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A good book may have the power to change the way we see the world, but a great book actually becomes part of our daily consciousness, pervading our thinking to the point that we take it for granted, and we forget how provocative and challenging its ideas once were—and still are. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is that kind of book. When it was first published in 1962, it was a landmark event in the history and philosophy of science. Fifty years later, it still has many lessons to teach.

With The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn challenged long-standing linear notions of scientific progress, arguing that transformative ideas don’t arise from the day-to-day, gradual process of experimentation and data accumulation but that the revolutions in science, those breakthrough moments that disrupt accepted thinking and offer unanticipated ideas, occur outside of “normal science,” as he called it. Though Kuhn was writing when physics ruled the sciences, his ideas on how scientific revolutions bring order to the anomalies that amass over time in research experiments are still instructive in our biotech age.

This new edition of Kuhn’s essential work in the history of science includes an insightful introduction by Ian Hacking, which clarifies terms popularized by Kuhn, including paradigm and incommensurability, and applies Kuhn’s ideas to the science of today. Usefully keyed to the separate sections of the book, Hacking’s introduction provides important background information as well as a contemporary context. Newly designed, with an expanded index, this edition will be eagerly welcomed by the next generation of readers seeking to understand the history of our perspectives on science.

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2012/4/30
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13.97 x 2.54 x 21.59 cm
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0226458121
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978-0226458120
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The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change
Thomas S. Kuhn

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“科学革命の構造"で著者Kuhnは、変容的なアイデアは日々の実験やデータ蓄積のプロセスから生じるものではなく、「正常な科学」の外で起こると言う。科学の革命、その画期的な進歩、科学実験がどのように時間の経過とともに変わったかについての彼の考えは、バイオテクノロジーの時代においても有益である。1962年に出版されて以来、挑戦的な内容はいまだ色あせることなく訴えかけてくる。

このアニバーサリーエディションには、Ian Hackingによる洞察に富んだ前書きが追加されている。その中で、Hackingは、パラダイム、比例関係などKuhnによって一般化された用語の解説をし、Kuhnの考えを今日の科学に適用させている。この本が書かれた当時の背景、そして現代的なコンテクストも説明されており、本書を理解するカギとなるであろう。デザインと見出しも新しくなっていて、次世代の読者にも受ける内容となっている。

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"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions did a gestalt flip on just about every assumption about the who, how, and what of scientific progress. . . . The book still vibrates our culture's walls like a trumpet call. History of science may not have become exactly what Kuhn thought it should, but The Structure of Scientific Revolutions knocked it off its existing tracks."
-- "Chronicle of Higher Education"

"One of the most influential books of the 20th century. . . . Singlehandedly changed the way we think about mankind's most organized attempt to understand the world."
-- "Guardian"

"So long as there are still paradigms among us, the achievements of Thomas Kuhn will be remembered."
-- "National Post (Canada)"

"The Kuhnian image of science has reshaped our understanding of the scientific enterprise and human inquiry in general. If you haven't already read The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the publication of this inexpensive 50th-anniversary edition offers a perfect excuse to do so."
-- "Science"

"Like Thomas Kuhn, Ian Hacking has a gift for clear exposition. His introduction provides a helpful guide to some of the thornier philosophical issues. . . . We may still admire Kuhn's dexterity in broaching challenging ideas with a fascinating mix of examples from psychology, history, philosophy, and beyond. We need hardly agree with each of Kuhn's propositions to enjoy--and benefit from--this classic book."
--David Kaiser "Nature"

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The Structure of Scientific REVOLUTIONS

By THOMAS S. KUHN

The University of Chicago Press

Copyright © 2012 The University of Chicago
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-226-45812-0

Introductory Essay by Ian Hacking...........................................viiPreface.....................................................................xxxixI Introduction: A Role for History.........................................1II The Route to Normal Science.............................................10III The Nature of Normal Science...........................................23IV Normal Science as Puzzle-solving........................................35V The Priority of Paradigms................................................43VI Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries.....................52VII Crisis and the Emergence of Scientific Theories........................66VIII The Response to Crisis................................................77IX The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions......................92X Revolutions as Changes of World View.....................................111XI The Invisibility of Revolutions.........................................135XII The Resolution of Revolutions..........................................143XIII Progress through Revolutions..........................................159Postscript—1969.......................................................173Index.......................................................................209

Chapter One

Introduction A Role for History

History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. That image has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study of finished scientific achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, in the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to practice its trade. Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text. This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by them in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself.

Even from history, however, that new concept will not be forthcoming if historical data continue to be sought and scrutinized mainly to answer questions posed by the unhistorical stereotype drawn from science texts. Those texts have, for example, oft en seemed to imply that the content of science is uniquely exemplified by the observations, laws, and theories described in their pages. Almost as regularly, the same books have been read as saying that scientific methods are simply the ones illustrated by the manipulative techniques used in gathering textbook data, together with the logical operations employed when relating those data to the textbook's theoretical generalizations. The result has been a concept of science with profound implications about its nature and development.

If science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts, then scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one or another element to that particular constellation. Scientific development becomes the piecemeal process by which these items have been added, singly and in combination, to the ever growing stockpile that constitutes scientific technique and knowledge. And history of science becomes the discipline that chronicles both these successive increments and the obstacles that have inhibited their accumulation. Concerned with scientific development, the historian then appears to have two main tasks. On the one hand, he must determine by what man and at what point in time each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered or invented. On the other, he must describe and explain the congeries of error, myth, and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the constituents of the modern science text. Much research has been directed to these ends, and some still is.

In recent years, however, a few historians of science have been finding it more and more difficult to fulfil the functions that the concept of development-by-accumulation assigns to them. As chroniclers of an incremental process, they discover that additional research makes it harder, not easier, to answer questions like: When was oxygen discovered? Who first conceived of energy conservation? Increasingly, a few of them suspect that these are simply the wrong sorts of questions to ask. Perhaps science does not develop by the accumulation of individual discoveries and inventions. Simultaneously, these same historians confront growing difficulties in distinguishing the "scientific" component of past observation and belief from what their predecessors had readily labeled "error" and "superstition." The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today. Given these alternatives, the historian must choose the latter. Out-of-date theories are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded. That choice, however, makes it difficult to see scientific development as a process of accretion. The same historical research that displays the difficulties in isolating individual inventions and discoveries gives ground for profound doubts about the cumulative process through which these individual contributions to science were thought to have been compounded.

The result of all these doubts and difficulties is a historiographic revolution in the study of science, though one that is still in its early stages. Gradually, and oft en without entirely realizing they are doing so, historians of science have begun to ask new sorts of questions and to trace different, and oft en less than cumulative, developmental lines for the sciences. Rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time. They ask, for example, not about the relation of Galileo's views to those of modern science, but rather about the relationship between his views and those of his group, i.e., his teachers, contemporaries, and immediate successors in the sciences. Furthermore, they insist upon studying the opinions of that group and other similar ones from the viewpoint—usually very different from that of modern science—that gives those opinions the maximum internal coherence and the closest possible fit to nature. Seen through the works that result, works perhaps best exemplified in the writings of Alexandre Koyr, science does not seem altogether the same enterprise as the one discussed by writers in the older historiographic tradition. By implication, at least, these historical studies suggest the possibility of a new image of science. This essay aims to delineate that image by making explicit some of the new historiography's implications.

What aspects of science will emerge to prominence in the course of this effort? First, at least in order of presentation, is the insufficiency of methodological directives, by themselves, to dictate a unique substantive conclusion to many sorts of scientific questions. Instructed to examine electrical or chemical phenomena, the man who is ignorant of these fields but who knows what it is to be scientific may legitimately reach any one of a number of incompatible conclusions. Among those legitimate possibilities, the particular conclusions he does arrive at are probably determined by his prior experience in other fields, by the accidents of his investigation, and by his own individual makeup. What beliefs about the stars, for example, does he bring to the study of chemistry or electricity? Which of the many conceivable experiments relevant to the new field does he elect to perform first? And what aspects of the complex phenomenon that then results strike him as particularly relevant to an elucidation of the nature of chemical change or of electrical affinity? For the individual, at least, and sometimes for the scientific community as well, answers to questions like these are oft en essential determinants of scientific development. We shall note, for example, in Section II that the early developmental stages of most sciences have been characterized by continual competition between a number of distinct views of nature, each partially derived from, and all roughly compatible with, the dictates of scientific observation and method. What diff erentiated these various schools was not one or another failure of method—they were all "scientific"—but what we shall come to call their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it. Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science. But they cannot alone determine a particular body of such belief. An apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a given scientific community at a given time.

That element of arbitrariness does not, however, indicate that any scientific group could practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. Nor does it make less consequential the particular constellation to which the group, at a given time, is in fact committed. Effective research scarcely begins before a scientific community thinks it has acquired firm answers to questions like the following: What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is composed? How do these interact with each other and with the senses? What questions may legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking solutions? At least in the mature sciences, answers (or full substitutes for answers) to questions like these are firmly embedded in the educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice. Because that education is both rigorous and rigid, these answers come to exert a deep hold on the scientific mind. That they can do so does much to account both for the peculiar efficiency of the normal research activity and for the direction in which it proceeds at any given time. When examining normal science in Sections III, IV, and V, we shall want finally to describe that research as a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education. Simultaneously, we shall wonder whether research could proceed without such boxes, whatever the element of arbitrariness in their historic origins and, occasionally, in their subsequent development.

Yet that element of arbitrariness is present, and it too has an important effect on scientific development, one which will be examined in detail in Sections VI, VII, and VIII. Normal science, the activity in which most scientists inevitably spend almost all their time, is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like. Much of the success of the enterprise derives from the community's willingness to defend that assumption, if necessary at considerable cost. Normal science, for example, oft en suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments. Nevertheless, so long as those commitments retain an element of the arbitrary, the very nature of normal research ensures that novelty shall not be suppressed for very long. Sometimes a normal problem, one that ought to be solvable by known rules and procedures, resists the reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the group within whose competence it falls. On other occasions a piece of equipment designed and constructed for the purpose of normal research fails to perform in the anticipated manner, revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort, be aligned with professional expectation. In these and other ways besides, normal science repeatedly goes astray. And when it does—when, that is, the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice—then begin the extraordinary investigations that lead the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science. The extraordinary episodes in which that shift of professional commitments occurs are the ones known in this essay as scientific revolutions. They are the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science.

The most obvious examples of scientific revolutions are those famous episodes in scientific development that have oft en been labeled revolutions before. Therefore, in Sections IX and X, where the nature of scientific revolutions is first directly scrutinized, we shall deal repeatedly with the major turning points in scientific development associated with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein. More clearly than most other episodes in the history of at least the physical sciences, these display what all scientific revolutions are about. Each of them necessitated the community's rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which scientific work was done. Such changes, together with the controversies that almost always accompany them, are the defining characteristics of scientific revolutions.

These characteristics emerge with particular clarity from a study of, say, the Newtonian or the chemical revolution. It is, however, a fundamental thesis of this essay that they can also be retrieved from the study of many other episodes that were not so obviously revolutionary. For the far smaller professional group affected by them, Maxwell's equations were as revolutionary as Einstein's, and they were resisted accordingly. The invention of other new theories regularly, and appropriately, evokes the same response from some of the specialists on whose area of special competence they impinge. For these men the new theory implies a change in the rules governing the prior practice of normal science. Inevitably, therefore, it reflects upon much scientific work they have already successfully completed. That is why a new theory, however special its range of application, is seldom or never just an increment to what is already known. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom completed by a single man and never overnight. No wonder historians have had difficulty in dating precisely this extended process that their vocabulary impels them to view as an isolated event.

Nor are new inventions of theory the only scientific events that have revolutionary impact upon the specialists in whose domain they occur. The commitments that govern normal science specify not only what sorts of entities the universe does contain, but also, by implication, those that it does not. It follows, though the point will require extended discussion, that a discovery like that of oxygen or X-rays does not simply add one more item to the population of the scientist's world. Ultimately it has that effect, but not until the professional community has re-evaluated traditional experimental procedures, altered its conception of entities with which it has long been familiar, and, in the process, shift ed the network of theory through which it deals with the world. Scientific fact and theory are not categorically separable, except perhaps within a single tradition of normal-scientific practice. That is why the unexpected discovery is not simply factual in its import and why the scientist's world is qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory.

This extended conception of the nature of scientific revolutions is the one delineated in the pages that follow. Admittedly the extension strains customary usage. Nevertheless, I shall continue to speak even of discoveries as revolutionary, because it is just the possibility of relating their structure to that of, say, the Copernican revolution that makes the extended conception seem to me so important. The preceding discussion indicates how the complementary notions of normal science and of scientific revolutions will be developed in the nine sections immediately to follow. The rest of the essay attempts to dispose of three remaining central questions. Section XI, by discussing the textbook tradition, considers why scientific revolutions have previously been so difficult to see. Section XII describes the revolutionary competition between the proponents of the old normalscientific tradition and the adherents of the new one. It thus considers the process that should somehow, in a theory of scientific inquiry, replace the confirmation or falsification procedures made familiar by our usual image of science. Competition between segments of the scientific community is the only historical process that ever actually results in the rejection of one previously accepted theory or in the adoption of another. Finally, Section XIII will ask how development through revolutions can be compatible with the apparently unique character of scientific progress. For that question, however, this essay will provide no more than the main outlines of an answer, one which depends upon characteristics of the scientific community that require much additional exploration and study. (Continues...)

Excerpted from The Structure of Scientific REVOLUTIONSby THOMAS S. KUHN Copyright © 2012 by The University of Chicago. Excerpted by permission of The University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

著者について

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-96) was the Laurence Rockefeller Professor of linguistics and philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His books include The Essential Tension; Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894-1912; and The Copernican Revolution.

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出版社 ‏ : ‎ University of Chicago Press; 第4版 (2012/4/30)
発売日 ‏ : ‎ 2012/4/30
言語 ‏ : ‎ 英語
ペーパーバック ‏ : ‎ 264ページ
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0226458121
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0226458120
寸法 ‏ : ‎ 13.97 x 2.54 x 21.59 cm

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科学的データの分析手法で、今までのデータをまとめる方法がうまくいかなくなった時に新しいやり方を試し、それがうまくいったときに新しい理論が成立するようなことが書かれているが、科学の理論的成立を人の主観にゆだねてしまう側面がある。
薬の有効性のデータで、有効でないものを有効なデータが出るようにまとめることで、本来有効でないものを有効と見せることもできるという、逆の使い方も、この理論を使えばできるだろう。
だから、科学を人の主観にゆだねるということ自体がどういう問題を生むかを考察するのに役立つ。
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It rarely happens that you feel you are reading a masterpiece from the first few pages of a book. Here we have one of those situations. This book is also one of those you wish you had read years before, and yet you realise you probably wouldn't have been ready for it.

The intuition won't disappoint. The book unveils answers to questions like "What is science and how does it differ from other disciplines?" or "Why do scientists behave in the way they do?" or "How does humanity progress in our understanding of nature?".
Not everybody would ask these questions about a subject that is part of our everyday life. Hence, when those questions surprisingly find an answer, it feels like you suddenly understand something that has always been in front of you. And that is an exhilarating feeling.

I'd consider this a must-read book for scientists and historians, as well as for lovers of both disciplines. But I believe the pages are of great value also for people with different professions and interests.
It is, in fact, possible to draw analogies between the behaviour of scientists before and during a scientific revolution and the behaviour of other types of professionals when the paradigm they are anchored to is challenged.

From that standpoint, this book has been invaluable to me. Now, I can better understand particular dynamics typical in my field (high-tech) when an emerging technology threatens the status quo.
It is more comprehensible to me why, how, and when proponents and critics of the emerging technology defend their positions or change their minds about it.

The book also opens the eyes to a fascinating angle with profound philosophical implications, articulated in Section X: replacing a paradigm with another doesn't merely lead to a different interpretation of the same data. Instead, it leads to capturing new data, resetting the observer's worldview (scientist or otherwise) rather than expanding it.

My recommendation is to skip the introductory essay by Ian Hacking and start from Section I. It makes more sense to read the introductory essay after finishing the book. And by the book, I mean inclusive of the Postscript, which contains another intriguing philosophical entanglement: an embraced paradigm influences perception (just like life experience influences the predictions that the human brain constantly makes).

A word of caution on the language: while accessible to most, the style is eloquent and erudite. Fully understanding each sentence requires above-ordinary focus and concentration.

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A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas é um clássico escrito pelo físico teórico e professor de História da Ciência Thomas Kuhn. O livro foi originalmente escrito na década de 60 e, apesar de ter apenas 266 páginas, tem uma leitura densa e reflexiva.

A tese do autor é entender o que são e qual a importância das revoluções científicas. Para Kuhn, a ciência tradicional cresce por meio de contribuições marginais e por essa razão é incapaz de criar ideias novas quando encontra uma limitação. Apenas uma revolução causando uma mudança de paradigma rompendo com o modelo antigo é capaz de desenvolver novas ideias conceituais e fenomenais de forma a expandir o domínio do problema. Assim, o progresso científico se origina das revoluções.

Para o autor, as revoluções científicas tem uma estrutura definida a qual evolui conforme a sequencia: (1) ciência normal; (2) resolução de problema; (3) paradigma; (4) anomalia; (5) crise e (6) revolução, finalmente estabelecendo um novo paradigma.

Apesar de não ter interesse na área científica, utilizei o livro para entender a dinâmica evolutiva dos paradigmas econômicos e de gestão. O modelo de Kuhn nos permite entender bem esse processo.

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Libro interessante, che tratta temi scientifici in maniera concreta e facile da capire. Idee rivoluzionarie, lungimirante. Specialmente in considerazione del periodo storico in cui fu scritto. Saluti.

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The Structure of Scientific REVOLUTIONS

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The Structure of Scientific REVOLUTIONS

The University of Chicago Press

Contents

Chapter One

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登録情報

著者について

ト−マス・ク−ン

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上位レビュー、対象国：日本

Fast response and delivery

科学を認識の問題にしてしまった功罪の分析は、現状を理解するのに役立つ

Great Product

Eloquent, erudite theory about the nature of Science

Classic reading a most in science

Um clássico ainda relevante

Interessante