Although it seemed that Kissinger never even wanted to call Europe, the famous question about whom to contact on this side of the Atlantic exposed a diplomatic gap. The EU tried to address this in 2009 by creating the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Then-European Commission president José Manuel Barroso proclaimed there was "no doubt — the U.S. Secretary of State should call Cathy Ashton because she is our foreign minister." Catherine Ashton, the first person to hold this position, was meant to serve as the EU’s diplomatic face to the world, bridging its Common Foreign and Security Policy with external relations.
But political and personal agendas have often undercut this role, leaving its ability to coordinate EU external action in question.
The foreign policy hyperactivity of former president of the European Council Charles Michel seemed to compete with that of commission president Ursula von der Leyen. This rivalry, occurring within a vague legal framework open to conflicting interpretations, came at the expense of the former EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell.
Von der Leyen has steadily consolidated power over foreign policy, infuriating member states on occasions. For instance, she undermined EU diplomacy during her visit to Israel, shortly after Hamas’s 7 October attack by appearing more pro-Israeli than agreed upon by the 27 member states.
Michel may now be gone, but von der Leyen’s actions resonate loudly in the distribution of powers within the college of commissioners. She has weakened traditionally powerful portfolios, splitting them among multiple individuals and even created a new position for directorate-general for external policy. Something is clearly at play, and it seems to me that the commission may be longing a bit too much for its old directorate-general for external relations (DG RELEX).
The parliament has consistently raised concerns about this situation. This is not about EU integration or the in foro interno, in foro externo legal doctrine of the Court of Justice of the EU – it is about ensuring coherence, credibility and effectiveness in our foreign policy. It concerns the balance of competences, institutions and respect for an EU foreign policy integrated by the sum of 27 Member States.
Parliament resolutions have highlighted how these inter-institutional in-fights damage the EU's credibility. The council’s laid-back stance has allowed the commission to expand its role to roam freely in this regard, leading to confusion over 'who does what' in foreign policy roles, as seen during the recent visit of EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas and EUCO president António Costa to Ukraine.
It’s incomprehensible that Slovak prime minister Robert Fico directed his complaints about this visit to von der Leyen rather than addressing them within the EU Council, as if the latter has no role in shaping EU foreign policy.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the first casualty of these power struggles, with its budget being used as a weapon against it. Russia’s aggression has triggered unprecedented inflation, disproportionately impacting the EEAS compared to other EU institutions.
Managing 145 delegations worldwide requires funding for rent, utilities, and security costs, particularly in high-risk areas. From 2022 to 2023, security costs surged by over 20 percent. However, budget increases are capped at two percent annually, creating a structural underfunding of €40m per year. EEAS budget cuts account for 76 percent of all EU administrative budget reductions.
In response, the EEAS has implemented serious cost-cutting measures by reducing non-essential expenses, halting IT projects, and minimising spending on infrastructure and security for its delegations.
Yet, despite these efforts, the EU diplomatic service still fails to meet basic security standards and IT systems – an alarming deficiency given the rise in cyber threats from third countries and proxies. These budget cuts come at a time when the EEAS faces growing responsibilities assigned by EU institutions, including the council.
The latest developments involve a push from the commission and a leaked plan that proposes to reduce personnel, particularly in international development and partnerships, and create 'super delegations.'
According to the working document awaiting Kallas’ response in December, the plan is to form a Network of Delegations. This new format could be potentially introduced in countries participating in Global Gateway initiatives. 82 countries (19 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 31 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 32 in the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific) out of more than 150 countries in those regions.
While the proposal aims to consolidate diplomats into regional hubs, it risks reducing some delegations to just an ambassador and a driver.
In a recent parliamentary session concerning budget control of the EEAS, Kallas was questioned about this issue. She stated that she called the commission president right after learning about the plan, which according to her might not be a “bad idea”, but she said she has to analyse it.
If implemented, it can pose serious and far-reaching negative consequences for the EU’s External Action and the performance of the EU institutions in this area.
The parliament has not only been vocal but also proactive on this issue, going beyond resolutions to address the EEAS’s financial needs and align them with the budget proposed by the commission and the council.
This effort was part of my agenda in the last term, including during the 2024 conciliation, and remains a priority to me as S&D coordinator for foreign affairs this term.
We are summoning Kallas, in both of her capacities, to the parliament – the budgetary authority – to explain these plans, which were not mentioned during the hearings.
We expect her to propose solutions to the EEAS’s financial challenges that neither reduce our global presence nor weaken our diplomacy or international development aid. We expect her to safeguard the EU’s foreign policy, not only on the world stage but also within Brussels.
Nacho Sánchez Amor is a Spanish MEP and the coordinator on foreign affairs of the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) Group in the European Parliament.
Nacho Sánchez Amor is a Spanish MEP and the coordinator on foreign affairs of the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) Group in the European Parliament.