17-09-28 Apple Responsive Brief On Design Patent Damages

Case 5:11-cv-01846-LHK Document 3523 Filed 09/28/17 Page 1 of 28

1 ERIK J. OLSON (CA SBN 175815) WILLIAM F. LEE

[email protected] [email protected]
2 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
NATHAN B. SABRI (CA SBN 252216)
[email protected] HALE AND DORR LLP
3
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 60 State Street
4 425 Market Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109
San Francisco, California 94105-2482 Telephone: (617) 526-6000
5 Telephone: (415) 268-7000 Facsimile: (617) 526-5000
6 Facsimile: (415) 268-7522
MARK D. SELWYN (SBN 244180)
7 [email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiff and WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
8 Counterclaim-Defendant APPLE INC. HALE AND DORR LLP
950 Page Mill Road
9 Palo Alto, California 94304
Telephone: (650) 858-6000
10 Facsimile: (650) 858-6100
11
12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
14
SAN JOSE DIVISION
15

16
17
APPLE INC., a California corporation, Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK
18
Plaintiff, APPLES RESPONSE TO
19 SAMSUNGS OPENING BRIEF IN
v. RESPONSE TO THE COURTS
20 JULY 28, 2017 ORDER
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., a Korean
21 corporation; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Date: October 12, 2017
AMERICA, INC., a New York corporation; and Time: 1:30pm
22 SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS Place: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
AMERICA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh
23
company,
24
Defendants.
25
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27
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APPLES RESPONSE TO SAMSUNGS OPENING BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURTS JULY 28, 2017 ORDER
Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
3 II. RESPONSE TO SAMSUNGS ANSWERS TO THE COURTS
QUESTIONS ...................................................................................................................... 2
4
5 A. Issue 1: Samsungs Proposed Test Improperly Equates The

Claimed Design With The Article Of Manufacture. ............................................... 2
6
B. Issue 2: The Identity of the Article of Manufacture Is A Question
7 Of Fact For The Jury, But Is Not Dictated By The Claimed Design
As Samsung Suggests. ............................................................................................ 6
8
C. Issues 3 & 4: While The Patentee Bears The Ultimate Burden On
9
Damages, The Defendant Bears The Burden On Certain Subsidiary
10 Issues. ...................................................................................................................... 9
11 D. Issue 5: The Articles of Manufacture Are Samsungs Infringing

Phones. .................................................................................................................. 12
12
E. Issue 6: The Record Evidence Supports Only The Conclusion That
13 The Relevant Articles of Manufacture Are Samsungs Infringing
Phones. .................................................................................................................. 13
14
15 F. Issue 7: There Is No Record Evidence Supporting The

Determination Of Total Profit For Any Article Other Than
16 Samsungs Infringing Phones. .............................................................................. 18
17 III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 20
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APPLES RESPONSE TO SAMSUNGS OPENING BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO THE COURTS JULY 28, 2017 ORDER i
Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 Federal Cases
4 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,

786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...........................................................................................5, 8
5
Application of Rubinfield,
6 270 F.ed 391, 393 (C.C.P.A. 1959).................................................................................4, 14
7 Clem v. Lomeli,
8 566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009)...............................................................................2, 6, 17, 20
9 Dang v. Cross,
422 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2005)...............................................................................................17
10
Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc.,
11 256 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................................15
12 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,
543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) ...............................................................................8
13
14 Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer Co.,

166 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ...........................................................................................18
15
Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc.,
16 90 F. Appx 540 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .........................................................................................8
17 Erving Paper Mills v. Hudson-Sharp Machine Co.,
332 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1964)...............................................................................................12
18
Exxon Corp. v. United States,
19
931 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ...............................................................................................5
20
Gantt v. City of Los Angeles,
21 717 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2013)...............................................................................................17
22 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.,

318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ....................................................................................19
23
Golden Bridge Technology v. Apple Inc.,
24
C.A. No. 12-4882, 2014 WL 2194501 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2014) .....................................11
25
Honeywell International Inc. v. ICM Controls Corp.,
26 45 F. Supp. 3d 969 (D. Minn. 2014) ...................................................................................11
27 In re Hruby,
373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967) ............................................................................................13
28
Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK ii
1 In re Stevens,
173 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1949) ............................................................................................5
2
Kokesh v. SEC,
3 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) ........................................................................................................10
4
Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
5 838 F.2d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ...........................................................................................16
6 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,

580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .............................................................................................9
7
MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., C.A. No. 11-5341,
8 2014 WL 2854890 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2014) ....................................................................11
9
Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc.,
10 318 F.3d 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................................11
11 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .............................................................................................4
12
O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co.,
13 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................7
14 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,
15 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) .............................................................................11
16 Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.,

719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) ...........................................................................10
17
Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.,
18 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016) ..........................................................................................................8
19 Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) .................................................................................................. passim
20
21 SEC v. Platforms Wireless International Corp.,

617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010).............................................................................................10
22
SEC v. Teo,
23 746 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................................10
24 Shinseki v. Sanders,
556 U.S. 396 (2009) ............................................................................................................18
25
SmithKline Diagnostics v. Helena Laboratories Corp.,
26
926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991) .............................................................................................9
27
Stowell v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,
28 3 F.3d 539 (1st Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................9
Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK iii
1 Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric & Manufacturing

Co., 225 U.S. 604 (1912) ....................................................................................................10
2
Wittich v. Allison,
3 56 F. 796 (5th Cir. 1893).....................................................................................................10
4
State Cases
5
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
6 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) ....................................................................................................12
7 Greenfield v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,

47 N.Y. 430 (1872) .............................................................................................................10
8
Federal Statutes
9
15 U.S.C. 1117(a) ..........................................................................................................................9
10
11 17 U.S.C. 504(b) ............................................................................................................................9
12 35 U.S.C. 284 ...............................................................................................................9, 11, 18, 19
13 35 U.S.C. 289 ....................................................................................................................... passim
14 Other Authorities
15 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 1503.01 ..........................................................................2
16 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 1503.02 ........................................................................15
17
Briefs & Transcript
18
Apple Brief,
19 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 14-1335,
2014 WL 3909249 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2014) ......................................................................18
20
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
21 Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 15-777,
2016 WL 3194218 (S. Ct. June 8, 2016) ..............................................................4, 5, 10, 12
22
23 Petitioners Brief,
Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 15-777,
24 2016 WL 6599922 (S. Ct. June 1, 2016) ............................................................................18
25 Samsung Brief,
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 14-1335,
26 2014 WL 2586819 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2014) .....................................................................18
27
28
Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK iv
1 Samsungs Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 15-777
2 2015 WL 10013702 (S. Ct. Dec. 14, 2015) ..........................................................................8
3 Transcript of Oral Argument, Samsung Electronics Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
4 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/
5 15-777_1b82.pdf .............................................................................................................5, 17
10
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Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK v
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Samsungs answers to the questions posed in the Courts July 28, 2017 Order amount to
3 little more than a repackaging of the earlier apportionment argument that the Federal Circuit
4 and this Court rejected and Samsung expressly abandoned at the Supreme Court. As explained in
5 Apples Opening Brief, Samsungs infringing phones are the relevant articles of manufacture
6 under any appropriate test, and Apple is entitled to Samsungs total profit on those phones.
7 Samsung seeks to escape that conclusion by constructing a self-serving test for identifying
8 the relevant article of manufacture that conflicts with both decades-old law and the Supreme
9 Courts ruling in this very case. Samsung proposes that the scope of a patents claimed design
10 defines the article of manufacture to which the defendant applied the design; therefore, it argues,
11 because Apples design patents do not claim entire phones, Samsung cannot have applied the
12 patented designs to entire phones. But by limiting the article of manufacture to the claimed
13 ornamental, non-functional design elements, Samsung would render it impossible for any
14 complex, multicomponent product to be the article of manufacture to which a patented design has
15 been applied. This, of course, runs counter to the Supreme Courts ruling that the term article of
16 manufacture as applied to a multicomponent product may be either a product as sold or a smaller
17 component. Moreover, Samsungs proposed test would necessarily require apportioning between
18 the functional innards of a device and its external design. As this Court (and Samsung) is well
19 aware, such apportionment under 289 is prohibited, and both the law of the case and the Federal
20 Circuits mandate forbid reconsideration of that issue. Samsungs proposed test therefore cannot
21 be the appropriate method for identifying the article of manufacture to which a claimed design
22 has been applied. Instead, as proposed in Apples Opening Brief, the correct test is one that takes
23 into account multiple factors and leaves open the possibilityas mandated by the Supreme
24 Courtthat the article could be either the product as sold or a smaller component.
25 Samsungs suggestion that it does not bear any burden of proof under 289 likewise
26 conflicts with settled law. As made clear by the Courts jury instructions in this case, the fact that
27 the patentee bears the ultimate burden on damages does not mean that the defendant bears no
28
Case No. 11-cv-01846-LHK 1
1 burden on certain subsidiary issues. Just as Samsung bore the burden to reduce its liability by
2 proving deductible costs, so too was it responsible for proving that it applied Apples patented
3 designs to any article of manufacture less than the infringing phones and the profit associated
4 with such an article. Because Samsung failed to do so, no new trial is warranted and the design
5 patent damages award should be confirmed.
6 Finally, contrary to Samsungs suggestion that a new trial is required if the record does
7 not establish as a matter of law that Samsungs phones are the articles of manufacture
8 (Samsung Br. 1), precedent cited by both Samsung and the Court holds that no new trial is
9 necessary or appropriate as long as it is more probable than not that the jury would have
10 concluded that the phones were the articles of manufacture even if Samsungs proposed
11 instruction had been given. Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009). That standard
12 is easily met here: the jury found that Samsungs phones infringed Apples design patents, and
13 the evidence proves not only that the entire phones are the relevant articles of manufacture but
14 also that they are the only articles on which the jury could have calculated Samsungs profits.
15 II. RESPONSE TO SAMSUNGS ANSWERS TO THE COURTS QUESTIONS
16 A. Issue 1: Samsungs Proposed Test Improperly Equates The Claimed Design

With The Article Of Manufacture.
17
Section 289 is clear that a patented design is distinct from the article of manufacture
18
to which that design is applie[d]. In fact, the statute expressly contemplates that a single
19
claimed design may be applied to multiple articles of manufacture, debunking any notion that the
20
two concepts are commensurate. See 35 U.S.C. 289 (authorizing the recovery of infringers
21
profits when the patented design is applied to any article of manufacture).1 The Manual of
22
Patent Examining Procedure also makes clear that the claimed design may be directed to only
23
a portion of [an] article and need not encompass an entire article of manufacture. See, e.g.,
24
MPEP 1503.01 ([T]he claimed design shown in full lines in the drawings may be directed to
25
only a portion of the article.). Yet Samsung repeatedly conflates the scope of a patented design
26
27
28 1
All emphases added unless otherwise noted.
1 with the identification of the article to which the defendant applies that design, arguing that [t]he
2 scope of a design patent . . . will principally determine the identity of the article of manufacture.
3 Samsung Br. 3; see id. 15 ([B]ecause Apples patents do not claim designs for entire products,
4 the articles of manufacture to which those designs are applied are not Samsungs entire products.
5 (emphases in original)). Because Samsungs proposed test for identifying the article of
6 manufacture ignores the critical distinction between the design as claimed by the patentee and the
7 article to which the defendant applies that design, it must be rejected.
8 The scope of a claimed design, as Samsung itself says, may by law extend only to the
9 ornamental appearance of an article of manufacture and not to internal or functional features.
10 Id. 3. Thus, if Samsung were correct that the relevant article of manufacture is always the part,
11 portion, or component of the [infringing] product that corresponds to the scope of the patented
12 design (id.), then the article of manufacture could never be an entire multicomponent product.
13 Instead, in Samsungs view, the article of manufacture must be limited to exterior elements of a
14 product. But that is inconsistent with the Supreme Courts holding that the term article of
15 manufacture is broad enough to encompass both a product sold to a consumer as well as a
16 component of that product. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016).
17 Even the one situation in which Samsung concedes that an article of manufacture may
18 be an entire productthe case of a single-component product, such as a dinner plate
19 (Samsung Br. 4 (quoting Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 432))proves that the article of manufacture to
20 which a patented design is applied may exceed the scope of the claimed design. As Samsung
21 recognizes, if a patented design is applied to a dinner plate, then the article of manufacture is
22 necessarily the entire plate. Id. But a design that is applied to a plate need not cover the entire
23 plate. Consider, for example, a patent that claims a design for the rim of a dinner plate. E.g.,
24 U.S. Patent No. D730,115 S. The patent claims only the rim, and disclaims, through broken
25 lines, the remainder of the front surface of the plate, as well as its back. Id. If an infringer then
26 applies the patented rim design to a plate it manufactures, the entire plateas Samsung
27 concedesis necessarily the article of manufacture. That is so even though the scope of the
28
1 patented design was expressly limited to the outer rim of the plate and even though the outer rim
2 of the infringing plate would be the portion . . . of the product that corresponds to the scope of
3 the patented design. Samsung Br. 3. And it is so even assuming Samsung is correct that the
4 majority of the plate would be disregarded for purposes of infringement. See id. 6. Thus, even
5 Samsung implicitly recognizes that a design covering only a portion of a product may nonetheless
6 be applied to a larger product, such that the entire product is the article of manufacture. 2
7 In the case of a multicomponent product, such as a kitchen oven, Samsungs proposed
8 test amounts to nothing more than a per se rule that if the patent claims a design covering fewer
9 than all components of that product, the design cannot be applied to the entire product.
10 Samsung Br. 4 (quoting Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 432); id. 3 (The relevant article of manufacture
11 is the specific part, portion or component of a product to which the patented design is applied.).
12 Putting aside that the Supreme Court expressly stated that such a case was not so simple,
13 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 432 (In the case of a design for a multicomponent product, such as a
14 kitchen oven, identifying the article of manufacture to which the design has been applied is a
15 more difficult task.), Samsungs proposed test also cannot be squared with the fact that Congress
16 and the courtsincluding this Court, in this caseconsistently have rejected any attempt to
17 apportion an infringers profits under 289 between the design of a product and its utilitarian
18 features. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Dkt.
19 1157 at 9 (excluding apportionment testimony of Samsungs expert as contrary to law); Dkt.
20 2271 at 12 (calling the apportionment argument clearly foreclosed by Federal Circuit precedent
21 and noting that Congress specifically drafted the design patent remedy provisions to remove an
22 apportionment requirement); see also Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
23 Party 8, 2016 WL 3194218 (U.S. Br.) (stating that 289s language unambiguously permits a
24 patent holder to recover the infringers entire profits from the article of manufacture to which
25
2
Furthermore, the claimed design cannot properly limit the article of manufacture because
26
a design patent may be infringed by articles which are specifically different from that shown in
27 the patent. Application of Rubinfield, 270 F.2d 391, 393 (C.C.P.A. 1959). That is, a patent
claiming a design for the outer rim of a dinner plate may be infringed by the application of that
28 same design to a teacup, or a bowl, or any other product that could bear the design.
1 the design was applied, regardless of the extent to which those profits are attributable to the
2 infringing design). Given that a design patent may not extend to features concealed or
3 obscure[d] in normal use, Samsung Br. 3 (quoting In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015, 1016 (C.C.P.A.
4 1949)), every design patent will claim only a products external features and not its internal, non-
5 design features. Id. 6. Thus, under Samsungs view, damages for design patent infringement by
6 a multicomponent product must always be limited to the infringers profits from the products
7 external components, as distinguished from the profits contributed by its internal components.
8 Samsungs argument is apportionment, plain and simple. But Samsung abandoned its
9 apportionment theory at the Supreme Court. Tr. of Oral Argument 52, Samsung, 137 S. Ct. 429
10 (No. 15-777) (Congress said you cant apportion the value of the design in relation to the article.
11 Were conceding that here.). And even had it not expressly conceded the point, the law of the
12 case and the Federal Circuits mandate would prevent Samsung from asserting it now. See Apple
13 Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 1001-1002 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting Samsungs
14 apportionment argument as inconsistent with [t]he clear statutory language); Exxon Corp. v.
15 United States, 931 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (When a judgment of a trial court has been
16 appealed, the decision of the appellate court determines the law of the case, and the trial court
17 cannot depart from it on remand. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Samsung cannot revive its
18 apportionment argument by disguising it as a test for identifying the article of manufacture.
19 Rather, the appropriate test must account for the Supreme Courts admonition that the
20 relevant article of manufacture may be either an entire product or a component of such a
21 product. Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435. Thus, as the Solicitor General explained, if the defendant
22 proposes an article that is something less than the product as sold, a case-specific analysis of the
23 relationship among the design, the product, and any components is required to determine which
24 of the proposed articles most fairly may be said to embody the defendants appropriation of the
25 plaintiffs innovation. U.S. Br. 9. That analysis should be guided by the language of the statute
26 and factors such as those discussed in Apples Opening Brief (at 3-6), including whether the
27 defendant sells its asserted article of manufacture as part of a unified product. In fact, Samsung
28
1 itself has conceded that if an asserted article of manufacture cannot be separated from the product
2 as sold, profits should be awarded on the entire product. See Dkt. 1300 at 21 (Samsung stating
3 that [i]n some cases the article bearing the infringing design is inseparable from the entire article
4 as sold, and therefore all profits from sales of the article are recoverable under Section 289).
5 Depending on the facts of a given case, a proper test (such as that proposed by Apple)
6 sometimes will lead the factfinder to conclude that a patented design was applied to a
7 subcomponent of the infringing product, and sometimes will lead the factfinder to conclude that
8 the patented design was applied to the product as a whole. In this case, the mere fact that
9 Apples patents claim less than an entire phone does not mean that Samsung did not apply those
10 designs to entire phones as the infringing articles of manufacture. It is thus irrelevant that Apple
11 owns multiple design patents covering design features of an electronic device. If a defendant
12 infringes any of those patents, the specific circumstances of the case will determine whether the
13 infringer has applied the patented design to an entire device or to a subcomponent thereof. The
14 record evidence here makes clear that the patented designs were applied to Samsungs infringing
15 phones and that those phones reflect, and indeed are the best embodiment of, Samsungs
16 appropriation of Apples patented designs. For that reason, and given Samsungs utter failure to
17 even identify an alternative article of manufacture for the jury, it was not error to decline to give
18 Samsungs proposed instruction. At a minimum, because it is more probable than not that the
19 jury would have concluded that Samsungs infringing phones were the articles of manufacture in
20 any event, any instructional error was not prejudicial. See Clem, 566 F.3d at 1182.
21 B. Issue 2: The Identity of the Article of Manufacture Is A Question Of Fact For

The Jury, But Is Not Dictated By The Claimed Design As Samsung Suggests.
22
Samsung concedes, as it must, that identifying the relevant article of manufacture is a
23
question of fact for the jury that may be determined by the Court as a matter of law where there
24
are no disputed issues of material fact. Samsung Br. 7. But what Samsung gives the jury with
25
one hand it takes away with the other, by arguing that this undisputedly factual question is
26
subject to the courts legal guidance (id.)guidance that Samsung quickly makes clear
27
28
1 effectively disposes of the jurys factfinding role (id. 8). Samsungs thinly veiled attempt to
2 substitute claim construction as the mechanism to be used to identify the article of manufacture
3 finds no support in law and should be rejected for several reasons.
4 First, [t]he purpose of claim construction is to determin[e] the meaning and scope of the
5 patent claims asserted to be infringed. O2 Micro Intl Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521
6 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Resolving the scope of design patent claims
7 for purposes of determining infringement and invalidity is a separate issue entirely from the
8 subsequent step of identifying the article to which the defendant has applied an infringing design
9 for purposes of calculating infringers profits.
10 Second, Samsungs insistence that the identity of the relevant article of manufacture
11 depends upon the scope of the patented design cannot be reconciled with its concession that the
12 identity of the article of manufacture is ultimately a question of fact. Samsung Br. 7-8.
13 Samsung argues, on the one hand, that the article of manufacture is limited exclusively to any
14 part, portion, or component of a product that correspond[s] to the claim attributes of a patented
15 design, and cannot include any part, portion, or component of a product that is disclaimed by
16 the patent. Id. 3. It also concedes that the scope of a patent claim is a question of law.
17 Id. 7. On the other hand, Samsung grudgingly admits that the identification of the article must
18 ultimately be a question of fact for the jury. Id. 7. But if the article of manufacture is
19 synonymous with the claimed scope of the patented design as Samsung suggests, then
20 identification of the article will never go the jury as a fact issue, because it will always be
21 resolved through claim construction. Unsurprisingly, that is exactly what Samsung asks for,
22 requesting that the Court identify the relevant articles of manufacture in this case as a matter of
23 law in advance of trial, using its desired articles, leaving for the jury only the issue of the
24 quantum of damages. Id. 8. Samsung does not explain how this procedure treats identifying the
25 article of manufacture as a question of fact for the jury, which Samsung concedes it must be. 3
26
3
27 Alternatively, Samsung argues (Br. 8) that [i]f the identity of the articles goes to the
jury, the Court should instruct the jury as to the scope of the patented designs and explain
28 that Apples patented designs disclaim everything outside the broken lines, including the interior
1 Finally, Samsungs suggestion (id.) that the Supreme Courts brief characterizations of
2 Apples patents should be provided as claim constructions to guide the jurys identification of the
3 article of manufacture ignores that this Court already construed and instructed the jury on the
4 patents scope. Nothing in the Supreme Courts decision suggests it intended for its descriptions,
5 located in the factual background portion of the opinion, to substitute for claim construction or to
6 guide the jury in identifying the relevant articles. To the contrary, the Supreme Court was
7 explicit that the only question we resolve today is whether, in the case of a multicomponent
8 product, the relevant article of manufacture must always be the end product sold to the
9 consumer or whether it can also be a component of that product. Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 434.4
10 More importantly, this Court already correctly rejected giving any detailed written claim
11 construction describing various elements of the claimed designs, recognizing that the ordinary
12 observer test focuses on the overall visual impression of the claimed designs. Dkt. 1425 at 3
13 (The Federal Circuit has cautioned against attempts to construe design patent claims by
14 providing a detailed verbal description of the claimed design. (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v.
15 Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Thus, this Court construed the design
16 patents as shown in the patent figures themselves. E.g., Dkt. 1425 at 9 (The 677 Patent claims
17 the ornamental design of an electronic device as shown in Figures 1-6.). The Federal Circuit
18 affirmed those constructions. Apple, 786 F.3d at 998-999. Asking this Court (again) to verbally
19 describe the design patents scope is contrary to the law of the case. Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v.
20 Bauer Compressors, Inc., 90 F. Appx 540, 541 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Claim constructions
21 previously determined on appeal to this court are law of the case on remand. (citation omitted)).
22 To the extent the scope of the claims has any bearing on the identity of the article to which the
23 patented designs were applied, the jury was already correctly instructed on that issue.
24
componentry. Samsung does not explain how the jury would then identify the relevant articles
25 based on those instructions, other than to assume they are commensurate with the claimed
designs scope, as Samsung insists they are. Id. Such an instruction would thus only invite error.
26 4
The Supreme Court declined to review Samsungs first question presented, which related
27 to the scope and construction of design patent claims. Compare Samsung Pet. for Cert., 2015 WL
10013702, at (i), with Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016) (Petition for writ
28 of certiorari granted limited to Question 2 presented by the petition.).
1 C. Issues 3 & 4: While The Patentee Bears The Ultimate Burden On Damages,
The Defendant Bears The Burden On Certain Subsidiary Issues.
2
Samsung asserts (Br. 11-12) that it bears no burden with respect to either step identified
3
by the Supreme Court for determining damages under 289 at any stage of the case. Samsung
4
stakes out this absolutist position even though this Court twice instructed the jury that, while
5
289 assigns Apple [] the burden of proving the infringing defendants gross revenue, . . .
6
Samsung has the burden of proving the deductible expenses. Dkt. 1903 at 72 (2012 Trial);
7
Dkt. 2784 at 39 (2013 Trial). Samsung did not object to this instruction on either occasion and
8
did not appeal it to the Federal Circuit.5 This shows the fallacy in Samsungs position. And
9
while Apple does not dispute that it bears the ultimate burden of proving damages, it does not
10
follow that Samsung has no burden whatsoever on any issue relating to damages, including
11
propositions that Samsung itself raises in an effort to reduce its liability once Apple has made a
12
prima facie case. As the Courts damages instructions show, defendants often bear discrete
13
burdens of proof on subsidiary issues, even where the ultimate burden rests on a plaintiff. 6
14
Samsungs reliance on copyright and trademark damages regimes also fails. Samsung
15
suggests that, since 289 does not on its face shift any burden to the defendant, no burden
16
shifting can occur. Samsung Br. 9. Once again, this argument founders on Samsungs agreement
17
at trial that 289 assigns the burden of proving deductible costs to the defendant, even though the
18
copyright and trademark statutes contain express language on this point (17 U.S.C. 504(b); 15
19
U.S.C. 1117(a)), and 289 does not. That the various remedies share similar features despite
20
different language is unremarkable: Congress may choose to express the same idea in many
21
different ways. Stowell v. Secy of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 539, 542 (1st Cir. 1993).
22
23
5
24 This was no mere temporary oversight on Samsungs part. Samsung offered extensive
testimony from Mr. Wagner regarding its deductible expenses in an effort to reduce its liability.
25 See Dkt. 1842 at 3021-3032; Dkt. 2841 at 1014-1024.
6
Samsungs cited authorities are not to the contrary. Neither Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.
26
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009), nor SmithKline Diagnostics v. Helena
27 Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), stands for the proposition that the burden of
persuasion on damages never shifts to the defendant on any issue. And both cases concern
28 damages under 35 U.S.C. 284, not the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits under 289.
1 In any event, 289 provides a damages remedy specific to design patent infringement.
2 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 432. That specific remedy is modeled on the equitable disgorgement
3 remedy, which often uses a burden-shifting regimen to determine ill-gotten profits even when the
4 governing statute is silent on the issue of remedies. See, e.g., Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635,
5 1640 (2017) (SEC may seek disgorgement despite the absence of statutory authorization for
6 monetary remedies); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intl Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010)
7 (once a plaintiff establishes a reasonable approximation of defendants actual profits . . . the
8 burden shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the disgorgement figure was not a reasonable
9 approximation (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also U.S. Br. 31 (citing SEC v. Teo, 746
10 F.3d 90 (3d Cir. 2014) to support that once the plaintiff has shown that the defendant profited by
11 explanting a product containing the plaintiffs design, the defendant should be required to identify
12 . . . the component that the defendant asserts is the article to which the design is applied).
13 Indeed, contrary to Samsungs reliance on legislative history, the default remedy for
14 infringement in 1887 was an equitable accounting of profits attributable to the infringement. See
15 Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1308-1312 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)
16 (discussing the history of accounting as a remedy for patent infringement in the nineteenth
17 century). This remedy was understood to involve burden shifting and often allocated the burden
18 of proof on subsidiary issues to defendants. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v.
19 Wagner Electric & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 610 (1912) (holding that once the plaintiff has
20 proved the existence of profits attributable to his invention the burden of separation is cast on
21 the defendant); Greenfield v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 47 N.Y. 430, 432 (1872) (An
22 account stated is not conclusive; it throws the burden of proving mistakes on defendants.);
23 Wittich v. Allison, 56 F. 796, 799 (5th Cir. 1893) (The burden is put on the defendant to show
24 [error in the accounting]; the account stated having made a prima facie case, and shifted the
25 burden of proof.). Given the prevailing law of the day, Congress would have well-understood its
26 design patent remedy to involve the sort of burden-shifting that is part and parcel of a traditional
27 equitable accounting.
28
1 In fact, such burden-shifting in the absence of express statutory language is common.
2 While Samsung cites cases involving utility patent damages under 284 to suggest that the
3 defendant never bears a burden of proof (Samsung Br. 10), such cases frequently employ burden-
4 shifting in the damages context. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1122
5 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (To recover lost profits [under 284] a patentee must show that but for
6 infringement it reasonably would have made the additional profits enjoyed by the infringer . . . .
7 A patentee may resort to any method showing, with reasonable probability, entitlement to lost
8 profits but for the infringement. Once the patentee establishes the reasonableness of this
9 inference, the burden shifts to the infringer to show that the inference is unreasonable for some
10 or all of the lost profits. (citations omitted)); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545
11 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (once a patentee has shown a reasonable estimation of lost profits,
12 [t]he burden then shifts to the infringer to show that the inference is unreasonable).
13 Even in the smallest salable unit context, on which Samsung relies (Br. 10-11), once the
14 patentee makes a case for what it believes is the smallest salable unit, the burden shifts to the
15 defendant to come forth with an alternative. E.g., Honeywell Intl Inc. v. ICM Controls Corp., 45
16 F. Supp. 3d 969, 1012 (D. Minn. 2014) (Although ICM challenges Honeywells assertion that
17 the accused products constitute the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, ICM has not identified
18 a smaller component within the accused products that should be deemed to practice the invention
19 such that use of the whole product is so improper as to warrant exclusion.); MediaTek Inc. v.
20 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 2014 WL 2854890, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2014) (MediaTek
21 has offered its experts opinion . . . that the smallest salable patent-practicing unit is the chip
22 itself . . . While Freescale argues that this is not the proper smallest salable patent-practicing unit,
23 it offers no evidence to support an alternative.). Thus, where a utility patent owner has made out
24 a prima facie case as to the smallest salable unit for damages purposes, the infringer must come
25 forward with evidence to rebut the case if it believes the smallest salable unit is something less. 7
26
7
27 Apples position in Golden Bridge Technology v. Apple Inc., 2014 WL 2194501, at *5-6
(N.D. Cal. May 28, 2014), cited by Samsung (Br. 10), is consistent with Apples position here.
28 Golden Bridge involved an experts failure to apportion under 284. Nothing in Golden Bridge
1 The same basic framework applies here. Apple agrees that it bears the ultimate burden on
2 damages, and that it bore an initial burden of making out a prima facie case regarding the relevant
3 article of manufacture and the revenues associated with it. Far from shirking that duty, Apple
4 offered overwhelming evidence that Samsung applied its patented designs to the infringing
5 phones and showed the profits Samsung earned on those phones. Apple Opening Br. 15-22. As
6 the Solicitor General agreed (U.S. Br. 31), any remaining burden to reduce liability by proving
7 additional deductible costs or identifying a lesser article of manufacture was firmly on Samsung. 8
8 D. Issue 5: The Articles of Manufacture Are Samsungs Infringing Phones.
9 Samsung (at 2) identifies the articles of manufacture for which profits should be awarded
10 as the phones round-cornered, glass front face (D677); the phones round-cornered glass
11 front face plus surrounding rim or bezel (D087); and the phones display screen while
12 displaying the single claimed array of GUI icons (D305). These articlesidentified more than
13 five years after trialdiffer from Samsungs previous, but still untimely articulations (see Dkt.
14 3503 at 4 n.3), and, as discussed below, find no record support under any appropriate test.
15 Samsungs asserted articles of manufacture are nothing more than specific design
16 elements Samsung alleges are covered by the patents claims. But as discussed above (pp. 2-5),
17 the scope of a claimed design is not commensurate with and does not dictate the article to which
18 the defendant applied that design. Also, Samsungs asserted article for the D305 patenta
19 display screen while displaying the single, claimed array of GUI iconsis not even an article,
20 but rather an article in a particular status, at a particular time. It is, in Samsungs own words,
21
22
stands for the proposition that, once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie damages claim (as
23 Apple did here), the burden never shifts to the defendant to rebut the claim.
8
Samsung suggests this Court should ignore the Solicitor Generals views about assigning
24 the burden of proof because [n]o court has adopted [its] approach. Samsung Br. 11 n.3. But as
is always the case with issues of first impression, no court has yet adopted any approach.
25 Samsung also argues that there is no reason to believe that defendants in design-patent cases will
have exclusive knowledge of relevant information. Id. But in many contexts involving
26
complex productsas Samsung describes its products here (id. 16-18)courts assign
27 manufacturers the burden to prove facts related to their products due to their superior knowledge
of the product. See, e.g., Erving Paper Mills v. Hudson-Sharp Mach. Co., 332 F.2d 674, 678 (7th
28 Cir. 1964); Barker v. Lull Engg Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).
1 fleeting. Br. 21 n.8. Given that an article of manufacture must be a thing made by hand or
2 machine, Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435, Samsungs asserted article for the D305 patent cannot be
3 correct.9 Rather, the articles of manufacture are, as Apple has claimed from the outset and as the
4 evidence described in Apples Opening Brief (at 15-21) shows, Samsungs infringing phones.
5 E. Issue 6: The Record Evidence Supports Only The Conclusion That The
Relevant Articles of Manufacture Are Samsungs Infringing Phones.
6
The manner in which Samsung applies its proposed article of manufacture test to the
7
evidence in this case confirms the tests flaws. Samsungs purported analysis makes clear that the
8
test conflates the claimed design with the article of manufacture to which the defendant has
9
applied the design. It also demonstrates that the test amounts to an impermissible per se rule that
10
only the exterior of a multicomponent product could qualify as the relevant article of
11
manufacture. Under any reasonable test, none of the evidence to which Samsung points
12
supports a finding of any article of manufacture other than Samsungs infringing phones.
13
The first category of evidence Samsung cites is the scope of the claims in the infringed
14
patents.10 For example, Samsung emphasizes that none of the three patents at issue depict[s] or
15
claim[s] any internal componentry of the phone. Samsung Br. 13-14. But as Samsung admits,
16
17
9
Samsung cites In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967), but that case was about the
18
patentees identification of an article of manufacture under 171, not the defendants application
19 of a patented design to any article of manufacture under 289. Apple accordingly cited it for
the proposition (which the Supreme Court adopted) that an article of manufacture may be
20 anything made by the hands of man from raw materials. Id. at 1000 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 435. And contrary to Samsungs claim that Hruby
21 approved of a fleeting article (Br. 21 n.8), Hruby actually held that the water fountain could
be an article of manufacture because it was not fleeting. 373 F.2d at 999 ([A] particular
22
droplet or droplets may be a fleeting product but the fountain itself is not. The fountain in its
23 entirety under proper conditions presents a product of constant appearance rather than a fleeting
product.).
24 Additionally, Samsungs identified article for the D305 patent does not even include all
the components needed to display[] the single, claimed array of GUI icons. Without additional
25 hardware and software, the display screen on Samsungs phones cannot display anything, let
alone the array of icons claimed in the patent.
26 10
Samsung includes the prosecution histories for the D677 and D087 patents among the
27 evidence in this category (Samsung Br. 15 (citing JX1062; JX1064)), but neither was an
admitted exhibit (Dkt. 1889; Dkt. 2789). Even so, while the prosecution histories may be relevant
28 to claim construction, they do not affect the article of manufacture analysis. See supra pp. 7-8.
1 that is true of every design patent, which by definition claim only ornamental aspects of an
2 article. Id. 3. It is thus unsurprising, and meaningless, that Apples design patents do not claim
3 the internal componentry of a phonesuch components are features not of a design, but of an
4 article of manufacture to which a design may be applied.
5 Relatedly, the fact that the patents at issue do not claim, for example, the back of a phone
6 (see Samsung Br. 13) does not mean that the design has not been applied to the whole product.
7 Again, the scope of a claimed design is not coextensive with the article of manufacture to which
8 the design has been applied; and, as 289 makes clear, the defendant may apply the patented
9 design to any article of manufacture. Put another way, the inventive concept of a design is not
10 limited to the exact article which happens to be selected for illustration in [a] patent.
11 Rubinfield, 270 F.2d at 393. The patent illustrations delineate the scope of the patented designs
12 and provide examples of articles to which the claimed designs may be applied, but they do not
13 determine the article to which Samsung applied those designs. 11
14 Indeed, Samsung goes so far as to intentionally misquote the Courts construction of the
15 D087 patentreplacing article of manufacture with phone (Samsung Br. 14)to better fit
16 its theory that the article cannot be anything broader than the claimed design. Samsung now
17 alleges that use of the term article of manufacture in the claim construction was incorrect.
18 Samsung Br. 14 n.4. However, as discussed above (p. 8), the Federal Circuit affirmed the
19 construction, which is the law of the case. Further, Samsung never objected to the Courts use of
20 the term article of manufacture in that construction. To the contrary, the Courts use of that
21 term is entirely consistent with Samsungs own use of the word article in its claim construction
22 brief, which makes clear that Samsung previously understood that the scope of a claimed design
23 is often narrower than the article to which it is applied. See Dkt. 1090-1 at 1 ([W]hen a field is
24
25 11
Samsungs proposed test also cannot be correct because it would exclude the exemplary
articles identified in the patents from being treated as articles of manufacture. See, e.g., JX1043
26
(D677 patent identifying an electronic device, such as a cellular phone, as an exemplary
27 article of manufacture in the description and drawings); see also Dkt. 999-18, 48 (Samsungs
damages expert noting that the D677 patent states that the article of manufacture to which the
28 ornamental design has been applied is an electronic device e.g., a cellular phone).
1 crowded with many references relating to the design of the same type of article, a design patents
2 scope of protection is limited to a more narrow range[.] (internal quotation marks omitted)); id.
3 at 9 (observing that shading is also necessary to distinguish between any open and solid areas of
4 the article depicted in the D087 patent (quoting MPEP 1503.02, 15.48)). 12
5 Samsung next argues at length in favor of a point no one disputes: that Samsungs
6 accused smartphones are complex, multicomponent devices containing hundreds of different
7 components. Samsung Br. 16; see id. 17-18 (citing Justin Denison and Itay Sherman); id. 20 n.7
8 (citing Drs. Balakrishnan and Singh for proposition that infringing phones have numerous
9 software applications). Though true, that is beside the point. Samsungs proposed test for
10 identifying the article of manufacture does not even consider whether the asserted articles are
11 manufactured as separate components. As Samsung previously conceded, what matters is
12 whether the asserted articles can be separated from the product as sold, which Samsungs asserted
13 articles cannot. See supra pp. 5-6.
14 Furthermore, while a patented design might or might not, in a given case, have been
15 applied to a product containing many internal components, the mere fact that the product contains
16 many such components does not make it more or less likely that the design was applied to the
17 product as a whole. If it did, then even an infringer who blatantly copied the design of a
18 multicomponent product for the specific purpose of increasing sales of that product could be
19 liable only for damages apportioned between the design elements of the product and its
20 functional elements. As explained above (p. 3), that is not the law. Accordingly, evidence that
21 Samsungs phones are multicomponent devices does not advance Samsungs argument that those
22 phones are not the relevant articles of manufacture.
23 Besides, Samsungs cited evidence fails even to support its assertion that the articles of
24 manufacture are the specific components Samsung has identified. For example, Samsung points
25
12
The Courts use of article of manufacture in the construction is also consistent with
26
Samsungs cited case, which makes clear that a claimed design is not coextensive with, and may
27 cover only a portion of, an article of manufacture. See Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc.,
256 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ([A] patented design may be embodied in less than an
28 entire article of manufacture[.]).
1 to a tear-down analysis of its infringing Vibrant phone showing components in isolation.
2 Samsung Br. 17. But the tear-down analysis does not identify or show a rounded-cornered, glass
3 front face, a surrounding rim or bezel, and a display screen while displaying the infringing
4 array of icons. See id. 16-17. Separately, Samsung cites testimony from Michael Wagner that
5 various software features could be redesigned without physical intrusion into Samsungs phones
6 and testimony from Paul Dourish that software programs can be conceived of and implemented
7 independent from one another, but Samsung does not explain what relevance either of these facts
8 could have to an analysis of what physical thing constitutes the article of manufacture in this
9 case. See id. 18. Samsung also cites evidence about the iPhones components and
10 manufacturing challenges Apple faced. Id. 18-19. But as explained (Apples Opening Br. 21),
11 evidence about the iPhone sold by Apple has no bearing on the article of manufacture to which
12 Samsung applied the patented designs. What should bear on that inquiry is the fact that Samsung
13 only sells, and consumers only use, the infringing phones in their entireties.
14 Next, Samsung argues that the allegedly narrow scope of Apples infringement
15 allegations somehow constitutes evidence that the articles of manufacture are something less
16 than Samsungs phones because Apple did not claim that all components of Samsungs phones
17 were infringing. Samsung Br. 19-20. Samsung bases this claim on testimony from Apples
18 experts that they focused on certain elements of Samsungs phones in concluding that the phones
19 infringed Apples patents. But the set of features relevant to the comparison of the patented
20 design and the accused design is not coextensive with the set of features contained within the
21 article of manufacture to which that design has been applied. Indeed, certain functional
22 features of an accused product are categorically irrelevant to design patent infringement. See Lee
23 v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988). And even non-functional aspects
24 of a product may be incidental to design patent infringement, yet still contained within or form a
25 portion of the article of manufacture to which that patented design has been applied. As
26 explained above, the fact that a portion of a product is outside the scope of a claimed design does
27 not determine whether such portion is part of the article of manufacture to which that design has
28
1 been applied. Accordingly, the fact that Apples expert Peter Bressler did not consider the back
2 of the phone, for example, in assessing infringement of the patented designs is irrelevant to the
3 article of manufacture determination. And, in any case, Apples experts did testify that
4 Samsung applied the claimed designs to the infringing phones. See Apple Opening Br. 15.
5 Furthermore, Apples infringement allegations were not narrow. Apple allegedand the
6 jury agreedthat Samsungs phones, not any lesser components of the phones, infringed Apples
7 design patents. Dkt. 75 at 24 (Final Amended Complaint); Dkt. 1931 at 6-7 (verdict). Thus, to
8 the extent the infringement analysis has any bearing on identifying the article of manufacture, it
9 weighs in favor of Apples argument that the articles are the entire phones.
10 Finally, Samsung wrongly asserts that Chief Justice Roberts recognized at oral
11 argument that a properly instructed jury could have found that smartphone components are the
12 relevant articles of manufacture. Samsung Br. 20. Chief Justice Robertss comment at oral
13 argumentwhich did not purport to be an authoritative statement of the lawsaid nothing about
14 the record evidence in this case. At most, the Chief Justices comment foreshadowed the Courts
15 later ruling that a patented design could be applied to a component of a product.13
16 Even if the jury could have reached a different conclusion as to the relevant articles of
17 manufacture if Samsungs proposed instruction had been given (and clearly the jury could not
18 have), that still would not entitle Samsung to a new trial. As explained in Apples Opening Brief
19 (at 24-25), it is not enough for Samsung to show that its proposed instruction could have led the
20 jury to reach a different verdict. Rather, the verdict must stand if it is more probable than not
21 that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if given Samsungs desired instruction.
22 Clem, 566 F.3d at 1182. The cases Samsung cites endorse that standard. See Gantt v. City of Los
23 Angeles, 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013); Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 811-812 (9th Cir.
24 2005). Thus, although there was no evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the
25 relevant articles were anything other than the infringing phones, even some quantum of evidence
26
13
27 The only comment about the record made by a justice at oral argument came from Justice
Sotomayor, who said to Samsung: I dont know where in the record you would have enough to
28 survive your argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8, Samsung, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777).
1 supporting that determination would not change the conclusion that the verdict here must stand. 14
2 F. Issue 7: There Is No Record Evidence Supporting The Determination Of

Total Profit For Any Article Other Than Samsungs Infringing Phones.
3
Samsung does not dispute (nor could it) that the record contains ample evidence of its
4
total profit on the infringing phones, including the testimony of its own damages expert.
5
Instead, Samsung argues only that the record also contains sufficient evidence from which a jury
6
could calculate Samsungs total profit from the smaller components that Samsung claims are the
7
relevant articles. It is hard to imagine how the jury could have made such calculations, given that
8
Samsung never even identified those alleged articles to the jury. And Samsungs brief to the
9
Supreme Court asserted the exact opposite: The Record Contains No Proof of Total Profit From
10
The Relevant Articles Of Manufacture. Pet. Br. 54, Samsung, No. 15-777, 2016 WL 6599922
11
(June 1, 2016). Even if Samsung had not already conceded the point, the record is plainly devoid
12
of evidence from which the jury could calculate profits on Samsungs alleged articles.
13
Notably, Samsung does not identify any actual amount of profits the jury could have
14
attributed to its alleged articles. Samsung instead gestures toward two (and only two) categories
15
of evidence that supposedly support a profit calculation, while refusing to say what the
16
calculation is. The first is evidence Apple put forth relating to Apples experts income method
17
for calculating a reasonable royalty under 284. Specifically, Samsung points to a single row of
18
a table within a summary damages exhibit and wrongly asserts that the method was based on
19
20
21 14
As set forth in Apples Opening Brief (at 23-24), Apple did not waive its argument that
any instructional error was harmless. Apple raised the argument at every stage, see, e.g., Apple
22
Br. 88, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 14-1335, 2014 WL 3909249 (Fed. Cir. July 28,
23 2014) (arguing that there was no error, let alone prejudicial error warranting a new trial), and
indeed as the appellee could not have waived the argument in the Federal Circuit. Rather, if any
24 party waived its argument regarding the effect of the alleged error, it was Samsung, which failed
to even allege prejudice in its opening brief to the Federal Circuit. Samsung Br. 36-39, Apple Inc.
25 v. Samsung Elecs., No. 14-1335, 2014 WL 2586819 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2014); see Shinseki v.
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) ([T]he party that seeks to have a judgment set aside because
26
of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted. (internal quotation
27 marks omitted)); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(An issue that falls within the scope of the judgment appealed from but is not raised by the
28 appellant in its opening brief on appeal is necessarily waived.).
1 profits from the components embodying the patented [designs]. Samsung Br. 23 (emphasis in
2 original).15 But the full sentence from which Samsung quotes shows otherwise: The income
3 approach to the value of the patents at issue is based on the future profitability of the products
4 embodying the patented technology. PX25A1.16; PX25F.16. Samsung similarly misrepresents
5 the testimony of Apples expert Julie Davis, who did not testify that Apples proposed royalty
6 estimated the value of each phones case, not its guts. Samsung Br. 23. Rather, Ms. Davis
7 said that, although the guts of an infringing phone theoretically could be placed into a non-
8 infringing case, such a redesign would take considerable time and would not be a financially
9 viable alternative to paying a reasonable royalty for the use of the patented designs. Dkt. 2840 at
10 772. Thus, the limited evidence regarding the income method that contributed to Apples
11 experts calculation of a reasonably royalty for each infringing phone offered absolutely no basis
12 on which a jury could calculate Samsungs total profit from any components of the phones.
13 The second category of evidence on which Samsung relies is evidence that, according to
14 Samsung, supports an inference that smartphones value is derived primarily from non-design
15 features. Samsung Br. 23. Samsungs argument based on that evidence is twice flawed.
16 First, the argument is a direct callback to the apportionment arguments this Court and the
17 Federal Circuit have unequivocally rejected in this case. To suggest that the jury should have
18 determined Samsungs profits from the articles of manufacture by segmenting off any profit
19 derived from the phones technical features is merely to call for apportionment by some other
20 name. Indeed, Samsung previously cited the very same documents it now relies on in support of
21 its rejected, and since-abandoned, apportionment argument. Compare Samsung Br. 23 (citing
22 PX143.6; DX586.004; DX592.023), with Dkt. 999-18 at 142, 145 (offering excluded
23 apportionment opinion and quoting the documents that became DX586.004 and PX143.6), and
24
25 15
The income method was one of three separate methodologies employed by Apples
damages experts to determine a reasonable royalty under 284 for design patent infringement.
26
See PX25A1.16; PX25F.16. The ultimate opinion offered at trial by both Mr. Musika and Ms.
27 Davis as to the appropriate royalty was based on consideration of all three methods, along with
the fifteen factors set forth in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
28 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Dkt. 1839 at 2088-2090; Dkt. 2840 at 705-708.
1 Dkt. 2013 (Samsungs JMOL) (citing DX592.023 in support of apportionment argument). 16
2 Second, even if this evidence properly could be considered in calculating profits, it alone
3 is clearly insufficient to support any specific determination of Samsungs profit from its asserted
4 articles of manufacture. Generic statements or survey results about which features matter to
5 consumers constitute no proof whatsoever of how much money Samsung actually made from
6 those or any other features of the phoneslet alone the specific features Samsung alleges are the
7 articles of manufacture. No witness provided any opinion as to how to translate those statements
8 into a damages assessment, and no other evidence would allow for such a conversion.
9 In sum, and as Apple explained (Opening Br. 21-23), there simply is no record evidence
10 to support a determination of Samsungs total profit from its asserted articles of manufacture. To
11 the extent Apple bore the burden to prove profits associated with an article, it fulfilled that duty
12 by presenting evidence of the profits Samsung earned on its infringing phones. 17 Because
13 evidence of Samsungs total profit from the infringing phones was the only calculation offered by
14 either side, it is far more probable than not that the jury would have reached the same damages
15 verdict even if Samsungs Proposed Instruction 42.1 were given. Clem, 566 F.3d at 1182. Any
16 asserted error in the jury instructions cannot have been prejudicial, and no new trial is warranted.
17 III. CONCLUSION
18 For the foregoing reasons, there was no error, let alone prejudicial error, in failing to give
19 Samsungs Proposed Instruction 42.1. Samsungs request for JMOL of no profits and its request
20 for a new trial should be denied, and the design patent damages judgment should be confirmed.
21
16
Samsungs suggestion that the jury could have relied on DX586.004 to determine
22
damages for its asserted articles of manufacture also ignores that the jury was instructed not to
23 consider that evidence in assessing damages. See Dkt. 1889 at 10 (Do not consider [DX586] to
prove or disprove the validity or invalidity of a claim or the amount of a disputed claim.).
17
24 For the reasons stated in Apples initial brief on remand to this Court (Dkt. 3490-2 at 15-
16), Samsung waived its argument for JMOL of no infringers profits by failing to raise any
25 article of manufacture argument in its Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) motions and now, more
recently, in its initial brief on remand to this Court. See Dkt. 3509 at 12-13 (Samsung no longer
26
seeks judgment as a matter of law with respect to the article of manufacture issue.). In any
27 event, given that Samsung did not identify any article of manufacture smaller than its infringing
phones before trial, Apple cannot possibly be blamed for focusing its damages evidence on the
28 only article of manufacture at issue at the time of trial.
2
Dated: September 28, 2017 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND
3 DORR LLP
5 By: /s/ Mark D. Selwyn

MARK D. SELWYN
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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APPLE INC.
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1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been
3 served on September 28, 2017 to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to
4 electronic service via the Courts CM/ECF system per Civil Local Rule 5.4.
6 /s/ Mark D. Selwyn

Mark D. Selwyn
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17-09-28 Apple Responsive Brief On Design Patent Damages

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Case 5:11-cv-01846-LHK Document 3523 Filed 09/28/17 Page 1 of 28

1 ERIK J. OLSON (CA SBN 175815) WILLIAM F. LEE

5 A. Issue 1: Samsungs Proposed Test Improperly Equates The

11 D. Issue 5: The Articles of Manufacture Are Samsungs Infringing

15 F. Issue 7: There Is No Record Evidence Supporting The

17 III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 20

4 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,

14 Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer Co.,

22 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.,

6 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,

11 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

16 Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.,

21 SEC v. Platforms Wireless International Corp.,

1 Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric & Manufacturing

7 Greenfield v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,

11 17 U.S.C. 504(b) ............................................................................................................................9

12 35 U.S.C. 284 ...............................................................................................................9, 11, 18, 19

13 35 U.S.C. 289 ....................................................................................................................... passim

1 Samsungs Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

16 manufacture as applied to a multicomponent product may be either a product as sold or a smaller

5 patent damages award should be confirmed.

15 II. RESPONSE TO SAMSUNGS ANSWERS TO THE COURTS QUESTIONS

16 A. Issue 1: Samsungs Proposed Test Improperly Equates The Claimed Design

7 article to which the defendant applies that design, it must be rejected.

9 ornamental appearance of an article of manufacture and not to internal or functional features.

15 manufacture is broad enough to encompass both a product sold to a consumer as well as a

18 be an entire productthe case of a single-component product, such as a dinner plate

7 In the case of a multicomponent product, such as a kitchen oven, Samsungs proposed

19 1157 at 9 (excluding apportionment testimony of Samsungs expert as contrary to law); Dkt.

18 apportionment argument by disguising it as a test for identifying the article of manufacture.

20 relevant article of manufacture may be either an entire product or a component of such a

21 B. Issue 2: The Identity of the Article of Manufacture Is A Question Of Fact For

3 finds no support in law and should be rejected for several reasons.

9 for purposes of calculating infringers profits.

7 (once a plaintiff establishes a reasonable approximation of defendants actual profits . . . the

1 In fact, such burden-shifting in the absence of express statutory language is common.

8 D. Issue 5: The Articles of Manufacture Are Samsungs Infringing Phones.

4 article of manufacture to which a design may be applied.

13 determine the article to which Samsung applied those designs. 11

6 accused smartphones are complex, multicomponent devices containing hundreds of different

11 manufactured as separate components. As Samsung previously conceded, what matters is

13 articles cannot. See supra pp. 5-6.

22 phones are not the relevant articles of manufacture.

1 to a tear-down analysis of its infringing Vibrant phone showing components in isolation.

15 later ruling that a patented design could be applied to a component of a product.13

2 F. Issue 7: There Is No Record Evidence Supporting The Determination Of

4 embodying the patented technology. PX25A1.16; PX25F.16. Samsung similarly misrepresents

1 Dkt. 2013 (Samsungs JMOL) (citing DX592.023 in support of apportionment argument). 16

5 By: /s/ Mark D. Selwyn

6 /s/ Mark D. Selwyn

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