Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices - factorable.net
We performed a large-scale study of RSA and DSA cryptographic keys in use on the Internet and discovered that significant numbers of keys are insecure due to insufficient randomness. These keys are being used to secure TLS (HTTPS) and SSH connections for hundreds of thousands of hosts. We found that 5.57% of TLS hosts and 9.60% of SSH hosts share public keys in an apparently vulnerable manner, due
Latest OpenSSL bug ‘may be more dangerous than Heartbleed’
Heartbleed was deemed to be one of the most critical internet vulnerabilities ever when it was uncovered in April. OpenSSL is supposed to protect people’s data with digital keys but has been exposed as flawed numerous times in recent months. The latest vulnerability was introduced in 1998 and has been missed by both paid and volunteer developers working on the open-source project for 16 years. Mea
ImperialViolet - Early ChangeCipherSpec Attack
OpenSSL 1.0.1h (and others) were released today with a scary looking security advisiory and that's always an event worth looking into. (Hopefully people are practiced at updating OpenSSL now!) Update: the original reporter has a blog post up. Also, I won't, personally, be answering questions about specific Google services. (I cut this blog post together from notes that I'm writing for internal gro
analysis of openssl freelist reuse
About two days ago, I was poking around with OpenSSL to find a way to mitigate Heartbleed. I soon discovered that in its default config, OpenSSL ships with exploit mitigation countermeasures, and when I disabled the countermeasures, OpenSSL stopped working entirely. That sounds pretty bad, but at the time I was too frustrated to go on. Last night I returned to the scene of the crime. OpenSSL uses
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SSL/TLS Deployment Best Practices
SSL/TLS Deployment Best Practices Ivan Ristić v1.1 (24 April 2013) Copyright © 2012-2013 Qualys SSL Labs Abstract SSL/TLS is a deceptively simple technology. It is easy to deploy, and it just works…except that it does not, really. The ï¬rst part is true—SSL is easy to deploy—but it turns out that it is not easy to deploy correctly. To ensure that SSL provides the necessary security, users must put
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TechCrunch | Startup and Technology News
Unlike Light’s older phones, the Light III sports a larger OLED display and an NFC chip to make way for future payment tools, as well as a camera.
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Debian DSA-1571-1 openssl 予測å¯èƒ½ãªä¹±æ•°ã®ç”Ÿæˆ - ã‚»ã‚ュリティホール memo
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Naming and Directory (JNDI) - no support for RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding after upgrade to 1.5
Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) - RSA premaster secret error
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