Malware Validation Techniques
Malware authors use a variety of obfuscation techniques to foil researchers and operate as covertly as possible on a user’s system. To that end, some of the techniques, like frequent changes of the executable (possibly daily) are designed to obstruct basic detection techniques. Often times, given a specific piece of executable code, it is not trivial to determine if the code is a piece of malware
書ç±ã€ŒAndroid Securityã€ã®æš—å·éµç”Ÿæˆæ–¹æ³•ã«ã¯èª²é¡ŒãŒã‚ã‚‹ - ockeghem's blog
書ç±ã€ŒAndroid Security　　安全ãªã‚¢ãƒ—リケーションを作æˆã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã«ã€ã¯æ—¢ã«å„æ–¹é¢ã§çµ¶è³›ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„るよã†ã«ã€Androidアプリケーションã®é–‹ç™ºè€…ã«ã¯å¿…æºã®æ›¸ç±ã ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ãŒã€æ–°ã—ã„分野ã ã‘ã«ã€é¦–ã‚’ã²ãらã–ã‚‹ã‚’å¾—ãªã„箇所もã‚ã‚Šã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ã“ã®ã‚¨ãƒ³ãƒˆãƒªã§ã¯ã€åŒæ›¸ç¬¬10ç« ã€Œæš—å·åŒ–手法ã€ã‹ã‚‰å…±é€šéµã®ç”Ÿæˆæ–¹æ³•ã«ã¤ã„ã¦è°è«–ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ ã¯ã˜ã‚㫠書ç±ã€ŒAndroid Securityã€ï¼ˆæ¥ç•Œã§ã¯ã€Œã‚¿ã‚ªæœ¬ã€ã¨å‘¼ã°ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ã®ã§ã€ä»¥ä¸‹ã‚¿ã‚ªæœ¬ã¨è¨˜è¿°ï¼‰ã®10ç« ã§ã¯ã€ç«¯æœ«å†…ã®ãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒ«ã‚’æš—å·åŒ–ã—ã¦ä¿å˜ã™ã‚‹æ‰‹æ³•ã«ã¤ã„ã¦èª¬æ˜Žã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ãã®éš›ã«å•é¡Œã¨ãªã‚‹ã®ãŒã€éµã®ç”Ÿæˆã¨ä¿ç®¡ã®æ–¹æ³•ã§ã™ã€‚スマートフォン端末ã€ã¨ãã«Android端末ã¯ã€ã‚¢ãƒ—リケーションã®ãƒªãƒãƒ¼ã‚¹ã‚¨ãƒ³ã‚¸ãƒ‹ã‚¢ãƒªãƒ³ã‚°ã¨ãƒ«ãƒ¼ãƒˆåŒ–ã®å¯èƒ½æ€§ã¯å¸¸ã«ã‚ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã€ã‚ã‚‰ã‚†ã‚‹å ´åˆã«ã‚‚ç ´ã‚‰ã‚Œãªã„æš—å·åŒ–ã¨ã„ã†ã‚‚ã®ã¯ã‚ã‚Šã¾ã›ã‚“。ã“ã®ãŸã‚ã€å®ˆã‚‹ã¹ãæƒ…å ±è³‡ç”£ã¨ã€æƒ³å®šã™ã‚‹è„…å¨ï¼ˆè¨€ã„æ›ãˆ
SAFECode Project - memologue
ç±³æ¾¤ç ” SurveyBBSã«ã‚ˆã‚‹ã¨ã€SAFECode Projectã¨ã„ã†ã®ãŒã‚るらã—ã„。 Control-Cã®è©±ã€‚ã„ã‚ゆる安全ãªC。メモリ安全性を100ï¼…é™çš„ã«ä¿è¨¼ã™ã‚‹ã€‚プãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ã«ã‚»ãƒžãƒ³ãƒ†ã‚£ã‚¯ã‚¹åˆ¶é™ã‚’課ã™ã€‚動的メモリ確ä¿ã¨ã‹ãƒã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ã‚„é…列ã®ä½¿ã„æ–¹ã«é–¢ã—ã¦ã€‚文脈ã¯çµ„ã¿è¾¼ã¿ã€‚ Cプãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ 用ã®å…¨è‡ªå‹•ã®region inferenceアルゴリズムを開発ã—ãŸã‚‰ã—ã„。 ã ãã†ã 。LLVMã®äººãŸã¡ãŒã‚„ã£ã¦ã‚‹ã®ã‹ãªã€‚
FC2ã®exec-shield (1) - memologue
Fedora Core 2 ã®kernelã«ã¯ã€exec-shield ã¨ã„ã†ã€ã‚»ã‚ュリティ強化ã®ãƒ‘ッãƒãŒçµ„ã¿è¾¼ã¾ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚インストール直後ã®çŠ¶æ…‹ã§ã€ãã‚ŒãŒã¡ã‚ƒã‚“ã¨æ©Ÿèƒ½ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‹èª¿ã¹ã¦ã¿ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ ã¾ãšãã®(1)ã€ã‚¢ãƒ‰ãƒ¬ã‚¹ã‚¹ãƒšãƒ¼ã‚¹ã®randomize機能ã§ã™ã€‚ã“ã‚Œã¯ãƒ‡ãƒ•ã‚©ãƒ«ãƒˆã§ã°ã£ã¡ã‚ŠåŠ¹ã„ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã。buffer overflow ãªã©ã«ã‚ˆã‚‹ exploit ãŒå›°é›£ã«ãªã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ # cat /proc/sys/kernel/exec-shield-randomize 1 ã©ã®ã‚ˆã†ã«åƒã„ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã®ã‹ã€å°ã•ãªã‚³ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚’書ã„ã¦ãƒã‚§ãƒƒã‚¯ã—ã¦ã¿ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ $ cat > print_stack_address.cpp #include <cstdio> unsigned long get_esp(void) { __asm__("movl %esp, %eax"); } int main(void) {
最近ã®glibcã§ã¯atexit関数やjmp_bufã‚’ç‹™ã£ãŸæ”»æ’ƒã¯åŠ¹ã‹ãªã„ (PTR_MANGLE) - memologue
å°ãƒã‚¿ã€‚MSã®ä¸ã®äººã®blogã‚’ãªã‚“ã¨ãªã眺ã‚ã¦ã„ãŸã‚‰ã€ Address Space Layout Randomization in Windows Vista - Function Pointer Obfuscation http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2006/05/26/608315.aspx Protecting against Pointer Subterfuge http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2006/01/30/520200.aspx ã¨ã„ã†è¨˜äº‹ãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã—ãŸã€‚è¦ç´„ã™ã‚‹ã¨ã€ã€Œé•·ç”Ÿãã™ã‚‹ãƒã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ï¼ˆç‰¹ã«é–¢æ•°ãƒã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ï¼‰ã¯æ‚ªç”¨ã•ã‚Œã‚„ã™ã„ã®ã§ã€å€¤ã‚’ç´ ã®ã¾ã¾æ ¼ç´ã—ãªã„ã»ã†ãŒã‚ˆã„ã€ã¨ã„ã†è©±ã§ã™ã€‚長生ããªãƒã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ã¨ã„ã†ã®ã¯ã€ atexit関数ã§ç™»éŒ²ã•ã‚ŒãŸé–¢æ•°ã¸ã®ãƒã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ (プãƒ
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第1回 æ€æƒ³ã®æ•°ã ã‘ã‚»ã‚ュアOSã¯ç”Ÿã¾ã‚Œã‚‹ æ‰æ‰€ 秀明 Linuxコンソーシアムç†äº‹ å…¼ ã‚»ã‚ュリティ部会リーダー 2007/6/1 ãªãœã‚»ã‚ュリティを確ä¿ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã®OSãŒå¿…è¦ã¨ã•ã‚ŒãŸã®ã§ã—ょã†ã‹ã€‚ãã—ã¦ã‚»ã‚ュリティを高ã‚ã‚‹ã¨ã„ã†ã“ã¨ãŒå”¯ä¸€ã®ã‚´ãƒ¼ãƒ«ã§ã‚ã‚‹ã«ã‚‚ã‹ã‹ã‚らãšã€ã„ãã¤ã‚‚ã®ç¨®é¡žã®ã‚»ã‚ュアOSãŒç”Ÿã¾ã‚ŒãŸã®ã§ã—ょã†ã‹ã€‚本連載ã§ã¯ãã®ç”ãˆã‚’探るã¹ãã€ã‚»ã‚ュアOSを支ãˆã‚‹äººãŸã¡ã®ã€Œæ€æƒ³ã€ã«æ³¨ç›®ã—ã¾ã™ï¼ˆç·¨é›†éƒ¨ï¼‰ ï¼ ITã‚’å«ã‚ã€å¤šãã®ãƒ¡ãƒ‡ã‚£ã‚¢ã§ã‚»ã‚ュアOSãŒç´¹ä»‹ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚æらãã€SELinuxã‚„LIDSã€TOMOYO Linuxãªã©ã®ç´¹ä»‹è¨˜äº‹ã‚’ã”覧ã«ãªã£ãŸæ–¹ã‚‚多ã„ã§ã—ょã†ã€‚ ã‚»ã‚ュアOSã¨ã„ã£ã¦ã‚‚ã•ã¾ã–ã¾ãªã‚‚ã®ãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ç†è€…ãŒãƒªãƒ¼ãƒ€ãƒ¼ã‚’å‹™ã‚ã‚‹Linuxコンソーシアムセã‚ュリティ部会Wikiã§ã¯ã€æ•°ã€…ã®ã‚»ã‚ュアOSを紹介ã—ã€ã‚»ã‚ュアOSã‚’é¸æŠžã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã®è©•ä¾¡é …目を公開ã—ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ã“ã‚Œã¯ã€å®Ÿ
The return of EVM [LWN.net]
The integrity measurement architecture (IMA) has been a part of Linux for roughly a year now—it was merged for 2.6.30—and it can be used to attest to the integrity of a running Linux system. But IMA can be subverted by "offline" attacks, where file data or metadata is changed out from under IMA. Mimi Zohar has proposed the extended verification module (EVM) patch set as a means to protect against
The Integrity Measurement Architecture [LWN.net]
One of the many new features in the 2.6.11 kernel was a driver for "trusted platform module" (TPM) chips. This driver made the low-level capabilities of TPM chips available, but gave no indication of what sort of applications were envisioned for those capabilities. Reiner Sailer of IBM has now taken the next step with a set of patches implementing the "Integrity Measurement Architecture" (IMA) for
Does CVE-2008-4609 affect Red Hat Enterprise Linux? - Red Hat Customer Portal
Environment Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Red Hat Enterprise MRG Issue Denial of service flaws in the way TCP connections are handled have been disclosed by Robert E. Lee and the late Jack C. Louis of Outpost24 AB. These flaws allow an attacker to create crafted TCP connections, which can eventually exhaust the receiver's system resources and lead
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2008年下期ã«ã¯ã€Perl ã® File::Path モジュール㮠rmtree 関数ã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹ CVE ㌠3件発表ã•ã‚ŒãŸã€‚ (CVE-2008-2827, CVE-2008-5302, CVE-2008-5303)ã¾ãŸã€symlink attack ã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹ CVE 㯠100件以上出ã¦ã„る。 テンãƒãƒ©ãƒªãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒ«ã®æ‰±ã„ã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹å•é¡Œã¯å¤ãã‹ã‚‰ã‚ã‚‹ãŒã€ã„ã¾ã ã«å¤šãã®å•é¡ŒãŒç™ºç”Ÿã™ã‚‹ã€‚ãã“ã§æœ¬ç¨¿ã§ã¯ãƒ†ãƒ³ãƒãƒ©ãƒªãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒ«ã®æ‰±ã„ã‹ãŸã«ã¤ã„ã¦è§£èª¬ã™ã‚‹ã€‚ã¾ãŸã€å®‰å…¨ãªå‰Šé™¤ã«åˆ©ç”¨ã§ãã‚‹æ–°ã—ã„システムコールãŒæ案ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ã®ã§ã€ãã‚Œã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã‚‚触れる。 テンãƒãƒ©ãƒªãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒ«ã¯ãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ãŒä¸€æ™‚çš„ã«åˆ©ç”¨ã™ã‚‹ãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒ«ã§ã‚る。 Unix ã«ãŠã„ã¦ã¯ /tmp ã‚„ /var/tmp ã¨ã„ã†ãƒ‡ã‚£ãƒ¬ã‚¯ãƒˆãƒªãŒæä¾›ã•ã‚Œã¦ãŠã‚Šã€ã™ã¹ã¦ã®ãƒ¦ãƒ¼ã‚¶ãŒãã®ãƒ‡ã‚£ãƒ¬ã‚¯ãƒˆãƒªä¸‹ã«ãƒ†ãƒ³ãƒãƒ©ãƒªãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒ«ã‚’生æˆãƒ»å‰Šé™¤ã™ã‚‹ã®ãŒæ…£ç¿’ã§ã‚る。本稿ã§ã¯ã€ã“れらã®ãƒ‡
ã‚»ã‚ュアプãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒŸãƒ³ã‚° for Linux and Unix HOWTO
ã“ã®æ–‡æ›¸ã¯ã€Linux ãŠã‚ˆã³ Unix システム上ã§å®‰å…¨ãªãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ を書ãéš›ã«å¿…è¦ã¨ ãªã‚‹è¨è¨ˆã‚„実装ã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã€ãã®ã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚’æä¾›ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ é éš”ã®ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚’見るãŸã‚ã®ãƒ“ューアーや Web アプリケーション(CGI スクリプト ã‚’å«ã‚€)ã€ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯ãƒ»ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒã€setuid ã‚„ setgid ã—ã¦ã‚るプãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ãŒå¯¾è±¡ã§ã™ã€‚ C ã‚„ C++ã€Javaã€Perlã€PHPã€Pythonã€TCLã€Ada95 個別ã®ã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚‚掲載ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ Table of Contents1. ã¯ã˜ã‚ã«2. 背景2.1. Unix ã‚„ Linuxã€ã‚ªãƒ¼ãƒ—ンソースもã—ã㯠フリーソフトウェアã«ã¤ã„ã¦2.2. ã‚»ã‚ュリティã®åŽŸå‰‡2.3. ãªãœãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒžã¯å±ãªã„コードを書ã„ã¦ã—ã¾ã†ã®ã‹2.4. オープンソースã¯ã‚»ã‚ュリティã«åŠ¹æžœãŒã‚ã‚‹ã®ã‹2.5. 安全ãªãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ã®ç¨®é¡ž2.6. ç–‘ã„æ·±ãã€ã“ã ã‚ã‚ŠãŒå¼·ã„ã“ã¨ã«ä¾¡å€¤ãŒã‚ã‚‹
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Reverse Engineering Malware (Part 1)
A Brief History of Malware Obfuscation: Part 1 of 2
Security - eLinux.org
Traficomin Kyberturvallisuuskeskus | Kyberturvallisuuskeskus
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