Assad’s Fall Is the Middle East’s 1989

The spectacularly rapid fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and his regime is the Middle East’s 1989. Like the fall of the Berlin Wall, this weekend’s end of 54 years of Assad family rule signals an earthquake in the regional order—with tremors that will be felt for decades to come. Just as 1989 was marked by a series of falling dominoes in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and elsewhere, the collapse of the Syrian regime is part of a chain of events, including Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah, Iran’s loss of its most potent proxy forces, and the weakening of Russia due to the war it started in Ukraine.

And just as 1989 marked the end of communism in Europe, Assad’s flight to Moscow signals the demise of the ideology of anti-Western, anti-Israel resistance in the Middle East. For more than half a century, the Assad family was the backbone for a political order in the Middle East in which a bloc of states styled themselves as the resistance to what they labeled Western imperialism and Zionism. The appropriation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict proved to be a powerful tool to mobilize the masses across the region who wanted justice for Palestinians—sentiments that the Syrian regime and its allies instrumentalized to distract from their domestic failures, oppress their own people, and extend their regimes’ regional influence. In reality, these regimes cared little about the Palestinians.

Within this bloc, Syria and Iran believed they had entered a mutually beneficial and durable alliance—and each thought it had the upper hand. Syria was crucial for Iran because it was the heart of the land bridge between Iran and its most valuable proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon, while Syria saw alignment with Iran as increasing its own stature against Israel and bolstering its influence over Lebanon.

For Iran, the ideology of resistance was an indispensable tool to rally support from Arabs and Sunnis as Tehran vied for dominance in the Middle East. As the leaders of a self-styled Axis of Resistance, the clerics in Tehran were able to supplant the old ideology of pan-Arab nationalism, as espoused by the Syrian Baath Party and others, and ultimately dominate several Arab countries through well-armed proxies. The Assad regime ignored this challenge even as Iran manipulated the Baath Party to serve Tehran’s own objective of achieving regional dominance. For example, Iran presented Hezbollah to Syria as an ally when Hezbollah’s primary purpose was to support exporting the Islamic revolution.

The Syrian uprising of 2011 and the war that followed shifted the balance of power toward Iran, which intervened to prop up the Assad regime. Most consequentially, Tehran summoned Hezbollah to support the Assad regime against the Syrian rebels.

In the course of the Syrian war, the country moved from being a partner to a client of Iran. A much-diminished Assad regime was now dependent for its survival on Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah and Tehran-controlled militias from various countries. In other Middle Eastern states, including Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, Iran’s proxies consolidated their status as dominant political and military actors. Iran increased its investment in them as its outer lines of defense and tools of geopolitical influence.

Iran’s rise and dominance as a regional power came to define an entire era of Middle Eastern politics. Across the region, most countries either were under direct Iranian influence via the country’s proxies or were forced to configure their foreign policies around the threats posed by Iran. The Gulf Arab states, for example, ended up pursuing de-escalation with Iran to stave off the instability caused by its activities.

The United States, other Western countries, and Israel did not like this Iran-dominated order, but they tolerated it. They saw it as lower risk compared with the unknown forces that sudden political change in Iran or Syria could unleash. This Cold War-like arrangement with a confrontational status quo made Damascus and Tehran feel confident in their power vis-à-vis the West and its allies.

U.S. disengagement from the Middle East under the Obama administration paved the way for Russia to insert itself into the regional order. When Iran and its proxies showed themselves unable to prop up the Assad regime on their own, Moscow saw the Syrian war as a low-cost opportunity to reclaim its status as a global power and arbiter of the region. Russia’s substantial naval and air bases in Syria also served as critical logistical centers for Moscow’s expanding military operations in Africa.

For almost a decade, Russia thus became a major actor in the Middle Eastern cold war. Russia, Iran, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance appeared to form one bloc, while Western allies such as Israel and the Gulf Arab countries formed another. But Russian support for Assad was little more than a transactional partnership, and Russian-Iranian relations were never frictionless. From the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, it sought to undermine Iran’s influence in the country so that Russia remained the dominant actor.

The Iranian regime, in turn, was concerned about the challenge that Russia presented to its influence in Syria. Yet Tehran had no choice but to remain in Moscow’s orbit, regarding its influence over Syria as a small price to pay in return for gaining a powerful backer for its Axis of Resistance.

Tehran presented Hezbollah and the Assad regime to the Iranian people as a worthy investment: the front line of resistance to Israel and the crown jewels of Iran’s regional clout. Tehran needed to reassure Iranians that the economic sacrifices and political isolation that its support for Hezbollah and Assad generated were not in vain. Otherwise, Tehran argued, Iran would be under threat of erasure by Israel and the United States.

The collapse of the Assad regime has jolted this dynamic to an abrupt stop. Russia’s abandonment of Assad—and by extension, Iran’s project in Syria—creates additional rifts in Iran’s already shrinking network of proxies. The Iranian leadership will struggle to justify to its people decades of investment in Syria that have gone down the drain in a matter of days.

Standing alone without Syria and Russia in the face of a still-strong Western-backed bloc, the regime in Tehran will be revealed to its people as having imposed a futile sacrifice that not even its nuclear program can redeem. This poses a serious risk to the survival of the Islamic Republic—potentially the biggest fallout of last week’s events.

The repercussions of Assad’s collapse will also ripple across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen as Iran’s proxies find themselves without an important lifeline. In Lebanon, in particular, the political dynamics set off by Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah are likely to accelerate with the loss of the all-important land bridge for weapons supplies from Iran. The sudden vulnerability of an already weakened Iran also means that Tehran’s remaining proxies may doubt the reliability of their patron.

The domino effect of the collapse of the Assad regime will inevitably mean the end of the Iran-dominated regional order. Replacing it will be a regional order dominated by Israel and its partners. Israel has shifted its perspective from an uneasy tolerance of Iran’s influence in the Middle East to actively seeking an end to this status quo and has succeeded in practically neutralizing the biggest threat to its security, Iran. Israel will move from being a state surrounded by adversaries and clawing at regional legitimacy to becoming the Middle East’s agenda-setter. Enjoying good relations with both the United States and Russia also makes Israel a key player in ending the cold war in the Middle East.

For the Gulf Arab countries, Iran’s degradation as a destabilizing actor also bolsters the implementation of their economic visions. The defeat of Iran’s revolutionary project will pave the way for widening the scope of normalization between Arab countries and Israel on the basis of shared business, political, and security interests. This recalibration will likely push Turkey to act more pragmatically in the way it engages with the region.

The anti-Western ideology nurtured by the Syrian Baath Party for 54 years and successfully appropriated by Iran blossomed for decades but is rapidly withering. Just as the Cold War ended with the defeat of communism, decades of confrontation in the Middle East will end with the defeat of the resistance ideology.