the honorary consul told me was responsible for the matters of Danish citizens in Kazakhstan.

I know that people have before been banned from Kazakhstan for writing about Uyghur issues and Xinjiang (such as Gene Bunin, Dilnur Reyhan, and a few others), but I’m not sure that is why I am banned. At the same time, I can’t imagine any other reason they would have done it. I have always respected the time limits of my stay and never violated any laws or regulations in Kazakhstan. So it’s just a qualified guess.

GV: You are an anthropologist who studies Uyghurs. Ironically, you are now barred from entering the two countries with the largest Uyghur populations in the world. What are your research plans now?

RS: There are many Uyghurs across the world in more than a hundred countries. Also, I have so much material already that it would probably be wise to take some years to process, analyze, and write about it rather than doing further research. I have hundreds of Uyghur books that can now no longer be found in China because they have been banned or removed and they too deserve analytical attention. They are very important.

So I won’t run out of material. Also, as I am currently leading a research project called Remote Ethnography of XUAR, I am constantly improving my methods for researching without having direct on-the-ground access. There is so much to find and so much to do even when you cannot go in person. Do check out our homepage for tips and inspiration.

India races to match China’s growing influence in South Asia

Originally published on Global Voices

PM Narendra Modi meeting President of China Xi Jinping at the 16th BRICS Summit (2024), via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0.

In recent decades, South Asian nations have emerged as pivotal destination points for major infrastructure investments from both India and China. Stretching from the shores of the Indian Ocean to the Himalayan foothills, the growing footprint of these two regional powers is reshaping the landscape of development. While many projects share similar outcomes, they have also raised concerns about their impact on local economies and everyday life.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Initiation and controversy

Proposed Belt and Road Initiative. Illustrated in 2017 by Lommes, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0.

First initiated in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is considered one of the most ambitious international infrastructure endeavours in recent history. Spanning more than 150 nations and involving over USD 1 trillion in investments, the BRI has supported the development of ports, railroads, highways, and energy networks throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As per the Green Finance and Development Center, there has been a revival in BRI financing after the COVID-19 pandemic, largely driven by Chinese policy banks and state-owned companies.

In Sri Lanka, however, the BRI has become a cautionary example. The Hambantota Port, built with loans from the Export-Import Bank of China, failed to generate the expected revenue. In 2017, the Sri Lankan government granted a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings, raising concerns over sovereignty and economic vulnerability. Critics, particularly in Western media, have pointed to this as evidence of what they describe as China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” — a claim that Chinese officials strongly deny.

However, some scholars argue that the term “debt-trap diplomacy” is misleading. Deborah Brautigam of Johns Hopkins University argues in her 2020 article “A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: the rise of a meme” argued that debt crises in countries such as Sri Lanka are mainly caused by domestic mismanagement, aggressive infrastructure spending, and global economic pressures — rather than coercion by China.

In Bangladesh, foreign initiatives have significantly influenced the country's infrastructure and energy landscape. A key example is the Payra Power Plant, a USD 2.48 billion coal-fired project constructed under the BRI framework with Chinese funding and technical expertise. The plant, operational since 2020, has helped alleviate chronic energy shortages but has been criticized for its environmental footprint and reliance on imported coal. Moreover, concerns have emerged regarding its long-term sustainability and alignment with Bangladesh’s climate commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement.

Another flagship BRI project is the Dhaka Elevated Expressway, a 20-kilometer-long project linking the capital’s airport to major industrial areas. Executed by the China Major Bridge Engineering Company, the project was structured as a public-private partnership under a 25-year build-own-transfer model. While it is expected to ease traffic congestion and boost logistics efficiency, experts have flagged the lack of competitive bidding and limited transparency in financial arrangements.

In March 2025, during an official visit to China, Bangladesh's Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, successfully secured a pledge of a total of USD 2.1 billion in investments, loans, and grants for Bangladesh, marking a significant step in strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

An agreement ceremony featuring the leaders of the Maldives and China. January 10, 2024. Image via Wikipedia and The President's Office, Maldives. Public Domain

In the Maldives, Chinese loans under the BRI supported major housing projects and the Sinamalé Bridge, an important link between Malé and Hulhulé Island. In 2018, reports indicated that the Maldives’ total public debt rose to 72 percent of its GDP, reaching around USD 3.8 billion.

By early 2024, worries have resurfaced as the Maldives’ total debt rose to approximately USD 8.2 billion — 116.5 percent of its GDP in the first quarter, up from 110.4 percent during the same period the previous year. About half of that is external debt, with a big portion owed to China, which has extended loans totalling USD 1.37 billion to the country. The growing debt burden has sparked concerns regarding autonomy and repayment conditions.

However, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu has described China as “one of the Maldives’ closest allies and development partners.” He has pledged to deepen cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with a focus on infrastructure development. In January 2025, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) signed a deal with the Maldivian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Infrastructure to build major infrastructure on Gulhifalhu Island in the Malé Atoll, further expanding China’s footprint in the country.

India’s rise: Neighbourhood First and Act East

Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, being welcomed on his arrival in Manila to attend the ASEAN-India and East Asia Summits, on November 12, 2017, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0.

India, long seen as a regional power, is increasingly using infrastructure as a tool of foreign diplomacy. However, with the exception of Bhutan, most of India’s South Asian neighbors have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), leading to a significant rise in Chinese investments across the region. Since 2018, China has invested more than USD 150 billion in the economies of Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

China’s expanding influence has raised concerns in India, and in response, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has strengthened India’s regional outreach through the “Neighbourhood First” policy, aimed at deepening ties between South Asian countries. Complementing this is the “Act East” policy, which focuses on building closer partnerships with Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. Unlike China’s debt-driven mega-projects, India’s approach emphasizes three core principles: transparency, respect for sovereignty, and people-centric development.

India’s infrastructure engagement in Sri Lanka has largely focused on strategic support, including over USD 4 billion in credit lines during the country’s 2022 economic crisis. This assistance covered essential imports such as fuel and food and played a key role in stabilizing the Sri Lankan economy. India has also contributed to energy cooperation, particularly through projects like the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm and renewable energy initiatives in the north. However, these efforts have drawn criticism regarding transparency and local impact. For instance, a USD 442 million wind energy project awarded to India’s Adani Group without a competitive bidding process sparked concerns over environmental oversight and national sovereignty.

India’s flagship initiative in the Maldives — the USD 500 million Greater Malé Connectivity Project (GMCP) — faced backlash from the “India Out” movement, led by opposition figures in 2022 who claimed the project threatened national sovereignty and enabled a foreign military presence. The protest underscored the fragile balance between development and concerns over external influence.

In an effort to rebuild trust, India launched a USD 110 million sanitation project in 2024, covering 28 Maldivian islands. Construction on the GMCP resumed in February 2025 following diplomatic negotiations. As a goodwill gesture, India introduced visa-free travel for Maldivian citizens in March 2025 to help repair bilateral ties.

The Maitree Super Thermal Power Project, a joint venture between India and Bangladesh with equal stakes, currently provides 1,320 MW to Bangladesh’s grid through its coal-fired facility in Rampal, Khulna, financed under India’s special financing program. A number of projects, such as the Bangladesh-India Friendship Pipeline, have been indefinitely suspended due to the August 2024 change of government in Bangladesh.

Modi meeting with the Chief Adviser of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, in Bangkok, Thailand, on April 4, 2025. Image via Wikipedia and Government of India. Public Domain.

On April 4, 2025, Modi met with Muhammad Yunus on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok, holding talks for the first time since 2024. The meeting opened up opportunities for reconciliation and restarting the paused projects.

The road ahead

Despite a history of tension, China and India are key players in South Asia, each with different strategies. China focuses on large-scale BRI projects, while India prioritizes connectivity and capacity building. However, there are areas where India’s and China’s interests overlap, which creates room for cooperation. With South Asia’s infrastructure needs reaching into the trillions, both countries’ initiatives are complementing each other, expanding their influence through trade and investment. While India gains from improved connectivity and trade with its neighbors, it will need to strengthen its economic diplomacy to keep pace with China’s growing influence in today’s geopolitical landscape.

The videos tap into anxieties around China's decade-long corruption crackdowns

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot from the CIA's Chinese informant recruitment video via the CIA's YouTube channel. Fair Use. The Chinese subtitle says: “And now I realise that my fate is just as precarious as theirs.”

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released two social media videos on May 1, attempting to recruit Chinese officials to act as informants. In response, the Chinese government said that it would take necessary measures to crack down on “infiltration and sabotage activities of foreign anti-China forces.”

Although the videos address the common anxieties that many Chinese people feel about China's single-party regime, many still find the US propaganda unappealing.

The CIA has been recruiting Russian informants through social media since 2022. Claiming that the Russian initiative was successful, the agency extended its recruitment effort to China, Iran, and North Korea last October, posting videos instructing their recruitment targets to make contact via the CIA's official website through trusted encrypted Virtual Private Networks (VPNS) or the TOR network. 

The latest Chinese informant recruitment videos target both senior and junior officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The narrator of the first video portrays a senior official stressed out by the corruption crackdown under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership. He says:

在黨內，我一邊往上升，一邊看著職位比我高的人，一個個被棄如弊履。但現在，我意識到我的命運與他們同樣，岌岌可危… 

As I keep climbing up the party ladder, I watch those in higher positions being discarded like worn-out shoes. And now I realise that my fate is just as precarious as theirs…

The senior official eventually reached out to the CIA to protect his family. Here is the full video:

The second video is presented from the perspective of a junior official who is frustrated about the seeming failure of the single-party system, which he claims benefits the few over the majority.

黨教育我們，只要勤奮地遵從領導指定的道路就會前途無量，原本應該大家分享的一片天，如今只剩下少數獨享，讓我不得不開創自己的路。

The party teaches us that we can have a great future by following the path designated by the leaders. However, what should have been shared by all is not monopolised by the very few. I have to walk my own path. 

Check out the video here:

The anxieties captured in the videos are related to the decade-long corruption crackdowns and power struggle within the party since Xi Jinping took over the leadership of the CCP in 2012. The clampdown has been extensive, targeting both “tigers” and “flies,” political allegories for big and small corruption cases.

Major tiger cases include the uprooting of former national security chief Zhou Yongkang and his network which began in 2013; crackdowns on regional political forces from Guangdong, Shanxi, Sichuan, and Jiangsu which began in 2012; the purge of the People's Liberation Army in 2023; the cleansing of the banking and finance sector starting in 2024, and more.

Last year, the number of party members punished for different degrees of corruption soared to 889,000, a fourfold increase from 182,000 in 2013. According to a recently released report from the office of the director of the US National Intelligence, at least 5 million Chinese officials were found guilty of corruption between 2012 and 2024. 

The rapidly diminishing soft power of the US 

Although the videos have addressed the political tensions within the CCP, many find the narratives unconvincing, largely because the US has lost its moral high ground under President Donald Trump. Amid the Trump administration's dramatic cut in global aid and media funding, provocative tariff wars with the rest of the world, as well as domestic crackdowns on liberal values and diversity policies (DEI), the US is no longer perceived as a global defender of democracy and freedom.

Against such a background, a counter-CIA propaganda video produced by Guangzhou-based video-blogger “Executive K” (K总) has gained more traction. The blogger copied the genre and setting of the CIA’s videos in an AI-generated video, urging US citizens to fight for freedom:

［美国版］选择抗争的原因：创造美好未来
Reasons for choosing to fight: Create a better future pic.twitter.com/weQxgxcpQs

— K总 (@KFCQZ) May 4, 2025

In the video, the narrator, a US citizen named John, said:

Our government told me ‘hard work pays off,’ but all I see is that Wall Street elites manipulate finance, politicians are taking bribes, and it seems like Israel is the real power pulling the strings behind us. And we ordinary people can only struggle to survive…

Widely shared by pro-China influencers on Twitter, the video has gone viral since it was released on May 4.

Unrealistic presentation of the recruitment videos

In addition to the diminishing soft power of the US, Japan-based Chinese video blogger Wuyuesanren explained in his YouTube channel that the “lures” were unrealistic because after a decade-long crackdown on corruption, most senior officials’ offspring have been forced to return to China, and any linkage to foreign forces would jeopardize their families’ security. As for junior officials, the appeal to idealism would not work, as most idealists have already left the country or were forced to give up their government position, as there was no institutional space for them to bring change.

The blogger also criticized the cinematic, glossy presentation of the videos — the office and the outfits of the senior officials were too luxurious and dramatic, which showed that the producers were out of touch with modern Chinese politics. 

On Weibo, many brought up the news that Beijing had uprooted the CIA network in China, with up to 20 informants having been killed or jailed in 2012, to show that the US is incapable of protecting its informants. 

“To muddy the water”

Hu Xijin, a political commentator from the Chinese state-funded Global Times, thus believes that the intention of the videos was not to recruit Chinese spies, but to create distrust within the CCP: 

CIA这样干，根本就没指望能真从这个途径捞几个有价值的间谍来。他们的最大目的是想搅浑水。

如果有人上当，真的联系CIA，并被中国反间机构抓住，CIA才不会同情那些想向他们效忠的叛国者。那些人身败名裂，甚至身陷囹圄，CIA什么损失也没有，所有惩罚只能那些人自己承受。中国反间机构抓他们也要消耗一些资源和精力，总之，所有成本都是中国这一边的。

还有一种可能，中国这边没人上当，但是CIA希望通过发这样的视频，增加中国社会内部的怀疑，可以当个“反间计”用。如果有一些人能因此被怀疑成美国间谍，搞得中国一些领域人心惶惶…

The CIA did this without any expectation that it could recruit a few valuable spies. Its biggest goal was to muddy the waters.

If someone falls for it, contacts the CIA and gets caught by the Chinese counter-agency, the CIA will have no sympathy for [the Chinese] traitors who want to pledge allegiance to them. The CIA has nothing to lose if those people lose their reputation or even go to jail. They have to bear all the punishment. The Chinese counterintelligence agency will have to spend extra resources and energy to catch them; in short, all the costs are on China's side.

There is also a possibility that no one on China's side will take the bait, but the CIA hopes that by posting such a video, it will increase the suspicion within Chinese society. This can be used as a ‘double-edged sword,’ leading to some Chinese being accused of being American spies. This would stir up panic in some Chinese sectors… 

On the other hand, Desmond Shum, author of the memoir “Red Roulette,” which exposes corruption within the CCP, believes that the US will pay a price for the provocative videos, as they could disrupt potential resolution between the US and China in the current tariff war:

A public CIA call for Chinese insiders to defect transcends typical intelligence operations — it is seen as a direct political provocation. It strikes at the heart of the Party’s fears of internal betrayal and is interpreted in Beijing as an assault on its control and stability — an impact far more consequential than any tariff.

That’s why this video might turn out to be the most consequential — and disruptive — move in the ongoing US–China trade talks. The signal it sends is louder than any tariff and strikes a very personal nerve within the Party.

Queer writing in Ukraine still retains limited visibility

Originally published on Global Voices

Iryna Shuvalova at DayBreak café in Taipei in January 2025 giving a reading of her poetry alongside her translator Hsu Yu-Hsuan. Photo by Filip Noubel, used with permission.

War often reduces entire cultures and countries to one over-simplified narrative, particularly in the domain of news. Ukraine was first invaded by Russia in 2014, and then again in 2022, and that story dominates the vast majority of media coverage on Ukraine, given the extent of death and destruction, but also the resistance demonstrated by the Ukrainian people. But Ukraine is also home to its own multilingual and multiethnic literature, music, and art that cannot ignore war but is more than war.

To unpack this paradox, Global Voices spoke to Iryna Shuvalova, a poet, scholar, and translator from Kyiv who now lives mostly in Oslo. She is the author of award-winning books of poetry in Ukrainian, including “stoneorcharwoods” and “endsongs.” Her work has been translated into 32 languages. The interview took place over email after an in-person meeting in Taipei. Answers have been edited for style and brevity.

Portrait of Iryna Shuvalova by Anton Bystriakov for Craft Magazine, photo used with permission.

Filip Noubel (FN): As a poet, how do you navigate your creative space between the war in Ukraine and the freedom of literature to find inspiration anywhere?  

Iryna Shuvalova (IS):  I remember how, during a poetry reading in Italy, one of the audience members asked me: ‘And what else do Ukrainian poets write about? Besides war.’ In a way, this was an understandable question. War has necessarily become a crucial subject for Ukrainian writers: after the current war’s outbreak in 2014 and then after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. It’s impossible not to write about something that shakes your world upside down so completely.

We, poets, also understood well the importance of literature as an element of wartime cultural diplomacy, as a way to speak to the world about our country’s plight. At the same time, Ukrainian poets invited to speak and read their work outside Ukraine are largely expected to speak and read on the subject of the war — not on other things, even while Ukrainian poetry is, of course, not limited to war writing.

My 2024 book ‘endsongs,’ which explores the experience of loss, includes many war poems. However, I am equally interested in growing up and aging as the loss of our past selves or in displacement and relocation as a type of loss.” Yet all these things tend to be of lesser interest to publishers and festival organizers abroad, who sometimes, sadly, expect me to perform my wartime Ukrainian identity in a rather limited and predictable way.

There is a certain paradox in this, because readers eventually get tired of coming into contact with war-themed Ukrainian material only. War fatigue is a real thing. So we want to show our readers abroad how much more Ukrainian literature has to offer, how witty, complex, and rich in good stories it can be. The war marks our writing, but it does not define it.

FN: One of your many projects focused on war songs in Donbas after the first 2014 invasion of Ukraine. What surprised you the most in this project? 

IS: Yes, besides being a writer and translator, I am also a scholar of Ukraine and Eastern Europe, currently in a postdoctoral position at the University of Oslo. As a researcher, I’m interested in how popular culture and politics intersect. The project you’ve mentioned was my PhD research, which I started in 2016. At that point, pre-2022, there was already a powerful cultural response to the war, which was then still centered in the region of Donbas but affected people all over Ukraine. The conflict continued to claim lives for all the eight years it burned, then simmered before erupting into yet another bloody explosion with the full-scale invasion.

I was especially interested in how popular music reflected people’s wartime attitudes and experiences. Unlike the so-called ‘high’ culture, popular culture is something that people find easy to access, consume, and even create, particularly in the age of social media. Not everyone is going to read a big fat novel on the subject of the war. Meanwhile, a pop song can be listened to in three minutes. Its music and lyrics tend to be accessible. On YouTube, a war song gone viral can collect millions of views. Popular songs offer unique insights into the rapidly evolving landscape of the war and the community’s response to it.

What surprised me was how many people, even inside the scholarly community, still consider popular culture to be somehow a lesser subject to explore academically. Some colleagues might secretly, or even openly, scoff at the material making up your research corpus. Thankfully, these attitudes are changing.

FN: You co-edited the first anthology of queer literature in Ukraine 120 Pages of “Sodom.” How visible is queer literature today inside Ukraine? Has the full-scale invasion changed views of the majority about queer people in Ukraine?

IS:  This is always an exciting subject to discuss, because we have just recently finished collecting the submissions for the first-ever queer poetry competition in Ukraine, which I co-organize with my colleague Polina Horodyska. The name of the competition is ‘Holosni’ which in Ukrainian means both ‘vowels,’ but also being ‘loud’ or ‘vocal.’ We are now reading through the submissions, and it’s a daily source of joy to discover fantastic new poetry, because queer writing in Ukraine, unfortunately, still retains limited visibility. We have had a few books in the past decade centered around queer narratives, and several great queer young adult books penned by Ukrainian authors. However, very few writers are openly out as LGBTQI+ people.

Ukrainian society still remains not the friendliest environment to be queer in. The community continues to face prejudice and discrimination — sometimes even violence. Recently, a bookstore in Kyiv had to cancel a presentation of a queer young adult novel because of the threats they received from a far-right group.

That’s why a lot of writing reflecting queer experiences still remains on the margins, often invisible. Because of this, when we launched our contest in early March, we had no idea how many submissions we would get, but in the end, we collected 114 submissions, coming not only from inside Ukraine but from Ukrainians based in 12 other countries. We are particularly grateful to our fantastic NGO partners KyivPride and Sfera for spreading the word.

FN: You lived in China and recently visited Taiwan. What are the reactions of people in China and Taiwan when they realize you are from Ukraine? 

IS: Indeed, I lived in China for three years, between 2019–2023, first in Hangzhou, then in Nanjing, where I worked in international schools. My visit to Taiwan this winter was my first time on the island.

Most people in both places begin by telling me how sorry they are about what’s happening in my country. I always appreciate these words deeply. But I find that, on average, people in Taiwan tend to be much better informed about the dynamics of the war and the causes behind it than people on the mainland. While my friends among the Chinese intellectuals know where to find reliable information about the war, I had many well-meaning Chinese tell me how they wish peace for Ukraine would come soon, without recognizing that Ukrainians don’t just want peace at any cost.

In Taiwan, we have a very important shared topic: our colonial past. Of course, Ukraine’s colonisation by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was not the same experience as Taiwan’s colonial past. But overall, there is a general lack of knowledge about Ukraine in the region. This is why we, Ukrainians, have a lot of work to do in building cultural bridges with East Asia and South-East Asia, including in the Sinosphere. Here poetry can be an important tool of such cultural diplomacy, as some projects demonstrate: My poems have been published in the April issue of Li Poetry, translated into Mandarin by a native of Taipei Hsu YuHsuan, a prolific translator from Ukrainian. I also hope to see my poems translated into the Taiwanese Hokkien language someday. Other poems I wrote during my stay in Taipei are now incorporated into a book, ‘I Don’t Speak This Language’ — a joint project combining poetry and art by a Suzhou-based Ukrainian artist Yuliia Tveritina. In this book, we explore our experience as Ukrainians living, working, and traveling in the Sinosphere. It is our dream, too, to bring this project to the Taiwanese readers one day.

Authors need creative freedom to tell China's story well

Originally published on Global Voices

Zhang Lijia. Photo used with permission.

There are about 50 million Chinese people living outside of China. Often reduced to a purely economic actor, this large diaspora is also active in media and culture, including literature, whether its members write in Chinese languages or in the languages of the countries where they now live.

To understand the nuances of such literature written outside of China, Global Voices spoke with Zhang Lijia (张丽佳),  a rocket factory worker-turned writer and social commentator who was born in China and now lives between London and Beijing. She is the author of a memoir, “Socialism Is Great!” and a novel, “Lotus,” which discusses prostitution in contemporary China. She is currently finishing a historical novel based on the life of China’s first feminist and revolutionary at the turn of the 20th Century, Qiu Jin, known as China’s Joan of Arc.

Filip Noubel (FN):  In which way is writing in a language that came much later in your life liberating? Is it a matter of (self)censored issues? Does it extend to style and experimentation with the very process of writing?

Zhang Lijia (ZLJ): As a Chinese writer who grew up in China, speaking only Chinese, writing in English has been unexpectedly liberating. Politically, it grants me freedom. Writing for an international audience allows me to bypass the constraints of China’s strict censorship, which has long stifled creative expression. In fact, I believe this censorship is one of the key reasons why China’s literary scene isn’t as vibrant or dynamic as it could be.

Creatively, writing in English offers a different kind of liberation. Because it is not my native tongue, I feel more comfortable experimenting with form, structure, and style. The unfamiliarity of the language opens doors to fresh perspectives and a certain boldness. My adopted language has enabled me to explore and articulate thoughts and emotions that might have felt constrained in Chinese. For example, in my memoir “Socialism Is Great!,” I wrote a sex scene that was far more explicit than it would have been had I written it in Chinese, where cultural and linguistic nuances might have demanded greater restraint.

Writing in English has, in many ways, become an avenue for both creative exploration and personal emancipation.

FN: Do you still write in Chinese? How do you experience the relationship between those two languages in your creative process?

ZLJ: I rarely write creatively in Chinese these days, though I occasionally contribute pieces to Chinese publications when invited. Chinese is such a rich and expressive language, full of cultural depth and historical resonance. When I do write in English, I like to deliberately weave in dated expressions and traditional idioms to give the prose a distinctive flair — almost as if breathing new life into forgotten phrases. It’s a way to make the language feel fresh and evocative while connecting with its deep roots.

In my creative process, English and Chinese serve different purposes. English is my primary medium for storytelling — it’s where I feel most liberated and experimental. Chinese, however, remains the language of my inner world, tied to my memories and identity. Writing in English sometimes feels like building a bridge between the two, translating not just words but experiences, emotions, and cultural contexts.

FN: There is a lot of talk about global Sinophone literature that transcends geographic and language barriers (you, but also Xiaolu Guo, Ha Jin, Dan Sijie, Yan Geling): do you agree there is such a type of literature? If so, what defines it?

ZLJ: Yes, I believe global Sinophone literature is a valid and vibrant category. I think it refers to literary works written in Sinitic languages (such as Mandarin or Hokkien) or by authors of Chinese descent, often living outside mainland China. These works engage with a diverse array of themes and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay of language, identity, and geopolitics within the global Chinese diaspora.

What defines this literature is its multiplicity — it is not confined to one geography, style, or perspective. Instead, it captures the lived realities of Chinese communities across the world, often exploring themes like migration, displacement, identity, and cultural hybridity. It challenges the notion of a singular ‘Chinese literature’ by emphasizing the plurality of Chinese voices.

In an age of globalization, I welcome the recognition of Sinophone literature as part of the broader landscape of world literature. It offers an opportunity to deepen our understanding of how Chinese culture functions beyond national borders and encourages dialogue about postcolonialism and global interconnectedness.

On a related note, Xi Jinping’s ‘Tell China’s Story Well’ campaign aims to project a favorable image of China through soft power and international storytelling. While the idea is sound, its success hinges on allowing Chinese writers the freedom to express themselves authentically. Currently, the controls are too stringent for writers to truly ‘tell China’s story well.’ Without creative freedom, this vision remains unattainable. I write about this is an article, ‘Tell China’s Story Well: Its Writers Must Be Free Enough to Do So.’

FN: Who are the Chinese authors who have most influenced you? What about the non-Chinese?

ZLJ: Among Chinese authors, Cao Xueqin, the author of ‘The Dream of the Red Chamber,’ has had a profound influence on me. His intricate portrayal of familial and social dynamics, set against the backdrop of a crumbling aristocratic world, is unmatched in its emotional depth and literary craft. Another major influence is Lu Xun, whose sharp, incisive observations of Chinese society reveal an unparalleled understanding of the Chinese psyche.

Among non-Chinese writers, Tolstoy stands out. His sweeping narratives, set against vast social and historical backdrops, are deeply immersive, yet he never loses sight of the intimate details that make his characters so human.

I also greatly admire Arundhati Roy, especially her novel ‘The God of Small Things.’ Its lyrical prose, rich imagery, and poignant exploration of social and personal struggles deeply resonated with me and have inspired my own storytelling.

Hong Kong exile journalists and political dissidents are often targeted

Originally published on Global Voices

Image created with Canva Pro by Oiwan Lam.

The crackdown on press freedom since the enactment of the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong in 2020 has led to an exodus of hundreds of media workers. Many have established independent media outlets overseas to report on politically sensitive news and connect the scattered diaspora communities. While these exile media outlets have the freedom to amplify critical voices, they are still threatened by transnational political harassment.

Exodus of Hong Kong media workers

One year after Beijing imposed the NSL in Hong Kong on June 30, 2020, pro-democracy Apple Daily and Stand News were alleged to have committed the offence of foreign collusion and sedition and forced into shutdown. More than a dozen independent media outlets announced their closure.  

According to a 2023 survey, “Journalists in Exile – A Survey of Media Workers in the Hong Kong Diaspora,” conducted by the Association of Overseas Hong Kong Media Professionals, hundreds of Hong Kong journalists and media workers have left the city since 2020. Largely due to language barriers in their new homes, two-thirds of the exiled journalists left the media industry altogether. 

Those who continue working in the media field tend to have a strong commitment to filling the gap in heavily restricted information flows in Hong Kong under the national security regime, which has criminalised political criticisms as “inciting subversion” under the NSL or “sedition” under the domestic Article 23 security law. Among the journalist diaspora, more than half settled in local media outlets, and some re-established their careers in online media outlets founded and funded by the Hong Kong diaspora.

Many of these exiled media outlets operate on social media platforms, publishing political commentaries that are likely to be flagged as seditious in Hong Kong, as they are critical of both the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese governments. A number of them have adopted the independent media organisational model, reporting sensitive news that is suppressed in Hong Kong due to political and self-censorship practices. 

Although the journalist diaspora can enjoy free press away from Hong Kong, their journalistic work is not risk-free, as overseas media outlets and outspoken journalists are also targets of China’s transnational repression. 

Currently, among the 19 people wanted for national security cases related to secession and subversion, several are engaged in media-related work, including political news columnist Chung Kim-wah and veteran journalist Victor Ho Leung-mau. Due to their political work, their families in Hong Kong are now at risk of being dragged into police investigations.

Last month, the city's Security Secretary, Chris Tang, again accused Chung Kim-wah and news YouTuber Stephen Shiu Yeuk-yuen of inciting “soft resistance” in their commentaries. 

However, despite the ongoing political harassment, the Hong Kong journalist diaspora continues to commit to their duty of amplifying suppressed voices. Ahead of World Press Freedom Day on May 3, Global Voices is showcasing three overseas Hong Kong independent media outlets to help our readers better understand the resilience of the journalist diaspora in their struggle for press freedom.

The Chaser News (追新聞)

The Chaser News is a Chinese news outlet founded in March 2022 by several Hong Kong exiled journalists based in the UK. It addresses the context of its establishment on its website:

今日的香港，當記者被成為「罪犯」，報道新聞會觸犯國安法「重罪」，傳媒要履行第四權的天職，變得越來越危險。記者報道時擔心被亂扣「假新聞」的帽子，評論當權者的施政更隨時面臨惡法清算。

In today's Hong Kong, journalists have been turned into ‘criminals’ because journalism has become a ‘felony’ under the National Security Law. It has become increasingly dangerous for the media to fulfil their vocation as the fourth estate. Journalists are worried that their news stories will be labelled as ‘fake news,’ and commenting on the ruling class will result in retaliation by the draconian law.

And outlines its missions:

《追新聞》有三大目標，包括維護新聞自由、捍衞民主人權、維繫全球港人。我們會為香港人提供最真實、不設紅線、不會經官方審查的深度報道.

The Chaser News has three missions: upholding press freedom, defending democracy and human rights, and connecting Hongkongers worldwide. We will provide Hong Kong people with the most truthful and in-depth reports, without any red lines or government censorship. 

In addition to following Hong Kong-related news, the independent news site also reports on the UK’s policy toward Hong Kong and China, conducts interviews with overseas Hongkongers, and runs regular commentaries about Hong Kong and Chinese politics produced by overseas dissidents, such as Chung Kim-wah. 

However, most editors and journalists working for the news site have remained anonymous. It has 10,000 followers on Facebook and 107,000 on YouTube.

Green Bean Media (綠豆）

Green Bean Media is also a Chinese news outlet based in the UK. It was founded in July 2022 by a group of former journalists from Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the city's public broadcaster, which has been transformed into a mouthpiece of the Hong Kong government following rounds of management restructuring, program reviews, and staff reprimands.

The mission of the independent media is embedded in its name:

取名《綠豆》，寓意即使大樹倒下，甚或被連根拔起，但種子仍會散落四周；只要有水和空氣，繼續拼命呼吸，種子就會再萌芽，茁壯成長。…我們希望透過影像、聲音、圖文等不同媒介，為這個流散的年代作一點記錄，讓身處世界不同角落的香港人，能夠看見彼此。

‘Green Bean’ is a parable that tells the story of how even if a tree falls or is uprooted, the seeds will still be scattered all around. As long as there is water and air, they will strive to breathe, sprout, and grow strong. We hope that through different forms — video, sound, image, and text — we can create a record of this diasporic era, so that Hongkongers can see each other, regardless of their whereabouts in the world. 

The independent media outlet not only covers news from Hong Kong but also addresses concerns of diaspora communities. It currently has 300,000 subscribers on YouTube.

Poton Media (光傳媒)

Poton Media was established in April 2023 by a group of former Apple Daily and Stand News journalists based in Taiwan. Its advisory team is composed of veteran journalists, including Mark Clifford, Ching Cheong, Stephen Vines, Lousia Lim, and Josh Rogin. 

Both Apple Daily and Stand News were forced to shut down in 2021. Seven Apple Daily’s senior staffers were charged with foreign collusion under National Security, and two from Stand News were convicted of sedition under the criminal ordinance. 

In an interview with Jeremy Goldkorn from the China Project in 2023, the co-founder and chief editor of the Taiwan-based independent news outlet, Shirley Leung, explained that the news platform would focus on political news and development in Hong Kong, but it has to source news from Hong Kong government, locally based and international media outlets as their news sources as they don’t have any reporters based in the city due to security concerns. The uniqueness of the new site relies on its news commentaries, which are written by overseas experts from a critical perspective. About 80 percent of the news outlet’s readers reside in Hong Kong, according to Leung.

Other Hong Kong exile media outlets, such as Points (棱角) and the Commons (同文), operate in a model similar to Poton Media, aggregating news from various sources and running commentaries critical of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments. 

Sustainability challenge

While exile media outlets may be successful in amplifying critical opinions, transnational repression, namely, the increasing targeting of overseas political dissidents and the extended political harassment of friends and family members of the “fugitives” and exiles, has, to a certain extent, successfully silenced critical voices from diaspora communities.

Meanwhile, as the city’s press freedom continues to be undermined by political harassment and self-censorship, more and more Hongkongers have avoided reading news altogether. A 2023 communication survey indicated that 4 in 10 Cantonese-speaking adults in Hong Kong said they sometimes want to avoid news about the changing social and political environment in Hong Kong. The trend is likely to affect the financial sustainability of these overseas media outlets, which rely on readers’ donations and subscriptions for their survival. 

Last month, Flow HK, an overseas HK media outlet founded by prominent exiled activists including Ray Wong, Sunny Cheung, Alex Chow, Glacier Kwong, and Nathan Law, announced that it was scheduled to shut down in July due to a lack of financial and human resources. The activist media was blocked from accessing the internet in Hong Kong in October last year, as the city’s national security police authorities alleged the outlet of incitement to subversion, a serious offence under the NSL. 

Hong Kong Education Minister said: schools are on the front line of preventing soft resistance

Originally published on Global Voices

The backdrop said, “This is a strong mother country.” The photo was taken at the opening ceremony of the 10th National Security Education Day on April 15, 2025. Photo: Kyle Lam/HKFP. With permission to use.

This report was written by Kelly Ho and published in the Hong Kong Free Press on April 15, 2025. The following edited version is published as part of a content partnership agreement.

Hong Kong’s education minister said that schools are on the “frontline” of preventing the spread of “soft resistance,” as students may develop “extreme, biased” values due to online rumours.

Schools in Hong Kong should cultivate patriotism among students and step up training for teachers to prevent “hostile forces from infiltrating schools,” Secretary for Education Christine Choi said on April 15, as the city marked its 10th National Security Education Day — a special day designated by the National People Congress on July 1, 2015, to raise public awareness on national security.

Choi warned of the “dangerous aspect” of soft resistance, saying it could “easily penetrate the heart and mind.”

She cited as an example illustrated books published by a now-disbanded speech therapists’ union and said the stories, ruled as seditious in 2022, had promoted “anti-government sentiments” to students who were “mentally immature.”

The minister went on to mention online rumours that portrayed “normal learning activities” as “forcing” students to visit mainland China and “brainwashing” them. Choi said in Cantonese:

Students unknowingly absorb these messages, forming extreme, biased, or even incorrect values.

They can be manipulated and incited to engage in illegal activities, disrupting social peace and endangering national security. The consequences are very serious.

Secretary for Security Chris Tang recently alleged that some people were using issues unrelated to national security to “divide society” and stir “hatred against the SAR government and the central government.”

He then accused a former examinations official of spreading rumors about the recent death of a secondary school student during a study tour in mainland China through a social media outlet, Edu Lancet. The outlet is run by former Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority (HKEAA) subject manager Hans Yeung on Facebook, Instagram, and Threads. Tang slammed the outlet for suggesting that the incident was caused by students being “forced” to take part in exchange trips across the border.

Choi said that the Education Bureau had rolled out various training programs for teachers to improve their ability to identify “soft resistance.”

Schools are asked to incorporate national education into their daily teaching in order to strengthen students’ “cultural confidence, national identity, and a conscious awareness to safeguard national security.”

“The younger generation is our future, and schools are on the frontline of preventing soft resistance,” the minister stressed.

Since 2021, government officials have cited “soft resistance” as a threat to national security, yet they have not provided a clear definition of the term.

Apart from the children’s books that led to five speech therapists being jailed for 19 months in 2022, another example of “soft resistance” cited by the city’s authorities was a series of national anthem blunders at international sporting events.

During those incidents, overseas organisers wrongly played the 2019 protest song “Glory to Hong Kong,” instead of China’s national anthem — which is also that of Hong Kong — “March of the Volunteers.”

Though Africa wasn’t a primary target, it has become collateral damage in this clash of titans

Originally published on Global Voices

President Xi Jinping, Image by President.az, CC BY 4.0; Map of Africa, Image by CIA.gov, Public domain; and Official 2025 inaugural portrait of President Donald Trump, image by Daniel Torok, Public domain. All via Wikimedia Commons.

In the current trade conflict between the US and China, the most misunderstood player isn’t China or the US — it’s Africa. And that’s no coincidence. Too often, the continent is treated as a pawn in global power games, rather than a collection of 55 member states navigating layered and often competing interests.

How it began

What began as a tariff spat driven by US President Donald Trump has evolved into something far more consequential. Trump says tariffs will encourage US consumers to buy more American-made goods. Economists, however, suggest that the consequences could be economically catastrophic and trigger a global recession. 

On Wednesday, April 2, 2025, Trump announced a 10 percent baseline tariff on all imports into the US from all countries, with higher rates for those with trade surpluses with the US. 

These sweeping measures, which took effect on April 9, are part of what Trump called a strategy to promote “economic independence” and reduce the US's trade deficit, particularly with major players like China and the European Union.

This staggering tariff on the world’s second-largest economy immediately triggered a tit-for-tat trade war. China responded by announcing its own 34 percent duties on US goods, deepening a showdown between the world’s two largest economies.

The swift retaliation from China sparked a fresh warning from Trump who imposed a 125 percent charge designed to both counter America’s trade deficit with China and punish Beijing for retaliating against US import taxes. China in turn adjusted tariff measures on imports originating in the United States from 84 percent to 125 percent.

Prior to 2025, the average import taxes charged by each side were less than 20 percent, even after the first trade war in Trump’s previous term in office. However, they now stand at an average of 134.7 percent, more than 40 times higher than before Trump kicked off the first trade war in 2018.

A composed satellite photograph of Africa. Image by NASA. Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons.

Africa: the silent casualty

Though Africa wasn’t a primary target, it has become collateral damage in this clash of titans. In April 2025, Trump imposed a minimum 10 percent tariff on imports from most African countries, with Nigeria facing a 14 percent rate. This move disrupts existing trade agreements like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which, since the year 2000, has provided duty-free access for 1,800 products from Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, over 5,000 products also enjoy duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program.

AGOA, set to expire in September 2025, has been a longstanding pillar of economic cooperation between the US and African nations. Many of its beneficiaries are low-income countries facing unsustainable debt levels or those at risk of debt distress.

Tariffs are taxes governments place on imported goods, which are calculated as a percentage of a product’s value. For example, with a 10 percent tariff, an imported product priced at USD 10 would cost USD 11 after the tax is applied. In cases where the tariff is significantly higher, like the 145 percent rate on select Chinese imports, that same USD 10 item could jump to USD 24.50.

In Africa, the countries most vulnerable to these new tariff regimes are Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar. All three are small, low-income countries that export apparel. Lesotho, in particular, faces a 50 percent tariff, the second-highest rate globally after China. Nigeria faces a 14 percent rate and South Africa 30 percent.

Under the new tariffs, energy exports such as oil, gas, and petroleum are exempt, offering some cushion to countries like Angola, Chad, the DRC, Ghana, and Nigeria, which are major oil, gas, and petroleum exporters. Additionally, the US is a relatively small export market for most AGOA countries, as nineteen of them send less than four percent of their total exports to the American market. However, for those who are reliant on apparel exports, the impact could be severe.

The fallout for Nigeria

In 2022, two-way trade in goods between Nigeria and the US totaled over USD 8.1 billion, making Nigeria the second-largest US export destination in Sub-Saharan Africa. The exports to Nigeria primarily include vehicles, wheat, machinery, fuels, and plastics. By 2024, Nigeria exported USD 5.7 billion worth of goods to the US and imported USD 4.2 billion in return, leaving the US with a trade deficit of USD 1.5 billion.

In 2016, Nigeria implemented an import ban on 25 different product categories in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, beverages, and consumer goods as part of efforts to control imports and stimulate local production. Some of the banned items include poultry, pork, refined vegetable oil, sugar, cocoa products, spaghetti, beer, and certain medicines.

Trump claimed he implemented the tariff on Nigeria’s exports to the United States because Nigeria’s import restrictions on 25 American product categories created trade barriers between the two countries.

According to a fact sheet released by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on X (formerly Twitter), restrictions on items like beef, pork, poultry, fruit juices, medications, and spirits by Nigeria, limit US market access and reduce export opportunities.

While the Trump administration says the measures are intended to protect American jobs and industries, the new USTR campaign highlights a growing list of grievances with global trade partners.

Meanwhile, Africa’s daily trade with the US is not insignificant. In 2024, total trade volume was an estimated USD 71.6 billion, with countries like South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya among the top African exporters of products like oil, textiles, and agricultural produce.

China’s influence and the challenge for Africa

While the US is busy trading tariffs with Africa, China is trading influence on the continent. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has cemented its presence in over 40 African countries. According to the Chinese Loan to Africa Database, China has financed over 1,000 projects on the continent since 2000.

But what does this mean for Africa? Debt, yes. But also dependency.

Critics argue that while these deals are wrapped in the language of mutual growth, it is a trap that can impede economic growth and development. In 2017, Sri Lanka handed over its Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease after failing to repay loans. Several African countries are on similar timelines. In Uganda, a USD 200 million loan from China to upgrade Entebbe Airport came with strict repayment terms, including control over an escrow account.

Historically, tariff wars are not new. The most infamous example is the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, where the US raised tariffs on over 20,000 imports — a move that worsened the Great Depression and led to global retaliations. The lesson? Tariff wars often trigger recessions, not solutions.

Earlier in the year, Angola announced plans to limit import licenses for beef, pork, and poultry starting in July 2025. As the ninth largest market for US poultry exports globally and the largest in Africa, the United States has warned that this move could disrupt over USD 130 million in American poultry exports. Under the new rules presented by Trump, Angola now faces a 32 percent tariff on its products, compared to the average customs duty rate of 11 percent.

Africa is standing at a strategic crossroads. In 2018, the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was adopted by the 10th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly in Kigali, Rwanda. Established to create “one African market,” AfCFTA is the largest free-trade area by number of member states — 54 countries — representing a combined GDP estimated at USD 3.4 trillion and a population of 1.3 billion people. 

With AGOA’s uncertain future, mounting trade restrictions, and burgeoning debt traps, it remains to be seen whether African nations will finally lean inward to trade more with themselves or whether they will remain on the sidelines auditioning for a pick-me role in the grand theatre of global affairs.  

Accidents occur daily at some plants due to slack safety protocols

Originally published on Global Voices

A YouTube screenshot from the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park‘s official promotional video. Fair use.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

In October 2024, a sudden explosion rocked a steel factory at Morowali in Indonesia’s Central Sulawesi province. Following the explosion, thick smoke rapidly engulfed the factory located in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP), one of the world’s largest nickel processing and stainless steel production centers. Fire erupted from the factory’s upper structure, and workers tried to contain the blaze by directing high-pressure water hoses there. A crane operator called Laode Gunawan was trapped in the fire and later died from the explosion, while another worker suffered a minor injury.

The steel plant is owned by Chinese metal conglomerate Tsingshan Holding Group (青山控股集团有限公司), which is also IMIP's largest investor. 

In 2013, Tsingshan entered a joint venture with Indonesia-based mining giants PT Bintang Delapan Investment and PT Sulawesi Mining Investment to build IMIP. Tsingshan was in charge of building infrastructure and production facilities, while the Indonesian partners dealt with government relations and the management of Indonesian workers. 

Today, the mega industrial park sprawls across 4,000 hectares and hosts 50 tenants, mostly subsidiaries of Tsingshan. The park also has its own airport, marine port, high-end hotel, and dorms for workers. Designated as a “national strategic project,” the industrial park employs more than 84,000 Indonesian and Chinese workers. 

But this rapid development has come with environmental and human costs. On top of environmental concerns such as deforestation, pollution, and waste management, labor abuses and work safety scandals have long loomed over the project. 

After the fatal incident in October 2024, the Chairman of the Morowali Industrial Workers Union (SPIM-KPBI), Komang Jordi, condemned Tsingshan for being negligent and indifferent to the safety of workers:

 Kejadian berulang, selalu menjadikan buruh sebagai tumbal 

Accidents keep recurring and workers are always the victims.

Widespread safety loopholes

In 2023, three Chinese workers at IMIP filed a complaint to Indonesia’s human rights commission due to a lack of proper safety protocols and equipment, overwork, and pay cuts. But their plea didn’t manage to prevent the industry park’s worst accident in history. Just months later, in December 2023, an explosion at a nickel plant of a Tsingshan subsidiary at IMIP resulted in 21 deaths and 46 injuries, marking a gloomy milestone as the park’s most fatal accident. Among the 21 fatalities, eight were Chinese workers. Two Chinese supervisors were later charged with neglecting safety protocols. 

Zhao Jingtian, a Chinese worker, witnessed the catastrophe during his shift. He told Chinese magazine Lifeweek that he remembered “there was a lot of smoke” (烟冒得很厉害) and that some workers had to jump down from a high place to escape. Another Chinese worker Wang Zizhuang who also witnessed the incident said:

一出事，上面温度太高，急得不行。我这里的炉子每一层都能逃跑，他们应该是跑不了才选择跳下的。

When the incident happened, the temperatures upstairs became unbearably high, and panic set in. Every level of the furnace has emergency exits, but they probably couldn't run away — that's why they had to jump.

In 2024, Financial Times interviewed more than two dozen workers from various companies at IMIP who alleged systematic loose safety practices, insufficient protective gear and equipment, and poor communication between Indonesian and Chinese workers, which led to a high-risk working environment plagued by frequent accidents. “Production first, safety later,” a worker at Indonesia Tsingshan Stainless Steel told FT. Foreign Policy cited multiple sources who alleged that nonfatal accidents, which rarely generate news headlines, are an almost daily occurrence in the industrial park.

A worker at a steel smelting factory. Image from PXhere. CC0 Public Domain. Fair use

A recent survey conducted by the Mining and Energy Federation of the Confederation of All Indonesian Trade Unions shows that long, grueling working hours and weak safety protocols contribute to the high number of workplace accidents at IMIP. The average working hours of employees there are 56 hours per week or 225 hours per month, according to the survey.

Language barriers have also contributed to workplace risks to some degree. According to a Lifeweek report, Chinese workers with experience in the metal industry are usually paired up with less-experienced Indonesian colleagues. A smelter team at IMIP typically contains three Chinese workers and five to ten Indonesian workers. In order to facilitate communication, each team has at least one translator. But that is still insufficient, according to Hasrih Sonna, an Indonesian union leader at IMIP, who told the Chinese magazine:

并不是每个人都能配一个翻译，所以有时翻译人员不够，交流起来就会有困难。处理紧急情况时，情况就变得复杂.

Not everyone can be assigned an interpreter, so when translation support falls short, communication becomes difficult. In emergency situations, this quickly escalates into a critical complication.

After the deadly accident in December 2024, around 300 workers protested at IMIP to demand safer working conditions. One of the demands from the protestors was that Chinese workers should be required to learn Indonesian.

Environmental NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia) stated in a press release that the repeated work accidents at Tsingshan-affiliated companies showed the “weak oversight” of the Indonesian government, as there were “no signs of improvement at all” by this Chinese-backed company. 

Former Indonesian President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) touring the PT Virtue Dragon Nickel Industrial Park in December 2021. Image from YouTube screenshot of Secretariat Presiden. Fair use.

The Chinese government has stayed largely quiet on the alleged systematic workplace hazards at Chinese-backed nickel and steel plants in Indonesia. After the fatal explosion at IMIP in December 2023, Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed condolences for the victims. She added that the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia was giving guidance to the company concerning follow-up arrangements.

Human costs behind Indonesia’s nickel boom

In just a decade, Indonesia has grown from a small player to a dominating force in the global nickel sector. It is currently the world’s largest producer of nickel, accounting for 1.8 million tons, or 51 percent of the global output. 

Raw nickel ore. Image from YouTube screenshot. Fair use.

The country’s nickel boom is driven by an export ban on raw nickel ore and large investments from Chinese companies that have mastered the refining technique and are hungry for nickel to power China’s fast-growing electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing industry. However, Indonesia’s rising status in the global nickel supply chain has laid bare the impacts on the most vulnerable in the production process — workers on the ground.

Non-profit organization China Labor Watch documented 77 deaths and 120 injuries at multiple Chinese-backed nickel plants in Indonesia, including IMIP, from 2016 to 2024. China Labor Watch also found that Chinese workers working in Indonesia’s nickel production sites are subject to employment malpractices such as passport confiscation, withheld payments, and restriction of movement. 

Chinese workers reportedly account for about 13 percent of the total workforce at IMIP. They live in dormitories at the industrial park and are forbidden from roaming outside the industrial area freely, making them feel isolated. A Chinese worker at IMIP wrote in an online blog:

我们工作的区域是全封闭的 “物离乡贵，人离乡贱”，曾经对我来说仅仅是个俗语，现在却是我在印尼青山工业园区工作的真切感受。

Our work area is completely enclosed.‘The value of goods increases when they leave their origins, while the value of a person decreases when they leave their homelands.’ This was once just a saying to me, but now it has become my true reality while working at IMIP.

Many Chinese workers at IMIP had worked in the steel industry back home. As the steel sector and China’s economy as a whole have been facing a downturn, workers are increasingly looking toward Indonesia’s nickel sector for job opportunities. 

On the other hand, many young Indonesian workers have migrated for employment from Sulawesi and other Indonesian islands to Bahodopi, the industrial center of Morowali. They struggle to find housing outside the industrial area, as the dormitories are reserved for Chinese workers, and there is a housing shortage due to the recent population boom. 

In 2017, Bahodopi had just 7,517 residents, but by 2022, that number had surged to around 50,000 as newcomers migrated for job opportunities. While essential infrastructure in the town struggles to keep pace, the worker influx has led to a rise in overcrowded and makeshift boarding houses. Reports indicate that these temporary housing structures for Indonesian workers are often made out of easily accessible materials such as wood, concrete, and even shipping containers. With the warm, tropical climate in Sulawesi, workers staying in these houses often have to struggle with sweltering heat, poor ventilation, and water leaks. Many of the housing structures sit near the smelter smokestacks and coal-fired power plants, and the air pollution has led to lung diseases among residents in Bahodopi. 

Experts warn that the growing demand for nickel, driven by the energy transition, will continue to incentivize nickel corporations to increase productivity, which may lead to more labor abuses, workplace hazards, and health issues for workers unless regulations and worker protections are implemented.

In February 2025, a workplace accident claimed yet another life at IMIP. A worker died after a 150-kg object crushed his head at a nickel smelter. Merely hours after the deadly incident, the plant’s production resumed. It was back to business as usual. 

The DRC faces resource exploitation, environmental destruction, unsafe working conditions, and rampant child labor

Originally published on Global Voices

Child workers at an artisan mine in Kailo, DRC. Julien Harneis, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping stood before African leaders at the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing in September and promised a greener, more sustainable future, the applause was loud. China pledged USD 50 billion over three years to develop a clean energy grid and green infrastructure across the continent. Official Chinese media painted the move as a win-win for global climate justice and Africa’s development. But thousands of miles away, in the dusty mining towns of the Democratic Republic of Congo, that promise rings hollow.

Cobalt is often found alongside copper and malachite (the blue-green stones). Therefore, these supply chains and the related risks are often closely linked to each other. Image from Flickr. CC BY-SA 2.0

The African continent holds a significant share of the world's natural resource reserves. The continent's subsoil contains large quantities of gems and minerals such as gold, diamonds, platinum, chromium, uranium, copper, colton, cobalt, and more.

Beneath the red earth of southern DRC lies more than 70 percent of the world’s known cobalt reserves — a mineral so vital to modern batteries that it's been dubbed the “new oil.” Indeed, cobalt is a crucial resource used in nearly everything with rechargeable lithium batteries, from smartphones and computers to electric vehicles and manufacturing equipment. Over the past decade, Chinese companies have come to dominate cobalt mining in the DRC, controlling extraction, processing, and export. What’s left behind is a wasteland.

A range of smartphones released in 2024. Cobalt is a crucial component in cell phone batteries. Image from YouTube. Fair use.

Apart from cobalt, the DRC is facing a number of other challenges, including decades of political instability due to its colonial past and violence driven by insurgency groups. These factors, plus the environmental consequences of dangerous, unchecked mining, are making life abjectly miserable in some parts of the DRC.

Resource management in the DRC

A network of “artisanal mines” where residents dig for minerals in Rubaya, DRC. Photo taken by MONUSCO Photos, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Despite being the world's leading producer of cobalt, with 70 percent of the market share, the exploitation of this globally scarce resource does not fully benefit the Congolese.

The sector is plagued by smuggling and corruption. Some Congolese earn a living through artisanal cobalt mining, where the workers aren't officially employed by a company and mine independently, often by hand, then sell their collections to larger mining companies. These artisanal miners are mostly found in very remote and isolated areas where the ore exists, while state oversight is scarce, meaning safety protocols are nonexistent, and child labor is rampant.

Children working in an “artisanal mine” in the DRC. Julien Harneis from Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

In one of its publications, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) estimates that many of the mining companies present in the DRC, including over 140 Chinese companies, are involved in this organized smuggling and illegal exploitation:

En raison de l’instabilité du pays, de nombreuses sociétés étrangères titulaires de licences minières ne produisent pas elles-mêmes le cobalt, mais s’approvisionnent auprès des mineurs artisanaux. Environ 150 000 à 200 000 mineurs artisanaux exploitent les gisements de cobalt en RDC et un million de personnes dépendent de leurs revenus.

Due to the country's instability, many foreign companies holding mining licenses do not produce cobalt themselves, but source it from artisanal miners. Some 150,000 to 200,000 artisanal miners exploit cobalt deposits in the DRC, and 1 million people depend on their income.

Artisinal miners account for 10–20 percent of the country's copper and cobalt exports, while the rest of the yield comes from more advanced industrial sites like the one featured below.

An industrial mining site in the DRC. Image from Flickr. CC BY-SA 2.0

Most of the country's cobalt mining sites are owned by Chinese companies, and today, China is responsible for 80 percent of the refined cobalt output from the DRC. This has been the case since September 2007, when the DRC signed a USD 9 billion contract with a consortium of Chinese state-owned companies to build the country's infrastructure in exchange for privileged access to minerals and mining sites. The contract included high interest rates and a USD 3 billion pledge from the DRC to support the Chinese investments. Although the contract was revised down to USD 6 billion in 2009, with lower interest rates and no financing from the Congolese state, China still came out on top.

Nowadays, many Congolese see the contract as a one-sided deal that largely benefitted the former President Joseph Kabila Kabange (2001–2019) and his government, rather than the Congolese people. A report by the Congolese Inspectorate General of Finances (IGF) published in February 2023 denounced the unbalanced exploitation and blamed the former government for selling off the country's valuable resources:

Les entreprises chinoises ont déjà encaissé un gain évalué à près de 10 milliards de dollars américains, tandis que la République démocratique du Congo n’a bénéficié que de 822 millions de dollars en termes d’infrastructures. Le déséquilibre criant qui a été constaté, le bradage, la dilapidation de nos minerais constatés dans ce contrat a été également l’œuvre de fils égarés de notre pays, qui ont accompagné les entreprises chinoises dans cette œuvre macabre contre notre pays.

Chinese companies have already pocketed a profit estimated at almost USD 10 billion, while the Democratic Republic of Congo has benefited from only USD 822 million in terms of infrastructure. The glaring imbalance, the sell-off and the squandering of our minerals in this contract were also the work of our country's misguided sons, who accompanied the Chinese companies in this macabre act against our country.

Major environmental incidents

According to Amnesty International and environmental watchdog groups, Chinese-owned mining sites have been linked to repeated toxic waste spills, deforestation, and widespread water contamination. In recent years, at least 14 major environmental incidents were reported near mining operations in the DRC, including a tailing dam collapse and acid discharges into rivers used by local communities. Cleanups are rare, and accountability is even rarer.

In some areas, entire villages have been forcibly evicted to make way for industrial expansion. Displaced persons report beatings, sexual violence, and intimidation. “We were not consulted. One day, they just came with machines,” recalls a woman who lost her home near Fungurume in an Amnesty International report. “We lost our homes and our fields. What kind of clean energy is this?” Residents who do stay report seeing their waterways polluted and facing health issues because of chemical spills and pollution.

Back in Beijing, Chinese state media continues to tout its global green credentials, calling the country's push for renewable energy a “gift to humanity.” Official outlets like Xinhua highlight China’s plans to help African nations build solar farms and hydropower projects.

Chinese state-owned media, including the big four — Xinhua, People’s Daily, China Daily, and CCTV and its overseas branch CGTN — have long bragged about the nation’s ability to invest and develop in the DRC, along with other countries.

A fleet of electric vehicles. Image from Flickr. CC0 1.0

As it deploys its strategy through its network of influence made up of major mining companies in the DRC and other African countries, China is asserting its energy power and positioning itself as a world leader in renewable energies and electric vehicles.

But a deep dive into the Chinese side of this narrative shows the investments are to emphasize the state’s role as a benevolent energy partner, while in reality, its contributions are top-down, technocratic, and largely disconnected from the everyday well-being of DRC communities.

In an article on cooperation between China and Africa, a researcher from Tsinghua University writes:

尽管资源丰富……非洲大陆的能源贫困问题依然严重.

Despite its abundant resources, Africa’s energy development potential has not been fully realized due to long-standing weaknesses in infrastructure, lack of technology, and funding shortages.

The article frames Africa’s energy poverty as a technical gap rather than a result of exploitative extractive practices. There is no mention of community impact, land rights, or participatory governance — only a call for more capital and infrastructure. The author continues:

中国在与非洲各国共同推动清洁能源务实合作的过程中，建设了一批技术先进、环境友好的能源项目，遍布非洲40余个国家和地区，涉及光伏、风电、水电、生物质能等多个领域，帮助非洲新增电力装机1.2亿千瓦，建设电网线路6.6万公里，显著增强了非洲的电力供应能力，有效促进了非洲的能源转型.

In the course of promoting pragmatic cooperation on clean energy with African countries, China has built a number of technologically advanced and environmentally friendly energy projects across more than 40 African countries and regions, covering solar, wind, hydro, and biomass energy. These efforts have helped add 120 million kilowatts of installed power capacity and build 66,000 kilometers of power transmission lines in Africa, significantly enhancing the continent’s electricity supply capacity and effectively promoting its energy transition.

Even as Chinese companies are creating pollution, deforestation, and water contamination, they are being closely monitored by local community populations; however, it’s rarely discussed in the Chinese public sphere.

Environmental damage in Africa by Chinese investment remains one of the most ignored taboos in the Chinese public sphere — media are not discussing it, civil societies have no access to data on the issue, and the public remains in the dark about the situation.

At the September 2024 Beijing Summit on China-Africa Cooperation, Chinese officials and state media made sweeping promises to support Africa’s sustainable energy development. However, little attention was paid to whether these interventions would truly benefit local communities or instead generate new environmental and social harms.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and leaders from around the continent posing at the 2024 China-Africa cooperation forum in Beijing in 2024. Image from Présidence de la République du Bénin's Flickr. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

To better understand the narratives surrounding China-Africa clean energy cooperation, Global Voices conducted a small narrative search using keywords such as “environmental damage,” “pollution,” and “deforestation.”

Image by Global Voices. Used with permission.

Across a wide range of Chinese government and state-affiliated media sources, there is a consistent discursive pattern: Complex sustainability challenges are routinely reframed as technical or financial issues — emphasizing capital, infrastructure, and access. At the same time, environmental degradation and local social impacts are downplayed or omitted entirely. These sources overwhelmingly portray Chinese intervention as benevolent, transformative, and welcomed by African nations, while criticism or alternative views are notably absent.

For example, a Xinhua feature describes China’s role as injecting “green power” into Africa’s development, highlighting over 100 clean energy projects without discussing ecological side effects. People’s Daily presents solar and hydro energy projects as milestones of green partnership yet omits any mention of deforestation, displacement, or regulatory oversight. A CCTV report includes UN Secretary-General António Guterres praising China-Africa cooperation but fails to acknowledge grassroots or environmentalist concerns.

Meanwhile, criticism that China promotes fossil fuels in Africa while going green at home — noted by international media — is absent from the Chinese-language narrative.

Another example is despite the gravity of the illegal logging case involving Chinese companies COKIBAFODE and SCIFOR in the DRC, a search for either company in Chinese-language media yields almost no results — not a single investigative report, not even a mention on social media.

The near-total absence of coverage reflects Beijing’s tightly controlled information environment, where scandals that may tarnish China’s overseas image or challenge its self-proclaimed green leadership are censored by design. Chinese private media are either denied access or preemptively silenced, while the state narratives drown out any potential dissent, leaving the Chinese public almost completely unaware of the environmental destruction carried out in their name.

With such systematic neglect and media silence, it’s not surprising to find that Chinese authorities could only focus on financial and economic investment returns. Environmental damages brought to DRC local communities are not on Chinese governmental officials and the Chinese companies’ operation agenda.

Our users are primarily Chinese or overseas Chinese communities

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot from  The China Unofficial Archives webpage.

Chinese president Xi Jinping has declared a monopoly on narratives not only about today's China but also about its ancient and more recent past. In that process, any diverging narrative or piece of historical testimony that could contradict the grand official narrative is erased and censored. Yet, historical memory has managed to survive in Chinese society to this day.

Global Voices interviewed China historian Ian Johnson via email after a meeting in Berlin to understand the importance of censored history and why it is essential to make it accessible to sinophone communities around the world.

Portrait of Ian Johnson by Sim Chi Yin. Used with permission.

Born in Montréal, Johnson, as he explains, was exposed to the value of multilingualism and eventually moved to the US, where he got his first job in journalism. He has lived mostly in Taiwan, Germany, and China. He describes his role as “trying to describe people’s lives by observing them closely and letting them speak as much as possible.” He launched The China Unofficial Archives, in Chinese 中国民间档案馆, as a US-registered non-profit in late 2023.

Filip Noubel (FN): Chinese authorities, from ancient times to today’s market-economy Communism have always paid special attention to history to justify their legitimacy and power. As a result, alternative or dissenting voices and materials have been regularly eliminated from mainstream public space. Is this why you decided to highlight censored content in your online archive? What are you hoping to achieve?

Ian Johnson (IJ): We want to make available to the general public the amazing outpouring of independent work that Chinese people inside China had done about their country’s history over the 75-year history of the People’s Republic. This includes books, magazines, blog posts, and documentary films, almost all of them banned inside China. We also have what we believe is the most comprehensive online database of independent Chinese thinkers. Our goal is non-ideological — we don’t endorse any particular item or person but try to present them with a neutral description in Chinese and English. To make research easier, each item or person is searchable by theme, era, or format.

Our target audience is people living inside China, who don’t have access to these works, but also we want to give people who can’t understand Chinese a sense of the works and the people who are involved in this movement.

FN: Your archive provides texts, images, and footage. How and where did you get such diverse material? What are the criteria for selecting and uploading such material?

IJ: Our single most important criterion is that our staff believes that the works are important — not that we endorse they but that they have proven to be important to Chinese people trying to understand their history. So this includes classic samizdat-style publications from the 1950s or ’60s all the way up to censored blogposts from the White Paper protests of 2022. We get the material from the authors or directors.

FN: Is the collection complete?

IJ: Absolutely not. We lack holdings on many things including China’s ethnic minorities, gender issues, and current events. A lot of the material stemmed from my initial work on ‘Sparks’ [a book Johnson wrote on alternative history inside China], so it is heavily weighted to the three big disasters of 20th century Chinese history: the Anti-Rightist Campaign/Great Famine from 1957–1961; the Cultural Revolution from 1966–1976; and the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. Those are all important events but there are many more events that Chinese people have written about, and which they are writing about today. We’re now filling in those holes, for example with material on the COVID-19 outbreak or feminism, but it’s a huge task and we rely on readers to point out important work to us, as well as our board of advisors (listed on our “about” page).

FN: In your book, “Sparks, China’s Underground Historians and Their Battle for the Future,” you refer to the notion of 江湖 (read as Jiang Hu), which has many meanings but can also refer to underground, unofficial activity, including in the field of culture and research. To what extent is this stream of alternative narratives, research, and testimonies alive under Xi Jinping’s efforts to impose his/the Party’s views on the past, present, and even future of China in all fields? 

IJ: One of the great myths about today’s China is that independent thought has been crushed. It definitely is less lively than in the 2000s, which was something like a golden age, and it is true that many platforms have been eliminated, for example with the closing of independent film festivals or the heavy censoring of Chinese social media. But it is not true that suddenly all these people disappeared from China or no longer work. They do, but they are less visible. So we see our role as making their works available. We are in contact with many of these independent thinkers. They are a great source of inspiration and knowledge about the scene inside China today.

FN: Who are your typical viewers and users of this resource? Besides researchers and academics, is this content also being used by Chinese diasporas living in Europe or elsewhere?

IJ: We’ve only had Google Analytics installed for a month, but based on that a quarter of our users are from China, a quarter from the United States, and the rest from a variety of countries around the world, primarily East Asia and Europe. Based on this and also from anecdotal information, we believe that our users are primarily Chinese or overseas Chinese communities. We’ve had strong positive feedback from overseas Chinese bookstores, podcasts, and publications, most of which are run by people recently from China or aimed at people going back and forth to the country. We think this reflects a new reality — that for the first time in roughly a century, there is a strong diasporic movement of Chinese who have the means (financial and social) to influence events back home. Our goal is to be a resource to this community of people inside and outside China, by providing the material they need to think about their country’s future.