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| 1 | +CVE-2021-36367 |
| 2 | +============== |
| 3 | + |
| 4 | +.. raw:: html |
| 5 | + |
| 6 | + <div class="card card-margin"> |
| 7 | + <div class="card-header no-border"> |
| 8 | + <h5 class="card-title cve-title">CVE-2021-36367</h5> |
| 9 | + </div> |
| 10 | + <div class="card-body pt-0"> |
| 11 | + <div class="widget-49"> |
| 12 | + <div class="widget-49-title-wrapper"> |
| 13 | + <div class="widget-49-date-primary"> |
| 14 | + <span class="widget-49-date-day">8.1</span> |
| 15 | + <span class="widget-49-date-month">CVSS</span> |
| 16 | + </div> |
| 17 | + <div class="widget-49-meeting-info"> |
| 18 | + <span class="widget-49-pro-title"><b>Vector:</b> CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N</span> |
| 19 | + <span class="widget-49-meeting-time"> |
| 20 | + <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36367">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36367</a> |
| 21 | + </span> |
| 22 | + </div> |
| 23 | + </div> |
| 24 | + <p class="widget-49-meeting-integration"> |
| 25 | + <i class="fas fa-check"></i> integrated in SSH-MITM server |
| 26 | + </p> |
| 27 | + <p class="widget-49-meeting-text"> |
| 28 | + <b>Note: MITRE's description is wrong. Please read note bellow.</b></br> |
| 29 | + PuTTY through 0.75 proceeds with establishing an SSH session even if it has never sent a substantive authentication response. |
| 30 | + This makes it easier for an attacker-controlled SSH server to present a later spoofed authentication prompt |
| 31 | + (that the attacker can use to capture credential data, and use that data for purposes that are undesired by the client user). |
| 32 | + </p> |
| 33 | + <span class="widget-49-pro-title"><b>Affected Software:</b></span> |
| 34 | + <ul class="widget-49-meeting-points"> |
| 35 | + <li class="widget-49-meeting-item"><b>PuTTY</b> < 0.71</li> |
| 36 | + </ul> |
| 37 | + </div> |
| 38 | + </div> |
| 39 | + </div> |
| 40 | + |
| 41 | +.. note:: |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | + **Comment from Simon Tatham:** |
| 44 | + |
| 45 | + CVE-2021-36367 refers to this new option as a fix for a vulnerability, and describes the vulnerability |
| 46 | + as "PuTTY through 0.75 proceeds with establishing an SSH session even if it has never sent a substantive |
| 47 | + authentication response". With respect to the author of that text, we consider that to be misleading. |
| 48 | + It is perfectly legal for the server to waive authentication, and actually useful in some legitimate use cases; |
| 49 | + it is perfectly legal for PuTTY to proceed with the connection regardless; and the trust sigil system introduced |
| 50 | + in 0.71 already defends against every spoofing attack we know of that a server could attempt by doing this unexpectedly. |
| 51 | + This new option is a UI improvement, but not in and of itself a vital vulnerability fix. |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | +References |
| 55 | +---------- |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +* https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commit;h=1dc5659aa62848f0aeb5de7bd3839fecc7debefa |
| 58 | +* https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/changes.html |
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