What to Watch in Africa in 2025

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Africa Brief.

The highlights this year: Geopolitical competition comes to the Sahel, South Africa takes the helm of the G-20, and Cameroon and Gabon prepare for questionable elections.

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During U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s first term, the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara in exchange for Morocco reestablishing diplomatic relations with Israel. The decision contravened a 1975 International Court of Justice ruling that stated that neither Morocco nor neighboring Mauritania had legitimate historical claims to the territory—a former Spanish colony that boasts rich Atlantic fishing grounds and phosphate reserves. In the late 1970s, Morocco annexed most of Western Sahara and has recently ramped up military purchases from Israel.

Trump’s decision intensified tensions between Morocco and its rival Algeria, which backs Western Sahara’s pro-independence Polisario Front. Outgoing U.S. President Joe Biden partly reversed Trump’s decision to open an embassy in Western Sahara, instead opening a virtual consulate. But a second Trump administration risks inciting an Algeria-Morocco arms race. One critical factor could be Europe’s stance.

In October, the European Court of Justice ruled that the European Union had violated Western Sahara’s right to self-determination by signing a fishing agreement with Morocco that included products from the territory. France and Spain have sided with Rabat, primarily due to their own financial interests and planned investments in Western Sahara as well as their reliance on Morocco to curb African migration to the EU.

While Western Sahara’s Sahrawi independence activists are not on Washington’s good side, there’s been much talk that Trump could recognize a breakaway region on the other side of the continent, Somaliland, which could encourage middle powers and emerging economies to expand their influence in Africa amid a proxy war that would also involve Egypt and Eritrea.

Last January, Ethiopia announced plans to build a port and naval base in Somaliland in exchange for becoming the first country to recognize the breakaway republic’s sovereignty. But after facing pushback from Somalia, Ethiopia will now seek “access to and from the sea, under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia,” according to a joint declaration signed in December.

Eritrea fears that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may attempt to take Eritrean ports by force. Meanwhile, Mogadishu has hired U.S. lobbying firm BGR Group as reports emerge of a possible suspension of U.S. aid and troops to Somalia amid speculation that Trump might support recognition of Somaliland in a new bill introduced in December by Republican Rep. Scott Perry.

Ethiopia and Somalia appeared to have dialed down tensions as part of their deal last month, which was brokered by Turkey. An Ethiopian delegation visited Mogadishu and issued a statement last week agreeing to “strengthen bilateral relations.”

Somalia itself is fracturing internally, with Jubaland—another self-proclaimed breakaway region—having cut ties with the federal government in November and Puntland announcing on Dec. 21 that it was considering launching its own currency. The wider regional reverberations could create new opportunities for the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as they vie for regional influence and Red Sea control.

Egypt has said it will join, at Mogadishu’s request, an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia that is due to be renewed this month. Mogadishu had previously rejected Ethiopian troops being part of the mission fighting the militant group al-Shabab, but that stance has mellowed following Turkish mediation. Ethiopia had around 3,000 soldiers in Somalia as part of the previous mission. As many as 7,000 additional Ethiopian troops are deployed in Somalia under a separate bilateral agreement.

Ethiopia has not yet made clear whether it has officially communicated the annulment of its controversial Somaliland deal with officials in Somaliland. This may give Trump pause, and he could decide to avoid the issue entirely, particularly given his close relationship with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who backs Somalia.

Sunday, Jan. 12: Comoros holds legislative elections.

Thursday, June. 5: Burundi holds legislative elections.

Tuesday, Sep. 16: National elections take place in Malawi.

Saturday, Sep. 27: National elections take place in the Seychelles.

Sunday, Oct. 5: Cameroon holds presidential elections.

New regional players in the Sahel. Instability in the Sahel has been largely overshadowed by conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine. Having ejected Western counterterrorism operations, military rulers from Mali to Niger are learning that Russian troops alone cannot eradicate the deep-rooted issues that have bred terrorists in the region. Russian forces have suffered significant losses fighting Tuareg separatist rebels and al Qaeda-linked JNIM militants in Mali. Armed groups have spread throughout West Africa along the Gulf of Guinea and into Ivory Coast and Ghana, and insecurity appears likely to increase.

What happens in the Sahel will depend greatly on the actions of Washington and Beijing. A China-backed oil pipeline from Niger to Benin was meant to bankroll the Nigerien junta but hit stumbling blocks due to armed attacks last June, and Beijing’s diplomacy this year could make or break Niger’s economy.

Meanwhile, possible disengagement with Africa by a new Trump administration—or worse, an amplified policy meant to undermine Russia and China—will create opportunities for middle powers. Expect new partnerships with Turkey, Morocco, and the Persian Gulf nations in 2025 by Sahel putschists interested in securing their own rule. Those deals are already emerging: Turkey has reportedly increased drone sales to Burkina Faso and Mali in recent years.

Cameroon’s leader for life. President Paul Biya has ruled Cameroon since 1982 and is the world’s oldest head of state. The 91-year-old is expected to seek an eighth term in an October ballot that he will almost certainly win amid frequent allegations of election fraud.

Following Cameroon’s last presidential ballot in 2018, which Biya ostensibly won by a landslide, the government solicited bids to build a new mansion for the country’s election judge. Biya’s legitimacy is assured by the United States, largely because by “[l]abelling all insecurity as simply ‘terrorism’ for an international audience, Cameroon convinces many countries to keep selling it arms, vehicles, and aircraft,” as Chris W.J. Roberts wrote in Foreign Policy in 2023.

The greatest threat to Biya is the country’s ongoing Anglophone crisis, which first erupted in 2017 and has since displaced more than 765,000 people—many of whom have fled to neighboring Nigeria. The conflict emerged out of secessionists in Cameroon seeking independence for the country’s two marginalized English-speaking regions.

“Human rights organizations have documented widespread abuses by Cameroonian security forces, many of which were carried out using US-supplied equipment,” wrote Cameroonian American writer Achille Tenkiang in Nigerian outlet the Republic. “Military aid and diplomatic support for Biya’s government have perpetuated a cycle of violence and repression, with devastating consequences for the Anglophone population.” An eighth term for Biya will likely lead to an increase in the violent attacks that have spilled into Nigeria’s border towns.

African diplomacy on the world stage. There will be a concerted effort to amplify Africa’s voice on the global stage in 2025, as South Africa holds the presidency of a newly expanded G-20, which now includes the African Union (AU). The AU will elect a new chairperson for its commission next month. In the running are former Kenyan President Raila Odinga; Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf; and Richard Randriamandrato, Madagascar’s sacked former foreign minister.

The candidates hope to tackle Africa’s immense security challenges. But top of the list of concerns for both the African Union and South Africa is wider African representation on the global political scene, including securing two permanent seats for the continent at the U.N. Security Council. “We are going to be a big noise, and we want that big noise to be recognized in the form of countries that will be part of the G-20 right now,” South African President Cyril Ramaphosa said last month.

Ramaphosa intends to use Africa’s role as a source for the critical minerals powering the world as leverage to argue for a more equitable financial system for the continent itself. He’s also likely to use the expanded BRICS grouping to push for a multipolar order that undermines certain U.S. interests—for example, regarding Israel—along with underscoring African agency and refocusing attention on the global south. Nigeria, Uganda, and Algeria received official invites to join BRICS as “partner states” last year.

Sudan’s proxy conflict. More than 30 million people, over half of them children, are in need of aid in Sudan after 20 months of war between Sudanese military chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his former deputy Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The U.S. government on Tuesday accused the RSF and its proxies of committing genocide and imposed sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act targeting Hemeti and seven companies in the United Arab Emirates.

A New York Times investigation accuses the UAE of supplying weapons to the RSF which controls the Jebel Amer gold mines in Darfur and smuggles its gold output via the UAE. However some critics say the sanctions have come too late. The conflict has drawn in various other nations including Iran, Russia and Ukraine. The RSF and Sudan’s army have recruited various armed militias—many of whom are motivated by ethnic rivalries and economic gains—that make it difficult to end the conflict.

Gabon’s sketchy elections. Gabon is set to hold a transitional election in August. The interim president—Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema, who deposed his cousin Ali Bongo in August 2023—has drawn up a new constitution that enables him to participate in the elections as a civilian while blocking other Bongo dynasty members from the ballot.

The new constitution eliminates the post of prime minister, concentrating power in the hands of the president.  More importantly, Gabon is the last remaining former French colony in West Africa to host French troops—and Paris is expected to ignore the country’s authoritarian turn. Washington is keen to avoid a greater Chinese military presence on the Atlantic coast and will likely also turn a blind eye to electoral irregularities.