Trump + Biden = 1 Good Syria Policy

No sooner had ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s plane touched down in Moscow than a debate erupted inside the Beltway about what the United States should do in Syria. Not surprisingly, it kicked off after U.S. President-elect Donald Trump posted on social media that Syria was “not our fight.” At around the same time, President Joe Biden said, “As we all turn to the question of what comes next, the United States will work with our partners and the stakeholders in Syria to help them seize an opportunity to manage the risks.”

Taken together, Biden and Trump have provided the foreign-policy community with the rough outlines of a decent U.S. approach to Syria.

Almost immediately after Trump’s post and Biden’s statement, the commentariat shot back. To pursue a policy based on what both were prescribing would ensure that Washington would miss a “historic opportunity” because the early actions of the new government indicated a commitment to “inclusivity and stability.” Others argued that it was the United States’ hands-off approach to Syria’s civil war in the first place that helped prolong its 13 years of agony. Presumably, this was why policymakers were informed that it was necessary for the United States to help ensure a smooth and stable transition in Damascus.

The idea that the United States can have some role in forging a new order in Syria is folly. It is not based on any particular insight or understanding of the country. Rather, it is based on the habits of some foreign-policy community members who have a hard time believing there isn’t an American solution to almost every problem and on a lot of hope that is founded on what may or may not be good assumptions about Syrian society.

Indeed, if Trump’s “not our fight” message meant that the United States should not get involved in engineering Syrian politics, his post was far wiser than his critics would ever allow. Syria is now under the control of a rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The press has reported that its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, broke from al Qaeda and the Islamic State, the evidence for which are his declarations about minorities and Syria being for all Syrians.

Those are, indeed, important statements. But the reason for Jolani’s break from these groups was not only or principally for doctrinal reasons. It was about power politics within the world of transnational jihadism. Specifically, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wanted to subsume HTS’s forerunner, the avowedly al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra into his group. This would have resulted in a significant diminution in Jolani’s power. So, essentially, he walked away and started HTS. It is true that HTS does seem to have eschewed some of the worst excesses of the Islamic State—a low bar, to be sure—but as Jolani was emptying Assad’s notorious prisons, others were bearing witness of the torture they endured in HTS’s dungeons.

It’s also important to keep in mind that these are the early days in post-Assad Syria. There is much for Syrians to celebrate after nearly 54 years of the Assad dynasty, but there are also people who have lost much with the end of the regime. No one knows if or how the latter group will respond. The good news is that the worst of Assad’s henchmen and financiers have left for Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere, but not everyone is gone and lesser-known regime supporters may not necessarily go quietly into the night as the new political order takes shape.

Separate, but related, Syria also has ethnic and religious structures much like its neighbor to the west—Lebanon. It is important to note that most transitions to democracy fail, and Syria’s diversity adds a degree of difficulty to this process that renders this outcome even less promising. Syrians may defy expectations and learn lessons from their neighbors, which would be great and would underline something that commentary often gives short shrift. While making the case for U.S. involvement in Syria’s transition, observers often claim that Syrians have agency. Policymakers should take the last part of this argument seriously: Syria’s future is for Syrians to decide.

No matter how laudable, Washington’s record on promoting more open, just, and democratic societies in the Middle East is one of disappointment and failure. To get involved in the revolution unfolding in Syria is unlikely to help Syrians or advance U.S. interests. Besides, no one in Syria has actually asked the United States for help ensuring a transition to democracy.

At the same time, the United States does have a role to play in Syria. Biden struck an appropriate tone, rightly suggesting that the United States has a responsibility to mitigate the worst risk that could result from Assad’s fall—namely the recrudescence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups. It is for that reason alone that Washington is working with its Israeli partners to destroy much of the Assad war machine and ensuring that it does not fall into the hands of those bent on violence and repression. Still, the prospect of instability and the fact that extremists feed off power vacuums makes the mission of the some 900 U.S. troops in Syria more urgent than it was just a few months ago. Withdrawing them now, at a moment of maximum instability in Syria, would be foolish.

Yet, there is a real risk that Trump would bring U.S. forces in Syria home. During his first term as president, Trump tried to withdraw those troops twice, before settling on drawing down their numbers and redeploying them. He also seems to have an affinity for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who seeks a major role in the new Syria. The Turkish government has repeatedly said to Trump and other U.S. presidents that Ankara is prepared to fight extremists in Syria, but it is a self-serving claim. The record demonstrates that Erdogan and company are more interested in undermining U.S. support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a predominantly Kurdish fighting force that is Washington’s partner in the fight against the Islamic State.

The problem for Turkey is that the SDF is linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK), a militant organization. The Turks have directed the Syrian National Army (SNA)—another Turkish-backed rebel group that also played a role in the liberation of Aleppo—to turn its attention to fighting the SDF. Since then, the Turkish military has marshaled forces along the Turkey-Syria border in advance of a possible invasion intended to destroy the Kurdish group.

It is easy to get lost in the details of Turkish maneuvering in Syria, but the SNA’s push against the SDF is the culmination of the Turkish government’s decade-long effort to hoodwink the United States into believing that Turkey would fight jihadists only when it is interested in fighting the Kurds. Handing off the U.S. mission to the Turkish government will likely lead to the worst of all outcomes: an Islamist extremist group in power in Damascus and no U.S. partners left to keep the other extremists in check. This outcome should be avoided even at the expense of leaving U.S. forces in Syria to ensure that neither the Islamic State nor al Qaeda can become global threats again. This is something that the United States can and should do in Syria.

There has been some tsk-tsking among some Democrats lately about how Trump has overshadowed Biden. The United States only has one president at a time, but when it comes to Syria, both men are basically correct. With both, the United States has the building blocks of a policy that recognizes what is actually important to it in Syria and, unlike promoting democracy and ensuring a smooth transition, is within Washington’s own power to achieve.