News from Connecticut
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Connecticut lawyers can't be sued for fraudulent activity in court
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
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| The Connecticut Supreme Court cited the doctrine of "absolute immunity" in ruling that lawyers cannot be sued for fraud based on their conduct in court cases.
Bob Simms, a former NFL player and founder of Simms Capital Management Inc., has been in an ongoing legal battle over divorce proceedings with his ex-wife, Donna Simms, for 30 years. Bob recently tried to sue Donna and her lawyers for withholding information about approximately $360,000 in inheritance money that she received in 2006 and 2008. A court order brought the facts of the inheritance to the surface in 2008, but a lower court judge ruled that the information had been improperly withheld.
At the Supreme Court, however, the justices were focused on a different point: whether or not Donna's lawyers were liable for the alleged fraud. They ruled 5-1 on May 10 that the lawyers could not be sued for fraud, citing the old doctrine of absolute immunity, as well as decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts.
Absolute immunity started in medieval England. It was created as a way to encourage free speaking during court proceedings without fear of future lawsuits. Justice Peter Zarella, in the majority's opinion, wrote,
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The mere possibility of such (fraud) claims, which could expose attorneys to harassing and expensive litigation, would be likely to inhibit their freedom in making good faith evidentiary decisions and representations and, therefore, negatively affect their ability to act as zealous advocates for their clients."[3][4]
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Justice Richard Palmer, the lone dissenter, argued that the decision was "unduly protectionist of attorneys."[3] |
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News from Indiana
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Fraternity will answer in court for alcohol-related student deaths
Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
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| In a decision that may influence the structure of Greek organizations nationwide, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that national fraternity Delta Tau Delta must stand trial over the death of a Wabash College freshman.[5]
Eighteen-year-old Johnny Dupree Smith was found dead in 2008 with a blood alcohol level of nearly .40, according to the complaint his family filed in the wrongful-death case. Smith, originally from Tucson, Arizona, attended a mandatory chapter party known as a "pledge family drink night." After a night of beer and vodka he was unable to walk, consequently falling down a stairwell. He was later left on an upstairs mattress where he was found dead the next morning.[5]
By and large, national fraternities exercise moderate to minimal authority over the behavior of individual chapters, but this scenario and many recent ones like it are prompting them to more closely consider their role—essentially, whether to take their hands off local chapters completely or more actively monitor everyone. Hazing, defined as "any action taken or situation created intentionally … to produce mental or physical discomfort, embarrassment, harassment, or ridicule," is nominally forbidden by Delta Tau Delta but is still commonplace in Greek life.[5][6]
The ruling came as a reversal of an order by Circuit Court Judge Don Daniel, which granted summary judgment to the fraternity based on an affidavit from the chapter's vice president and the testimony of two freshman pledges. As determined in the appellate court's reversal on May 8, these statements contained conflicting information and the two witnesses had not been properly certified.[5][6]
Wrote Patricia A. Riley in the opinion,
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We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain paragraphs of [the vice president]’s affidavit and by admitting two unsworn, unverified, and uncertified statements. Additionally, we find that the trial court erred in granting Delta Tau Delta’s motion for summary judgment as there is a genuine issue of material fact that (1) an agency relationship existed between the national fraternity and its local chapter and (2) the national fraternity assumed a duty to protect its freshmen pledges.[6][4]
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The case has been remanded for further proceedings. |
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News from Michigan
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Toking then driving OK'd by Michigan Supreme Court
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
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| In 2010, when Rodney Koon was pulled over for speeding, he admitted to the police that he was a registered medical marijuana patient and that he had smoked marijuana five to six hours before the traffic stop. Koon’s subsequent blood test was positive for THC, and he was charged with driving under the influence of a Schedule 1 narcotic.[7]
At conflict in Michigan were two separate laws: (1) the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA) which allows a person to use medical marijuana without fear of prosecution; and (2) the Michigan Vehicle Code which prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle if that person has any amount of a Schedule 1 controlled substance in their body. The issue before the Michigan Supreme Court was whether "MMMA’s protection supersedes the Michigan Vehicle Code’s prohibition and allows a registered patient to drive when he or she has indications of marijuana in his or her system but is not otherwise under the influence of marijuana."[7]
Both the District Court and the Circuit Court held in favor of Koon, finding that the MMMA superseded the Michigan Vehicle Code and that, under the MMMA, patients are only prohibited from driving a vehicle if they are “under the influence of marijuana.” Therefore, the prosecution needed to show that Koon’s ability to drive was actually impaired by the presence of THC in his bloodstream.[8]
The Michigan Court of Appeals believed otherwise and reversed the lower courts’ decision, holding instead that the ‘ “zero tolerance” provision of [the Michigan Vehicle Code] which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with any amount of a Schedule 1 controlled substance in the driver’s body, still applies if the driver used marijuana under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA).”[9]
On May 21, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and unanimously held for Koon. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ strict reading of the Michigan Vehicle Code and stated that...
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"[w]hen the MMMA conflicts with another statute, the MMMA provides that '[a]ll other acts and parts of acts inconsistent with [the MMMA] do not apply to the medical use of marihuana…' [and] [c]onsequently the Michigan Vehicle Code’s zero-tolerance provision, MCL 257.625(8), which is inconsistent with the MMMA, does not apply to the medical use of marijuana.”[7][4]
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However, the Supreme Court noted that the MMMA does not provide a definition for the meaning of “under the influence". They decided it must mean something more than having just any amount in a person’s system – it must require to the marijuana to have some effect on that person. In conclusion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the MMMA was an imperfect statute and invited the Michigan State Legislature to make amendments and clarify any further issues.[7] |
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News from Montana
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Montana Supreme Court reverses lower court's decision releasing Barry Beach
Court: Montana Supreme Court
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Last week, in a 4-3 ruling, the Montana Supreme Court reversed former District Judge E. Wayne Phillips' 2011 decision to allow a retrial for Barry Beach. Beach was convicted of murdering classmate Kim Nees in 1979, but has maintained his innocence in recent decades, claiming that his earlier confession to the murder was coerced.[10][11] The 2011 decision by Judge Phillips allowed Beach 525 days out of prison, during which he had settled into a new life with a house and a job.[12] The Supreme Court's decision last week sent Beach back to a cell, where he could remain for the rest of his life.[13]
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It was hard enough to be innocent to begin with. But to be going back, still innocent, for the second time, is just unbelievable.[13] - Barry Beach[4]
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Former Judge Phillips said the Supreme Court's opinion weighed heavily upon him, explaining,
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I am troubled that I got it wrong. I am, however, much more deeply troubled — from the heart outwards — that I may have done a soul-wrenching injustice to Mr. Beach. By my error and giving him a taste of freedom based on that error, he now faces an almost unimaginable return from the freedom any right thinking person cherishes to the confines of a prison cell.[12] [4]
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Justices Beth Baker, Jim Rice, Laurie McKinnon and District Court Judge Richard A. Simonton concurred with the reversal of the district court's decision, while Justices Patricia Cotter, Michael E. Wheat, and Justice [[Brian Morris]] dissented, agreeing with the lower court's decision to grant a re-trial.[14]
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News from Nebraska
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Nebraska Supreme Court places limits on school searches
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
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| The Nebraska Supreme Court made a decision on Friday, May 17, 2013, which was a matter of first impression for the court.[15][16] The relevant facts of J.P. v. Millard Public Schools are as follows: "J.P.," a student at Millard West High School in Omaha, left school grounds without permission and retrieved items from his pickup truck, parking off-campus on a public street across from the school. Upon returning to the campus, the assistant principal searched the student and the student's backpack and wallet. This search resulted in nothing of consequence, which led the assistant principal to search the student's truck, not only without consent, but against J.P.'s direct refusal. The search of the truck resulted in the discovery of drug paraphernalia, which brought about J.P.'s nineteen day suspension. J.P. requested a hearing as allowed by the school's student handbook, but the school board upheld the suspension. Judge James T. Gleason, a district judge for the Fourth District Court in Nebraska, reversed the decision of the school board and ordered that J.P.'s record be expunged. Gleason's decision held that the search was in violation of J.P.'s Fourth Amendment rights.[16][17]
An appeal by the school board brought the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the Fourth District Court.[16] This case was the first time that the Nebraska Supreme Court had addressed the off-campus rights of students in regards to searches that do not occur at an off-campus school function.[15] Both the lone dissenting judge and the school district relied on the U.S. Supreme Court case, Morse v. Frederick, where the Court held that schools are allowed to regulate the speech of students at off-campus school functions. The Nebraska Supreme Court majority disagreed with dissenting Chief Justice Mike Heavican and found this situation "readily distinguishable" from that in Morse v. Frederick, according to the opinion written by Justice John Wright.[16] The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that, not only did this case involve a search while Morse did not, but the act of driving to school and parking off-campus did not constitute a "school-sponsored event" which might justify the school's attempt to regulate the student's actions.[16] The court's opinion also stated that this decision does not leave schools without a course of action should suspicion of criminal conduct arise in relation to a student while off-campus. A Nebraska statute actually requires the principal, or a principal's designee, to report suspected violations of Nebraska's criminal code to law enforcement personnel, who are better trained in the circumstances that would allow a lawful warrantless search of a vehicle.[16]
In a colorful analogy, Rich McGowan, the attorney for J.P., compared off-campus searches by school officials to the "tactics...employed by the dean of students in the movie 'Ferris Bueller's Day Off.'"[15] The overzealous dean's attempt to catch Ferris Bueller in the act while playing hooky led the dean to conduct an "illegal search" of Ferris' home. While the methods of the movie's dean were outlandish, and would not likely ever be at issue in the future, McGowan used this example to "convince the Millard schools to overturn the suspension of his client," according to an Omaha World Herald article.[15] |
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