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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-11
review-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-11-secdir-lc-nir-2024-10-31-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2024-11-01
Requested 2024-10-18
Authors Eric Rescorla
I-D last updated 2024-10-31
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -11 by Yoav Nir
Genart Last Call review of -11 by Susan Hares
Assignment Reviewer Yoav Nir
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/ySGdUX-Q2XRVZ5fzEO7yq9ygmis
Reviewed revision 11
Result Ready
Completed 2024-10-31
review-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-11-secdir-lc-nir-2024-10-31-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document
editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.

This document is very much like RFC 8446 with some tightening of the
requirements. As far as security considerations, if follows the example of RFC
8446 in leaving the security considerations section blank, and discussing
security issues "throughout this memo," especially in three appendices.  Those
appendices are very much copied from RFC 8446, with relatively minor additions.

RRC 8446 was thorough and well done, and this is no different. To quote from
Rich Salz's review of the RFC 8446 draft,

    No, seriously, this protocol has been designed with the help of world-class
    cryptographers and academics. It has been analyzed with verification tools.
     It has been tweaked as necessary to get around middlebox ossification. It
    is available in two highly popular browsers and at least one widely-used
    open source toolkit.

    This document is READY.

I can't agree more, except to say that by now it's implemented in many more
browsers and all serious TLS libraries.