From waterlogged missiles to a sinking submarine, recent reports about China’s military setbacks have fueled speculation about the readiness and strength of its military forces.
While these developments highlight real challenges within China’s defense sector, it would be a mistake to allow them to distract US policymakers from the bigger security picture.
These difficulties present a critical opportunity for the United States to engage with China in ways that reduce risks and improve relations rather than reinforce current assumptions.
China’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and its strategic intentions remain opaque. Rather than fixating on temporary challenges or internal dysfunctions within China’s military and defense sector, the United States must stay focused on the long-term goals of reducing nuclear risks and improving the US-China relationship.
This means establishing deeper political-military connections and building a better understanding of China’s evolving nuclear policy. Constructive engagement can prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations and, crucially, help avoid a conflict between the United States and China that would benefit neither.
Only through sustained diplomatic and military engagement can the United States mitigate the risks of nuclear miscalculation and ensure a stable strategic relationship.
Real challenges, real uncertainty
China faces notable internal challenges in its quest to modernize its military, including vulnerabilities within its defense industrial base (DIB), labor shortages and governance issues. These obstacles make China’s military buildup uneven and, at times, uncertain.
However, ascribing too much significance to these shortcomings would be short-sighted. China remains committed to enhancing its conventional military and nuclear capabilities and has yet to signal a commitment to nuclear-related dialogue, while the US understanding of these choices remains peripheral.
This gap in understanding prevents the United States from building a truly productive and worthwhile interchange. While it may be tempting to interpret developments such as corruption within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and inefficiencies in China’s DIB as evidence of a larger vulnerability in China’s grand strategy, this would be a dangerous miscalculation.
Such interpretations often reflect a lack of holistic understanding of China’s strategic priorities and long-term goals. Corruption, for example, while problematic for internal military governance, does not inherently translate into an inability to manage or deploy nuclear forces.
Similarly, inefficiencies in the DIB may slow aspects of China’s broader military modernization, but they don’t undermine the strategic importance of China’s nuclear arsenal in the eyes of Chinese Communist Party leaders.
Misreading these signals could lead US policymakers to misunderstand China’s actual capabilities and motivations, thereby diverting focus from more important objectives like risk reduction and transparency.
The United States cannot allow China’s internal challenges to overshadow the broader need for strategic engagement.
Just as Washington eagerly watches for signs of Beijing’s intentions, China too seeks clarification about US threat perceptions and reassurance that the United States is willing to engage on issues Beijing deems critical to its national interests.
Rather than viewing China’s challenges as evidentiary points to reinforce a competitive narrative, these incidents should confirm the need for deeper communication and engagement.
The United States must recognize that a lack of understanding of China’s strategic calculus can lead to dangerous misinterpretations. The priority should be to engage China on its long-term objectives, as well as the technical, doctrinal, and cultural dimensions of its nuclear thinking.
This can be achieved through military-to-military dialogue and sustained diplomatic efforts and by prioritizing a reciprocal approach to engagement that emphasizes transparency and mutual understanding.
At the same time, there’s room for US officials to better educate their Chinese counterparts on the political, ideological and bureaucratic drivers that are shaping US nuclear policy discussions in ways that seem foreign to Beijing.
Demonstrating a willingness to meet China halfway on critical issues is key to building a more stable strategic relationship.
By focusing on shared interests, such as preventing nuclear miscalculation and direct military confrontation, the United States can foster greater trust and understanding between the two nations.
This does not mean making unnecessary unilateral concessions; it means recognizing that both sides have legitimate interests in a candid discussion.
Constructive engagement over distraction
Great power competition has shifted from being a challenge to manage in US-China relations to an active objective that increasingly drives policy decisions in Washington.
As such, many are eager to look for possible signs of advantage or disadvantage. Corruption within the PLA ranks, water-filled missiles or an aberrant submarine accident are all convenient distractions. The US must resist the urge to draw sweeping conclusions from such developments.
Instead, US policymakers should view these incidents as opportunities to engage in strategic dialogue. In the long-term, deeper political-military connections are far more important to US interests than reacting to every sign of possible weakness or dysfunction in China’s military establishment.
The US-China rivalry will persist, but by focusing on improving communication, building trust and addressing shared interests, it can be managed. Better still, through these efforts, the United States can create the conditions necessary to avoid nuclear escalation and foster a more predictable future in US-China relations.
Shawn Rostker is a research analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.