(Guatemala City) – Successive governments in Guatemala have failed to meet their obligations toward girls facing early and forced pregnancies due to sexual violence, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. The authorities need to provide sexual violence survivors with comprehensive health care, education, and social security, as well as necessary legal protections, justice and reparations.

The 85-page report, “‘Forced to Give Up on Their Dreams’: Sexual Violence against Girls in Guatemala,” documents the numerous barriers that girls who are survivors of sexual violence face accessing essential health care, education, social security, and justice. Guatemalan law classifies any sexual activity involving a child under 14 as sexual violence. Guatemala’s National Registry of Persons (RENAP) reported that between 2018 and 2024, 14,696 girls under 14 gave birth and became mothers, in many cases against their will.

“Sexual violence remains a pervasive and systemic issue in Guatemala, disproportionally affecting girls under age 14,” said Cristina Quijano Carrasco, women’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Guatemala’s failure to take adequate steps to prevent and end sexual violence and forced pregnancies among girls can have life-threatening consequences, including risks to girls’ physical and mental health, and can profoundly affect the realization of their economic, social, and cultural rights.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 72 representatives of civil society organizations, government officials, healthcare personnel, and other experts for the report in 2023 and 2024, and analyzed government data.

In one case, an 11-year-old girl from a rural area was raped by her father and sought health care after discovering she was five months pregnant. Although she reported the case, the authorities sent her back home to her father, and she was forced to give birth at home in unsafe conditions and without assistance. The authorities never arrested the father and because the case was never the subject of a judicial ruling, the girl received no reparations for the harm she suffered.

Access to comprehensive health services for girls in Guatemala is severely limited. Long travel distances, chronic shortages of trained personnel, and inadequate resources in health centers hinder timely access to essential healthcare services and supplies, such as emergency contraception and prenatal, delivery, and postnatal care.

These barriers have a disproportionate impact on girls from rural and Indigenous communities, who often must travel for hours or even days outside of their communities to reach healthcare facilities in department capitals. Guatemala law permits therapeutic abortion when the life of the pregnant person is at risk, but stigma and lack of awareness of the law among healthcare providers obstruct access to this essential health service.

Guatemala’s education system also fails to support pregnant girls and young mothers. As of November 2024, only 213 students who were pregnant were registered as enrolled in the education system nationwide from January to June. Lack of support from schools and government, stigma, family pressure, and violence contribute to high dropout rates for pregnant girls, especially in rural communities. Many are pressured to drop out of school permanently and are often sent to live with their assailants or tasked with labor in the home.

Societal views often label girls as “impure” or “dirty,” further stigmatizing them and placing the blame on the survivors rather than the abusers. Lack of public policies designed to enable students who are pregnant or are mothers to continue their studies leaves girls without the necessary academic, social, and emotional support.

Social protection programs for pregnant girls and girls who are mothers are also inadequate to ensure their right to social security. The government’s Vida program, which is intended to provide cash assistance to pregnant girls and mothers under 14, has low coverage due to its restrictive eligibility requirements and onerous bureaucratic hurdles. In 2024, only 129 girls were enrolled in the program, even though 1,953 girls under 14 gave birth that year.

The path to justice for girls who are survivors of sexual violence is fraught with systemic failures. From January 2018 to October 2023, prosecutors and judges dismissed 6,697 cases of sexual violence against girls under 14, including 2,271 from January 2023 to October 2023 alone; a sharp rise compared to previous years. Even when cases proceed, accountability remains rare: judges issued just 136 preliminary indictments between January 2018 and September 2023 and 102 rape convictions between January 2018 and October 2023 in cases involving pregnant girls under 14 who are survivors of sexual violence.

These failings of the justice system indicate a lack of a gender-sensitive and of a child-centered approach in legal processes. Survivors of sexual violence encounter numerous barriers, including gender-based stereotypes, mistreatment, and limited access to government offices. Indigenous girls and deaf girls face additional challenges due to language barriers and a lack of culturally sensitive trained interpreters for Indigenous languages and sign language. When reparations are granted, they often fall short of addressing the needs, reflecting a broader lack of understanding of the girls’ specific circumstances and needs. The gaps in justice are further compounded by an overloaded judicial system that leads to severe delays.

Underreporting of sexual violence, poor data management, and a lack of coordination between government institutions has further hindered the government’s ability to track, prevent, and respond effectively to sexual violence.

“Without meaningful reforms—including strengthening prevention, services, and access to justice—girls in Guatemala will continue to face shocking levels of sexual violence and insurmountable barriers to realizing their rights,” Quijano Carrasco said. “The government needs to take urgent action to ensure that girls who are survivors of sexual violence have access to the health care, education, social security, and the legal protections to which they are entitled, in order to recover and rebuild their lives.”

Key Data on Sexual Violence and Forced Motherhood in Guatemala:

A worker unloads bags and boxes of humanitarian aid from the back of a truck in the opposition-held Idlib, Syria, June 9, 2021.

(Beirut) – Sweeping sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other countries are hindering the restoration of essential services in Syria, Human Rights Watch said today.

These sanctions, imposed on the former government of Bashar al-Assad, remain in place despite its collapse and lack clear, measurable conditions for removal. They are hindering reconstruction efforts and exacerbating the suffering of millions of Syrians struggling to access critical rights, including to electricity and an adequate standard of living. 

“Syria is in desperate need of reconstruction and Syrians are struggling to survive,” said Hiba Zayadin, senior Syria researcher at Human Rights Watch. “With the collapse of the former government, broad sanctions now stand as a major obstacle to restoring essential services such as health care, water, electricity, and education.”

Thirteen years of conflict and displacement have left much of Syria’s infrastructure in ruins, with entire towns uninhabitable, schools, hospitals, roads, water facilities and electrical grids damaged, public services barely functioning, and the economy in freefall. Over 90 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line, with at least 13 million—more than half the population—unable to access or afford enough quality food, and at least 16.5 million Syrians across Syria requiring some form of humanitarian aid to meet their basic needs. Human Rights Watch previously found that broad sanctions hindered aid delivery in Syria, despite humanitarian exemptions, and especially after the February 2023 earthquakes in northern Syria.

Sanctioning entities should prioritize the well-being of Syrian civilians by lifting sanctions that hinder access to basic rights. This includes restoring Syria’s access to global financial systems, ending trade restrictions on essential goods, addressing energy sanctions to ensure access to fuel and electricity, and providing clear legal assurances to financial institutions and businesses to mitigate the chilling effect of overcompliance, Human Rights Watch said.

Syria has been under international sanctions for over 45 years. Since 2011, the United States, the EU, the UK, and others have imposed more severe sanctions on the Syrian government, its officials, and its entities in response to the previous government’s war crimes and human rights violations. These sanctions include targeted asset freezes and travel bans, as well as broader restrictions on trade, financial transactions, and key industries.

Certain armed groups operating in Syria and designated as terrorist organizations, including Hay’et Tahrir al Sham (HTS), are also subject to United Nations Security Council-mandated counterterrorism measures that prohibit making funds, assets, and economic resources available directly or indirectly to them. HTS, which led the ouster of the Assad government and which dominates the caretaker government, announced in late January 2025 that the group was “dissolved” and would be absorbed into state institutions alongside other armed groups.

The United States enforces the most severe measures, prohibiting nearly all trade and financial transactions with Syria, including exports of US goods, software, and services, with limited exceptions for humanitarian aid. The Caesar Act extends these restrictions by sanctioning foreign companies engaged in business with the Syrian government, particularly in oil and gas, construction, and engineering.

EU sanctions focus on banning the purchase of Syrian crude oil, restricting investments, and limiting Syrian banks’ access to EU financial systems. Financial sanctions also restrict bond sales, new bank accounts for Syrian institutions, and transactions with designated individuals. State-owned entities like the Central Bank of Syria, Syriatel, a major telecom company, and Syrian airlines are also sanctioned, with impacts on sectors like education due to restrictions on Information Technology imports and software access. EU sanctions also prevent the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods and technology that might be used for internal repression. The UK government’s sanctions regime largely resembles the EU’s. 

Since the fall of the Assad government, the United States and European countries have made limited adjustments to their sanctions policies. In January 2025, the United States authorized limited energy and remittance-related transactions in Syria, while the EU proposed a conditional plan to ease sanctions, and the UK announced forthcoming amendments for parliamentary debate.  

But in February, the new head of Syria’s Investment Agency, Ayman Hamawiye, called the steps taken “inadequate” and told Reuters that Western sanctions on Syria’s banking sector, in particular, are preventing critical investments in the economy.

The country’s reconstruction needs are estimated to exceed US$250 billion, spanning infrastructure, essential services, and economic recovery. The healthcare system is in critical condition, with over half of Syria’s hospitals nonfunctional, and with severe shortages of medical and other necessary supplies. Water infrastructure is similarly degraded, with at least two-thirds of treatment plants, half of pumping stations, and a third of water towers damaged since 2011, according to the UN Children’s Fund. Education is in crisis, with over 7,000 schools damaged or destroyed and about 2 million children out of school.

For years, broad sectoral sanctions have exacerbated Syria’s economic crisis, fueling inflation, depleting essential goods, and creating a complex web of financial and trade barriers that narrow and inconsistently applied humanitarian exemptions fail to meaningfully address. These restrictions—compounded by counterterrorism measures, export controls, and private sector overcompliance—have made it difficult for aid organizations, financial institutions, and businesses to operate effectively in the country.

In just one example, the current US Treasury license does not exempt internet services, telecom infrastructure, and digital tools, barriers that Access Now and over 160 civil society groups warn have hampered Syrians’ access to critical online tools and services. Lifting these broad sanctions is crucial for exercising their human rights online and can play an important role in economic growth.

The broad designation of Syrian state entities, including the central bank, key financial institutions, and state-run utilities, weakened already struggling infrastructure and services. Restrictions on the energy sector, have exacerbated fuel and electricity shortages, worsening the strain on water systems, food supply chains, and healthcare facilities. Comprehensive trade sanctions—particularly the near-total US ban on exports to Syria—have limited access to vital imports, including medical supplies, agricultural equipment, and industrial materials necessary for reconstruction.

The humanitarian carveouts in United States, UK, and EU sanctions vary from one sanctioning entity to another, are piecemeal in nature, and have separate restrictions, limitations, and compliance procedures, making it difficult, time consuming, and costly for banks, exporters, and humanitarian actors to navigate and ensure compliance.

Financial institutions, wary of legal risks and potential penalties, have often refused to engage in Syria even when exemptions exist. This chilling effect has led to widespread financial “de-risking,” cutting off banking channels and making it difficult to process transactions for humanitarian aid, trade, and private sector engagement. Humanitarian groups have repeatedly warned that such short-term measures do not provide enough certainty for businesses and financial institutions to re-engage Syria. UN experts have also criticized humanitarian exemptions in sanctions as “ineffective and inefficient,” citing structural flaws that hinder humanitarian work.

Human Rights Watch opposes sanctions that have a disproportionately negative impact on human rights or create unnecessary suffering, and maintains that sanctions should not be punitive, but should instead be designed to deter and correct human rights abuses. To be effective, sanctions must be tied to clear, measurable, and attainable conditions for their removal, with regular monitoring to assess progress. The Caesar Act in the United States was designed to punish the Assad government, but in a post-Assad world, its broad and indefinite restrictions risk harming civilians without advancing clear human rights objectives. 

“Rather than using broad sectoral sanctions as leverage for shifting political objectives, Western governments should recognize their direct harm to civilians and take meaningful steps to lift restrictions that impede access to basic rights,” Zayadin said. “A piecemeal approach of temporary exemptions and limited waivers is not enough. Sanctions that harm civilians should immediately be lifted, not refined.”

A person holds a Chinese passport at the Zabaikalsk international checkpoint on the Russian-Chinese border, Zabaykalsky Krai, Russia, October 17, 2023. 

(Taipei) – The Chinese government has increasingly imposed arbitrary restrictions on people’s internationally protected right to leave the country, Human Rights Watch said today.

Chinese authorities are requiring citizens from locales they broadly consider to be high risks for online fraud or “unlawful” emigration to submit additional paperwork and obtain approval from multiple government offices during passport application processes. Those not meeting these cumbersome requirements are often denied passports. The government has long restricted people’s access to passports in areas where Tibetans and Uyghurs predominantly live.

“While many Chinese citizens enjoy international travel, the right to leave China appears to be restricted for growing categories of people throughout the country,” said Maya Wang, associate China director at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities are going beyond existing restrictions on Tibetans and Uyghurs to limit the travel of people throughout China under the guise of anti-crime campaigns.”

All Chinese citizens can apply for “ordinary passports” (因私普通护照) with an identity card. However, in recent years, police agencies responsible for issuing passports have increasingly subjected applicants from dozens of locales to a more cumbersome process. This conclusion is based on official complaints filed by those affected as well as social media posts by residents, travel agents, and overseas employment agencies in those locales.

In these locales, people have to submit more extensive documentation, which may include providing documentation that they do not have a criminal record, evidence of social security contributions, bank statements showing regular income and savings, and employment contracts. They may also be required to obtain the approval of multiple police and Chinese Communist Party offices. While many succeed after weeks or months of traveling back and forth to offices to fulfill these requirements, some people reported simply giving up.

These locales also often place additional restrictions on travel, such as requiring applicants to apply in their hometowns where their household registration (“hukou”) documents are registered. These restrictions appear to apply even years after people have moved their hukous to another province.

There is no published list of affected locales. Difficulties have been reported by people with hukous in Fujian province, such as Fuqing, Longyan, Anxi counties; Shenyang City’s Sujiatun district and Tieling City in Liaoning province; Donghai county in Jiangsu province; Shangcai and Yiyang counties in Henan province; and the cities of Changde and Shaoyang in Hunan province. Human Rights Watch was able to confirm reports of restrictions with individuals from Fujian Province.

The authorities in some of these cases have informed the applicants that their home base is “sensitive” due to “prevalence of certain town [residents] exiting the country to engage in online fraud and transnational crime and gambling.” A few of these locales appear on lists of “targeted locales” in a joint departmental effort to crack down on online fraud formed in 2015, though this list has not been updated. Residents in other locales appear to be penalized solely because fellow residents emigrated to other countries “illegally.” The Chinese government has not responded to Human Rights Watch’s emailed query about these restrictions.

These time-consuming passport requirements recall those in place before 2002, when applicants for ordinary passports were required to compile a significant volume of documentary material in support of their applications and undergo a protracted procedure that included a “political examination.”

In late 2002, the Ministry of Public Security’s Entry and Exit Administration, the agency responsible for issuing passports, initiated a new “on demand” system to simplify the passport application process. This has since been extended to the vast majority of areas in China, though Xinjiang, Tibet, and the 13 Tibetan or Hui autonomous prefectures in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces were never granted permission to use the fast-track passport application system.

Applicants from these areas are required to provide far more extensive documentation in support of their passport applications than elsewhere in China and they face extremely long delays, often lasting several years, before passports are issued, or are routinely denied passports for no valid reason.

In addition, in 2016, Xinjiang authorities further confiscated all passports previously issued, as part of its abusive crackdown in the region.

The authorities have also increasingly required government employees to hand in their passports for “safekeeping,” which requires official approval for their return. While such practices have long been common among high-level officials, they have since been expanded to include lower-level employees, including those at schools, universities, and hospitals. The authorities claim that these measures are to prevent graft and to avoid leaking state secrets.

China’s Exit and Entry Administration Law in article 12(5) broadly states that citizens who “may endanger national security or interests” can be prohibited from leaving the country. Similarly, the Passport Law in article 13 allows the authorities to deny passports to those whose departure is broadly considered to “cause harm to national security or cause significant losses to national interests.” The new Law on Countering Telecommunications Network Fraud in article 36 directs the police to bar people from exiting the country if they have “a major suspicion that such travel is related to telecommunications fraud.”

The right to freedom of movement is recognized under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is considered reflective of customary international law, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which China is a signatory. Under article 12 of the ICCPR, “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on the Right to Freedom of Movement, stated that “Since international travel usually requires appropriate documents, in necessary travel documents.” Governments may only limit freedom of movement where “provided by law” and where necessary “to protect national security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”

Such restrictions must be nondiscriminatory, be necessary to achieve one or more legitimate aims, proportionate in relation to the aim sought, and must be the least restrictive measure possible to achieve such aims. Restrictions invoking lawful aims must be specific about how, for example, national security would be threatened if the people prohibited from leaving were allowed to leave.

Chinese legislation that allows the authorities to broadly restrict people’s right to exit the country under vague claims of national security do not meet these standards, Human Rights Watch said.

“Growing restrictions on the right to obtain passports have raised anxiety that Xi Jinping’s government is restoring practices from when few people could travel abroad,” Wang said. “Chinese authorities should drop these arbitrary and discriminatory practices so that everyone has the equal right to leave the country.”

Residents walk by charred vehicles in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, January 31, 2025.

The European Parliament, in a strong resolution last week, slammed the inaction of European Union executives on the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Rwanda-backed M23 armed group is committing grave violations of the laws of war. Calling out the EU’s “lack of coherence” and “inconsistent messages” to Rwanda, lawmakers pressed the European Commission and member states to put real pressure on those fueling atrocities in Congo, starting with Rwanda, the M23’s main backer. 

The European Parliament has reason to be outraged.

The reemergence of the M23 since late 2021 in eastern Congo has exposed civilians to mass displacement, indiscriminate shelling and killings, widespread sexual violence, and other violations by all parties to the conflict. Rwanda’s active support to the armed group has been confirmed by many, including United Nations investigators. The humanitarian crisis is dire, with hundreds of thousands displaced - some more than once - by the M23 and lacking access to humanitarian aid.

But what has the EU done? It issued a strong statement on January 25, pressing Rwanda to cease support to the abusive M23 while committing to use all tools available. Since then, nothing.

But last week’s parliamentary resolution gives the EU a clear way forward.

First, it should sanction high-level commanders involved in violations in eastern Congo, including top Rwandan officials.

Second, the EU should suspend its minerals deal with Rwanda. The UN Group of Experts on the Congo are categorical: the M23 and Rwanda are hugely benefitting from illegally exploiting minerals in eastern Congo, while Rwanda has “de facto control and direction” over M23 military operations. EU Partnership Commissioner Josef Sikela should recognize the deal conflicts with reality and sends an inconsistent message to Rwanda. 

Third, the EU and its members should stop military cooperation and arms sales that further Rwandan military operations in Congo. A €20 million check for Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique was approved as Rwanda was ramping up support for the M23. While operations in northern Mozambique have had some success, a commander of the EU-funded Rwandan forces in Mozambique was freshly transferred there from leading Rwanda’s operations in eastern Congo. Through its military support, the EU could be risking complicity in Rwanda’s violations in eastern Congo.

EU ministers have a chance at their meeting on February 24 to take action. Sanctioning abusive actors from all sides and dropping deals with Rwanda that foster abuses are the first steps to take.

North Korean soldiers along the Yalu River in Chunggang, as seen from Linjiang in the province of Jilin, northeast China, February 29, 2024. 

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has released an important new report about North Korea’s human rights situation and OHCHR’s work in the past two years to promote justice for victims.

The report, based on extensive interviews with escapees, victims, and former officials, documents the government’s intensifying repression, worsening food security, and the authorities’ persistent use of forced labor, detention, and torture to maintain totalitarian rule. It also cites other recent OHCHR reports documenting abuses that amount to crimes against humanity.

The new report corroborates the findings of a recent Human Rights Watch report on the impacts of North Korea resealing its border between 2018 and 2023 and imposing strict new laws, policies, and punishments.

North Koreans quoted in the report who escaped the country before and during the Covid-19 pandemic told UN investigators of widespread food scarcity and hunger. Some people who had previously been detained in the country’s prisons spoke of tiny food rations “not fit for human consumption.” These abuses and the country’s dire food situation are the results of the North Korean government’s actions and policies, including diversion of state resources towards its military and weapons programs.

The UN report calls for stronger international efforts to obtain justice for the government’s rights violations. North Korea denies almost all reports of rights abuses and is unlikely to ever investigate or prosecute its own misconduct.

The OHCHR recommends that the UN Security Council, however unlikely, refer North Korea’s situation to the International Criminal Court. It also urges countries to pursue alternative domestic legal avenues to prosecute North Korean government crimes, including universal jurisdiction and civil suits.

The report also calls on states to “ensure that efforts aimed at securing a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula give due priority to human rights.” This means ensuring that rights are part of any future negotiations about North Korea’s military policies and weapons programs. As several governments and UN officials have raised at the UN Human Rights Council, security issues and human rights abuses in North Korea are inexorably connected. Concerned governments should continue to underscore these connections and explore options for investigations. The Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly member states should ensure security and rights are discussed together in any future diplomatic meetings.

As the Human Rights Council prepares to discuss human rights in North Korea at its session in March, this report demonstrates why it is imperative that the council renew the mandate of the UN special rapporteur on North Korea and intensify its efforts to advance accountability. Sustained international pressure is essential to ensure North Korean government officials do not continue to evade accountability for serious abuses.

A returning resident to Nabatieh, in southern Lebanon, stands before the wreckage in the city on November 30, 2024, days after the start of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. 

(Beirut) – Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon between October 2023 and December 2024 destroyed vast swathes of critical civilian infrastructure and public services, preventing tens of thousands of Lebanese from returning to their homes, Human Rights Watch said today. 

Since the November 27 ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah came into effect, Israeli attacks have reportedly killed at least 57 people in Lebanon, including at least 26 who were attempting to return to villages that remain occupied by the Israeli military. As of February 5, 2025, nearly 100,000 people remain displaced in the country from the recent conflict, according to the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM). People affected by the war should be able to realize their rights to reparations, housing, education, electricity, water, and health care, among others.

Between October 2023 and December 2024, Israeli attacks in Lebanon killed more than 4,000 people and displaced over one million. Tens of thousands of housing units, businesses, and agricultural establishments across Lebanon have been damaged, according to the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Much of the damage was caused by the Israeli military’s use of explosive weapons in populated areas. 

“Israel’s deliberate demolition of civilian homes and infrastructure and its use of explosive weapons in populated areas are making it impossible for many residents to return to their villages and houses,” said Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Even if their houses are still there, how can they return when there is no water, electricity, telecommunications, or health infrastructure?”

Mahdi Sadeq, who runs the Nabatieh Emergency Rescue Service Association, told Human Rights Watch that donors need to prioritize providing services that would enable residents to return and live in their villages.

In October 2024, donor countries pledged more than US$750 million in humanitarian aid to support Lebanon. But a November 2024 assessment by the World Bank estimated that war-related damages to “physical structures alone” amount to US$3.4 billion, with nearly 100,000 housing units across the country damaged or destroyed. 

In November and December 2024, Human Rights Watch researchers visited the southern suburbs of Beirut and the southern Lebanese cities of Nabatieh and Tyre (Sour) and interviewed 12 residents, including town officials, first responders, school principals, waterworks employees, and store owners. 

“For the last three days, we haven’t been able to find anything to eat here,” Sadeq told Human Rights Watch on November 30. “Stores and restaurants are gone, banks are gone, food stores are all gone, all pharmacies are gone.” 

A first responder in Nabatieh said: “Nobody can return now, where will they stay?” 

The bombing and shelling of cities, towns, villages, and other populated areas has long-term indirect, or “reverberating,” effects that can cause civilian harm years after conflicts end. Explosive weapons damage or destroy critical civilian infrastructure, which then interferes with the provision of public services, like health care and education, which in turn infringes on human rights.

“You need at least 4-5 years for economic life to resume here,” said a store owner in Nabatieh’s old souq (market), which was struck in an Israeli airstrike on October 12. 

In Tyre, an Israeli strike on a water filtration and pumping station on November 18 disrupted water access to around 72,000 people in the city and its surrounding areas, two technicians at the South Lebanon Water Establishment, the public utility responsible for supplying water across southern Lebanon, told Human Rights Watch. 

“All of Sour [Tyre] lost access to water,” said Kassem Khalifeh, the utility’s chief of supervision. “We had to deliver water by trucks in cooperation with international organizations.”

While temporary adjustments to the water network restored water access to residents more than a month later, on December 25, the water station, which is the main water source for people in Tyre and the surrounding areas, “needs to be rebuilt from scratch,” Khalifeh said.

In the southern suburbs of Beirut and in Nabatieh, Human Rights Watch researchers visited two schools that were heavily damagedfrom Israel’s use of explosive weapons. Ali Awada, the principal of the Lycée de la Finesse school in Beirut’s southern suburb, said that the post-war reconstruction efforts should also prioritize support for the rehabilitation of damaged schools, the purchase of new school equipment, and financial support with school tuitions for families impacted by the war. 

Human Rights Watch found that, within a radius of less than 100 meters from the Lycée de la Finesse school complex, at least seven high-rise buildings were destroyed or had significant damage, as shown on satellite imagery throughout the month of November, starting on November 1.

The Israeli military issued multiple evacuation warnings through their Arabic-language spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, on November 1, 12, 20, and 26, highlighting some of the buildings that subsequently appeared destroyed on satellite imagery. A video posted on social media on November 12 and geolocated on Geoconfirmed, a volunteer-based geolocation platform, shows two Israeli strikes hitting one of these high-rise buildings.

The Israeli military said that the building closest to the school was a Hezbollah command center. That building appears severely damaged in satellite imagery recorded on December 2, while five of the high-rises appear to have been reduced to rubble. The Lycée de la Finesse school also appears damaged, with visible impact on its rooftop. 

During their visit to the school, Human Rights Watch researchers found that in several classrooms, in addition to the school’s auditorium and hallways, whole walls were missing and nearly all of the windows were shattered, with glass, debris, and dust covering the floors.

On January 13, 2025, Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun, designated Nawaf Salam, the former president of the International Court of Justice and Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN from 2007 to 2017, to lead the new government, which was subsequently formed on February 7.

Lebanon’s government should continue working with donors to provide support for reconstruction, conditioned on properly assessing and publishing the costs of the physical damage caused by the war, and regularly publishing information about funding allocations, expenditures, and outcomes. The new Lebanese government and donor countries should also put in place necessary measures to prevent the mismanagement of donor funds. 

Human Rights Watch has documented a series of apparent war crimes and unlawful attacks by the Israeli military, including apparently deliberate attacks on journalists, peacekeepers, medics, and civilian objects, in addition to the unlawful use of booby-trapped devices and artillery-delivered white phosphorus in populated residential areas.

Attacks on northern Israel and the occupied Golan Heights originating from Lebanon between October 2023 and November 2024 used several different types of explosive weapons, such as rockets, missiles, and projectiles, killing at least 30 civilians. A July 27 attack on the town of Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights also killed 12 children. While Israel claimed that it was a Hezbollah rocket attack, Hezbollah has denied responsibility. The strikes caused the displacement of more than 60,000 residents of northern Israel from their homes since October 2023, disrupting schooling for at least 16,000 students and causing significant infrastructure damage, according to media reports. 

The UN Human Rights Council should urgently establish, and UN member countries should support, an international investigation into the recent hostilities in Lebanon and northern Israel. It should ensure that investigators are dispatched immediately to gather information and make findings as to violations of international law and recommendations for accountability for abuses committed by all parties. Lebanon’s new government should also urgently give the International Criminal Court jurisdiction to enable the court’s prosecutor to investigate grave international crimes.

“Without access to housing, water, and electricity, hundreds of thousands of people across Lebanon are continuing to suffer from the consequences of the war,” Kaiss said. “As Lebanon continues to engage with donor countries on reconstruction efforts, it needs to prioritize rebuilding the critical infrastructure and the delivery of public services in a transparent, accountable, and corruption-free manner.”

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has found that 83 educational institutions, 36 health facilities, 40 water facilities, 18 telecommunication facilities, and 36 public electricity facilities were damaged in the Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Tyre districts in southern Lebanon as well as Baalbek and Baadba in northeastern and central Lebanon, respectively, in addition to 48 percent of business establishments in those areas. 

In the Nabatieh district alone, more than 27 percent of educational institutions, 82 percent of public electricity facilities, and 33 percent of water facilities were reported to be damaged, according to UNDP, complicating residents’ ability to return.

More than 27 percent of buildings in the Marjayoun district and nearly 15 percent of buildings in Bint Jbeil were damaged or destroyed, according to UN-Habitat.

According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), one in three school-age children in Lebanon is out of school. UNICEF said that the government should prioritize education and commit to “equitable and efficient domestic public financing to ensure that every child, especially the most vulnerable, can access quality, safe and inclusive education.” 

According to Save the Children, at least 60 schools have been destroyed since September 2024, and nearly all schools in Lebanon were closed during the escalation of hostilities between September and November 2024, affecting up to 1.5 million children. Between September and November 2024, 77 percent of public schools were not operating due to their location in conflict zones or because they were repurposed as collective shelters for displaced people, Save the Children said. 

More than 240 health workers have been killed, and at least 68 hospitals, 63 primary healthcare centers, and 177 ambulances have been damaged in Israeli attacks, according to Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health. Since October 2023, 47 percent of attacks on health care in Lebanon caused fatalities, a higher percentage than in any other currently active conflict, according to the World Health Organization.

The exterior of the UK’s Home Office building in London, November 20, 2024.

(London) – The United Kingdom government’s order to Apple to allow access to encrypted cloud data harms the privacy rights of users in the UK and worldwide, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today.

The UK government order is an attempt to force Apple to provide access to encrypted user data, including device backups that can include contact lists, as well as location and messaging history, for any Apple user worldwide. The secret order, which the Washington Post reported was issued in January 2025 by the Home Office, the interior ministry, concerns Advanced Data Protection, an iPhone option that uses end-to-end encryption on data stored in the cloud, and means Apple has no access to user data stored on its servers. The UK government should drop the order.

“If these reports are true, this is an alarming overreach by the UK authorities seeking to access the private data of not only people in the UK, but anyone worldwide with an Apple account,” said Zach Campbell, senior surveillance researcher at Human Rights Watch. “People rely on secure and confidential communications to exercise their rights. Access to device backups is access to your entire phone, and strong encryption to prevent this access should be the norm by default.”

News reports said that the UK government ordered Apple to build a back door into its products under the Investigatory Powers Act, a 2016 surveillance law that includes provisions allowing the government to order companies to remove “electronic protection” of user data. The law also prohibits the recipients of these orders, in this case Apple, from acknowledging or commenting on them. The new UK order, according to the Washington Post,  "requires blanket capability to view fully encrypted material” for Apple users worldwide, including users with no apparent connection to the UK.

Encryption is a crucial enabler of human rights online and offline. Human rights defenders, journalists, and everyone else rely on the security and privacy of their devices to protect them not only from unlawful government spying, but also from cybercrime and other attacks from non-state actors. Weakening encryption, or mandating back doors, leaves all users more vulnerable. Governments should support strong encryption, and companies should build it into their products and services by default.

In recent years there has been a steady drumbeat of revelations about government spying relying on surveillance tools like spyware and digital forensic tools but also taking advantage of overly permissive legal regimes that allow states to access huge troves of personal data from private companies.

These tools are often used in combination. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both highlighted the steep human rights costs of such surveillance: state surveillance threatens the work of human rights defenders and journalists, puts marginalized groups including women and LGBT activists at particular risk, and creates a society widechilling effect, undermining the rights of everyone to express themselves and protest peacefully. These tools exploit weaknesses in device encryption and security, and their use is enabled by an under-regulated trade in spyware and other surveillance tools at a global scale, and by the unwillingness of states to regulate their own surveillance practices, too often leaning on “national security” as a blanket excuse for unfettered snooping.

In part due to such revelations, some companies, including Apple, have added new security features to help protect users, including those who may be at particular risk. These include Lockdown Mode, a feature that provides extra protection from spyware and targeted hacking to mobile devices, as well as Advanced Data Protection, the subject of the UK government’s reported order. Any limits to these features would harm users worldwide and put journalists, human rights defenders, and other critical voices at increased risk.

The United Kingdom is a party to several international and regional treaties enshrining the right to privacy and data protection rights. The vital role of encryption as an enabler of privacy and human rights has been widely recognized including by United Nations bodies, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and human rights experts. The UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council in several resolutions, have called upon states to refrain from interfering with encryption technologies. UN resolutions also encourage technology companies to secure and protect the confidentiality of digital communications and transactions, including measures for encryption, pseudonymization and anonymity.

A 2015 report by the United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of expression specifically urged governments to avoid all measures that weaken security for individuals online, such as mandated back doors. Requiring technology companies to build vulnerabilities into secured products unavoidably and disproportionately undermines the security for all users of that product.

The UK government’s reported order requiring Apple to provide access to encrypted user data is disproportionate by design, as it would weaken data protections for all users, not just those suspected of a crime or under investigation. Compliance with the order by Apple would harm privacy rights of users worldwide.

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been critical of the Investigatory Powers Act since its inception. In written evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill in 2016, Human Rights Watch recommended that the UK should refrain from undermining encryption and digital security. It specifically said that the legislation should be amended to ensure that authorities are prohibited from imposing obligations on internet service providers to weaken security measures or design their systems to incorporate measures for exceptional access into encryption by UK authorities.

“States have more, and more powerful legal and technical tools at their disposal, and research shows that they are using them to target people for protesting, speaking out, or even just because of who they are,” said Joshua Franco, senior research adviser at Amnesty Tech. “Strong encryption is one of the few protections we have against such attacks, and states should be encouraging companies to provide greater protections of our data and our rights, not seeking back doors that will leave people around the world at risk.”

Memorial ceremony held on February 21, 2020 at the Saint Theresia Cathedral l in Kumbo, North-West region, Cameroon, for victims of the Ngarbuh massacre. 

Brutal violence has taken hold in Cameroon’s North-West and South-West regions since 2016 as armed separatist groups seek independence for the country’s minority Anglophone regions. Attacks on communities and acts of banditry have become the norm. 

Government security forces were deployed to stop attacks and bring stability, but the conflict has only deepened. Security forces and separatist groups have both been responsible for serious abuses against civilians. One gruesome case, however, highlights the security forces’ role in cold-blooded attacks and the government’s attempts to delay any accountability. 

On February 14, 2020, Cameroonian soldiers and armed ethnic Fulani raided Ngarbuh, in the North-West region, killing at least 21 civilians, including 13 children, and burning homes. Bodies of some victims were found charred inside their homes. The killings shattered the community and sent shockwaves throughout the country. The attack was a reprisal against residents whom government forces accused of collaborating with separatist fighters. 

The government initially denied its troops were involved in the massacre and described allegations against them as fake. But following sustained national and international pressure, Cameroon’s President Paul Biya established a commission of inquiry in March 2020. The government eventually admitted the role of security forces in the attack and announced the arrest of two soldiers and a gendarme in June 2020. 

A trial opened in December 2020 before a military court in the capital Yaoundé. However, the trial has faced numerous delays and has been marred by irregularities. Hearings have been postponed multiple times for various reasons, including the absence of judges and other court members. Victims’ families have had minimal participation in the proceedings and the court has refused to admit key evidence, including death certificates. Senior officers have not been arrested or charged, and 17 ethnic-Fulani vigilantes, who were also charged with murder, remain at large. 

The last hearing took place on October 17, 2024, and the next is scheduled for February 20. The glacial pace of the proceedings has victims’ families wondering if justice will ever be rendered. 

The Ngarbuh trial is an opportunity for the government to show its people and the world it can hold its senior officers responsible. The question is whether Cameroon’s judiciary will act. 

Iran’s High Court in Tehran.

(Beirut) – Iranian authorities have issued heavy prison sentences for at least two dozen activists from the Azeri minority since October 2024, without showing real evidence, Human Rights Watch said today. Azeris are the largest ethnic minority in Iran.

The Tehran appeals court, Branch 36, has upheld harsh prison sentences for 10 Azeri activists issued by Judge Abolqasem Salavati of Branch 15 of Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionary Court on charges of “propaganda against the state,” “assembly and collusion with the intent to act against national security,” and “espionage.” Sentences ranged from 3 to 14 years.

“Iranian authorities systematically target civil society and ethnic minorities with abusive charges and heavy prison sentences to silence dissent,” said Nahid Naghshbandi, acting Iran researcher at Human Rights Watch. “This repression is an attempt to crush civil society and prevent ethnic minorities from demanding their basic rights.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed five informed sources about the prison sentences for Azeri activists, as well as the health conditions of those arrested in two separate cases. Human Rights Watch also reviewed court documents of two of the cases.

In the case of the 10 Azerbaijani activists, Ayaz Seifkhah was sentenced to 14 years in prison; Araz Aman Zeinabad and Bagher Hajizadeh Mazraeh to 13 years; Karam Mardaneh Mostalibeyglu to 11 years; Taher Naghavi and Morteza Parvin Joda to 6 years; Salar Taher Afshar, Fatemeh Atash Khiavi-Nasab, and Saeed Minai Qeshlaq to 5 years; and Hassan Ebrahimi to 3 years.

Previously, in October 2024, Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court had also issued prison sentences in connection with this case on charges of "assembly and collusion with the intent to act against national security” for five other Azeri activists. The sentences included 4 years for Vadood Asadi, 6 years for Abdolaziz Azimi Ghadim, 5 years for Hossein Piri, 3 years for Kamal Noori, and 3 years for Soleiman Mohammadi.

The Human Rights Activists News Agency reported that all 10 were arrested on February 6 and 7, 2024, in various cities such as Urmia, Bonab, Ardabil, Tabriz, and Karaj. Some were released on bail, while others remain in prison. 

An informed source told Human Rights Watch that the authorities did not present any evidence to support the charges. The authorities have primarily cited their past activism on issues like environmental concerns over Lake Urmia, a salt lake in Iran which is the largest lake in the Middle East, and advocating for the civil rights of ethnic groups in Iran, as well as their publications on these topics. In the case of Taher Naghavi, a lawyer, the authorities also documented his work representing clients who were family members of protesters killed or injured during the 2022 protests in Iran.

Naghavi, who is in Evin Prison, has been denied access to medical care. An informed source told Human Rights Watch that “Mr. Naghavi suffers from multiple health issues, and even the prison clinic has recommended an MRI and specialist care for his prostate and spine. Yet, the authorities refuse to act. While his condition is worsening, he has been saying that he can’t sleep due to pain, and his right hand is so numb and weak that he can’t lift or hold anything. We are deeply concerned about his health.”

Human Rights Watch has previously documented Iranian authorities’ pattern of restricting health care to detainees. Prison officials have used such restrictions as a tool to try to silence dissent but have faced no accountability. Iranian authorities have consistently failed to investigate instances of medical neglect or hold those responsible to account.

In a separate case, Branch 15 of the Tabriz Islamic Revolutionary Court summoned 13 Azeri activists for their final defense. These activists were arrested between September and November 2023, and they were kept in solitary confinement for days during their detention, where they were subjected to psychological pressure to confess, sources said.

The activists are Araz Ebrahimnejad, Davood Shiri, Mehrdad Qaderi, Ayat (Yoorosh) Mehrali-Beyglu, Hamed Yeganehpour, Seyed Mohammadreza Movahed, Amirhossein Aghaei, Ali Babaei, Javad Soodbar, Morteza Nourmohammadi, Hossein Azadi, Naser Razmjoo, and Ebrahim Avazadeh. They were charged with “membership in an opposition group” and “conspiracy against the country.” In the case of Mehrali-Beyglu, the charge was “forming an opposition group against the state.” 

These accusations are related to their advocacy of civil rights and the rights of ethnic minorities in the country. Yet, during their interrogations, the charges were based on unfounded claims, such as involvement in the formation of the “Demokratler” group and their role in leading field operations during the 2022 protests.

On October 1, 2024, Branch 15 of the Tehran Islamic Revolutionary Court sentenced Seyed Mohammadreza Faqihi, an Azeri lawyer, to five years in prison, along with a two-year ban from practicing law, on charges of “conspiracy to commit a crime against national security.” The charges were related to his participation in a gathering in front of the Iran Central Bar Association in Tehran during the 2022 nationwide protests in Iran, as well as his legal representation of protesters from the 2022 protests and other human rights defenders. On January 21, 2025, he was transferred to Evin Prison to serve his five-year prison sentence.

“Iranian authorities target anyone who advocates for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, labeling them as separatists and accusing them with baseless charges,” Naghshbandi said. The authorities should drop all these unlawful accusations against these Azeri prisoners, release those currently imprisoned, and uphold the right of people to advocate for civil rights and minority rights.”

People displaced by the fighting between the M23 armed group and Congolese government forces leave their camp following an order from the M23 in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 11, 2025.

(Nairobi) – The Rwanda-backed M23 armed group has unlawfully ordered tens of thousands of displaced people to leave the camps around Goma in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Human Rights Watch said today.

Since the M23 took control of Goma on January 27, 2025, many displaced people have returned to their home villages or have fled to Goma, where they have faced dire conditions and been with limited or no humanitarian aid. On February 9, the M23 told camp leaders and residents west of Goma, North Kivu’s provincial capital, that they had 72 hours to leave. International humanitarian law, applicable to the armed conflict in eastern Congo, prohibits the forced displacement of civilians except for their security or for imperative military reasons.

“The M23’s order to forcibly remove tens of thousands of displaced people from camps to areas with no support is both cruel and a possible war crime,” said Clémentine de Montjoye, senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Rwanda and other countries with influence over the M23 should press the armed group to immediately change course.”

In February, Human Rights Watch spoke with 22 former camp residents, camp leaders, and witnesses to abuse, and analyzed satellite imagery showing dismantled camps north of Goma.

Prior to the January offensive by the M23 and Rwandan forces on Goma, the city had over one million residents and over a half million displaced people, most in displacement sites north and west of the city. During the fighting, nearly 3,000 combatants and civilians were killed and thousands more injured, according to the United Nations.

Two aid workers and several camp residents said that on February 9, the M23 had told people in Bulengo and Lushagala camps, west of Goma, which together were hosting over 100,000 people, to leave within 72 hours. Since the M23 gave the order, the Lushagala camp has been looted and humanitarian organizations have been unable to carry out their work there, an aid worker and a witness told Human Rights Watch.

“We tried to explain why we are still here,” said a camp resident who was at the meeting with the M23. “The majority of us no longer have homes, some have disabilities and need support to travel, others have large families. We don’t have food to sustain ourselves during the trip. But they [the M23] responded to all of our concerns by saying ‘What is said is said. By Thursday, everyone should be gone.’”

A man who fled the fighting in Goma in late January said: “We know when the M23 arrive somewhere, they force everyone out and close the camps. They do that everywhere they go.”

On February 12, a camp known as Lushagala extension was also dismantled. Human Rights Watch received photographs, videos, and a witness account on February 13 indicating the local population and camp residents had torn down shelters and medical infrastructure and some displaced people were leaving Goma. The witness said M23 officials and camp leaders were present and did not react as the camp was being dismantled.

In late January, a person in the South Kivu town of Minova, west of Goma, said that the M23 had dismantled displacement camps and forced out the camp residents. The M23 told the residents they should not expect further aid and should return home. An aid worker said that in January, the M23 told camp leaders in the towns of Minova and Masisi that the camps should be closed and that aid agencies could only help any remaining people in the camps under specific conditions.

Aid workers and displaced people said that none of the camps in Nyiragongo territory north of Goma exist anymore, and that the residents had either gone home or ended up in churches, schools, and host families nearby or in the city.

On February 3, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that three displacement sites north of Goma, Don Bosco, Bushagara, and EP Mbogo, had been destroyed and abandoned and that over half of the displaced people were on the move toward their home areas, controlled by the M23. There were conflicting views on who dismantled the camps, although it seems the local population may have been responsible.

Satellite imagery from January 31 analyzed by Human Rights Watch shows that people have abandoned virtually all the camps in Nyiragongo territory. Only debris is visible where shelters previously stood.

Aid workers said that as of February 11, tens of thousands of people remained in some of the camps west of Goma, including many who initially fled as the M23 approached but then returned. They said other camps in the area had been abandoned, emptied, or destroyed, with 80 percent of the residents now living with local residents or in overcrowded sites in Goma or nearby.

On February 10, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a political-military coalition that includes the M23 and other armed groups and political parties, said in a statement that “internally displaced persons are voluntarily returning to their now-secured homes in liberated areas. The AFC/M23 fully supports and encourages this process but does not compel anyone to return without firm security guarantees.”

On February 13, Human Rights Watch wrote to AFC coordinator Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo to seek information about the M23’s orders for people to leave the camps and whether they were facilitating aid for displaced people in Goma and in their hometowns, but had not received a response at time of publication.

The fighting in Goma involving the M23 and Rwandan forces against the Congolese military and allied militias and the subsequent looting of storage facilities have significantly interrupted activities by humanitarian groups, including those providing essential aid to displaced and vulnerable people across North and South Kivu provinces. Goma’s airport has been closed since the M23 took control of the city, cutting off new supplies of critical aid.

Many displaced people said they could not return to their home areas without sustained support for weeks or months from humanitarian groups because their fields had not been prepared, there was no other food support there, and their homes and healthcare infrastructure had been destroyed. Some expressed concern about unexploded munitions and the presence of armed men in their hometowns, saying it was not safe to return.

The M23 and Rwandan forces controlling Goma should immediately ensure that civilians, including displaced people, are not unlawfully transferred from their displacement sites and are not denied access to items essential for their survival, including water, food, shelter, and medicine. The M23 and Rwandan forces should also facilitate safe passage to areas under control of Congolese forces for civilians who choose to leave the city.

The UN, regional bodies, and donors should press the Rwandan government and the M23 to ensure the health and well-being of the population in territories they control, in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law, Human Rights Watch said. They should urge all warring parties to facilitate access to humanitarian aid and ensure the free movement of humanitarian workers.

“Rwandan forces and the M23 should abide by international humanitarian law and cease the unlawful displacement of civilians,” de Montjoye said. “Concerned governments should press all the parties to uphold the rights of displaced people and ensure that access to humanitarian aid is fully restored and protected.”

People displaced by the fighting between the M23 armed group and Congolese government forces leave their camp after the M23 ordered their displacement, Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, February 11, 2025.

As the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo reaches a critical juncture, pressure is mounting on the African Union Peace and Security Council to take decisive action when government leaders attend the 38th Summit of Heads of State and Government meeting on February 14.  

A coalition of Congolese, African, and international organizations has urged the Peace and Security Council to take concrete measures to protect civilians, including human rights defenders and journalists, and hold perpetrators of abuses accountable. 

The Rwanda-backed M23 armed group’s capture of Goma in North Kivu province in late January has not ended the fighting, as their forces are now advancing into South Kivu. The M23 has forced out tens of thousands of displaced people from camps around Goma. This coupled with the obstruction of humanitarian access, increasing threats against rights defenders, and severe shortages of essential supplies, has worsened a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation. In Ituri province further north, armed groups continue attacks on civilians. 

Following an Emergency Ministerial Meeting on January 28, the Peace and Security Council acknowledged the severity of the situation and mandated the African Union Commission to immediately deploy a fact-finding mission to assess the crisis. Civil society groups are now calling for clear timelines and concrete steps to make the mission operational. 

Leaders at this week’s meeting should ensure the African Union Commission chairperson provides a detailed briefing on the mission’s implementation. The Peace and Security Council should set a timeline for its deployment, a firm deadline for launching the mission this month, and clarify coordination with African regional mechanisms, particularly the processes led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to ensure a unified approach around peace and accountability efforts. 

The meeting comes on the heels of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s decision to establish a Commission of Inquiry on the conflict. The AU should bolster this effort by holding those responsible for grave violations in the long-running armed conflict to account.  

The Peace and Security Council meeting is a critical opportunity for African leaders to demonstrate political will and leadership in support of Congo’s civilian population, who are victims of abuses by all the warring parties. Decisive action is needed now.  

Kinney County sheriff's deputies, Border Patrol, and state highway patrol at a vehicle pursuit crash site on Monday, March 27, 2023, in Bracketville, Texas.

(Austin, Texas) – Vehicle pursuits by Texas state troopers and local law enforcement have killed at least 106 people and injured 301 in counties participating in Texas’ Operation Lone Star since the program began in 2021, Human Rights Watch said today.

State authorities are poised to play an enhanced role in United States immigration enforcement under President Donald Trump’s administration. On his first day in office, President Trump issued an executive order to increase the role of state and local law enforcement in deportation efforts. Texas Governor Greg Abbott has already responded by ordering the deployment of “tactical strike teams” dedicated to this purpose. This is a dangerous approach, and Operation Lone Star, during which high-speed chases have killed many people including bystanders and children, is a case in point. Such practices should be curbed, not embraced and expanded.

“To end unnecessary injuries and deaths, many law enforcement agencies nationwide have restricted vehicle pursuits to situations where they are necessary to prevent death, injury, or serious damage to property,” said Vicki B. Gaubeca, associate director for US immigration and border policy at Human Rights Watch. “Texas state troopers should consider human life paramount and cease putting people’s lives, including those of Texans and bystanders, at risk.”

The updated analysis follows Human Rights Watch’s November 2023 report, “So Much Blood on the Ground,” which documented that dangerous chases of vehicles thought to contain immigrants under Operation Lone Star led to deadly crashes. That report covered the period from March 2021, when Operation Lone Star began, through July 2023. The new analysis updates those findings through the end of 2024, based on media reports, and most likely underestimates the total.

The El Paso Times reported in October 2024 about a pursuit in which Texas troopers pursued a car driven by a 17-year-old US citizen. The 17-year-old’s car crashed into the vehicle of Wendy J. Rodriguez, 44, a mother who was on her way to work, killing her.

Human Rights Watch also obtained and analyzed Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) data on vehicle pursuits through August 2024, which shows a massive increase in the number of DPS pursuits. Pursuits increased by about 50 percent, from about 1,680 in the state before Operation Lone Star to an average of 2,440 per year in 2022 and 2023. Through August 2024, the state was on track for a third consecutive year of more than 2,000 pursuits. More than 70 percent of Texas’ statewide increase in pursuits has occurred in Operation Lone Star counties, even though these counties only hold 15 percent of the population.

In its analysis of pursuits from media sources, Human Rights Watch identified 10 people killed who were reportedly bystanders—not in the pursued vehicle—and 20 bystanders who were injured. The reports also included the deaths of two children—under the age of 18—including a bystander, and four children who were injured in a crash after a vehicle pursuit.

“These pursuits regularly occur in residential areas or in sensitive areas: around schools, places of worship, and hospitals,” El Paso County Commissioner David Stout said in an interview with Human Rights Watch. “DPS is often conducting pursuits at 80-100 miles per hour. They are putting our lives in danger. Comparing these policies to the Department of Justice and police departments shows that DPS is out of line with all of these other organizations and the best practices they implement.”

The Texas legislative session, which began in January 2025, provides an important opportunity for lawmakers to ask questions about Operation Lone Star and consider ending the abusive program, Human Rights Watch said.

Given the loss of life and human rights abuses associated with Operation Lone Star—including racial discrimination, prolonged detention, and the unjustified use of pepper spray projectiles on immigrants—the state legislature should end appropriations for the program, Human Rights Watch said. In the short term, all state and local law enforcement agencies in Texas should end vehicle pursuits when the only basis for the pursuits is suspected involvement in offenses related to unauthorized migration and other nonviolent offenses, such as traffic offenses.

“Deadly and reckless vehicle pursuits under Operation Lone Star are but one aspect of the program’s abuses,” said Bob Libal, consultant to Human Rights Watch in Texas who has investigated abuses under the program for nearly three years. “It is beyond time for the Texas legislature to put an end to these pursuits and roll back Operation Lone Star once and for all.”

Operation Lone Star: Expensive, Ineffective, and Abusive

Deadly and reckless vehicle pursuits by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) and other collaborating law enforcement agencies are a part of Operation Lone Star (OLS), a more than $11 billion border security program in Texas. The program sends thousands of DPS and Texas National Guard personnel to the border, provides grants to local law enforcement agencies, and uses state prisons to jail those who are arrested and prosecuted. Operation Lone Star has funded border walls, razor wire, placement of shipping containers as barriers, and the construction of an enormous “forward operating base” near Eagle Pass, Texas.

Human Rights Watch has previously documented the impact of Operation Lone Star, finding that the program has both failed to achieve its stated aim to “deny Mexican Cartels and other smugglers the ability to move drugs and people into Texas” and led to injuries and deaths, racial discrimination, prolonged detention, and a chilling effect on freedom of association and expression.

Human Rights Watch has also documented that Texas National Guard troops deployed under the program repeatedly fired pepper spray projectiles at or near arriving migrants. In June 2024, Human Rights Watch wrote to the Civil Rights Division of the US Department of Justice to raise concerns about reports that national guard members had shot migrants and journalists with pepper spray projectiles, reportedly resulting in injuries and bruises, as well as allegations that national guard members may have physically assaulted several migrants and beaten one migrant man to death in El Paso. The Justice Department has not responded.

In September, the Washington Office on Latin America, a nongovernmental group, documented reports of abuse by Texas law enforcement and National Guard under Operation Lone Star, including the unjustifiable use of kinetic impact projectiles—commonly called rubber bullets—and pepper spray projectiles, beatings, and pushing people into concertina wire. At least 12 national guard members have died from suicide, accidental shootings, or injuries unrelated to direct attacks from migrants while deployed under Operation Lone Star since the program began.

Trump Administration Policies Undermine Public Safety

The violent and punitive nature of the policies under Operation Lone Star look poised to worsen. On January 28, Governor Abbott ordered the Department of Public Safety to deepen its involvement in federal immigration enforcement by deploying “tactical strike teams.” The Trump administration has also issued several executive orders and policies that will increase state involvement in immigration enforcement within Texas and throughout the United States. One such executive order, issued on January 20, requires creating federal “Homeland Security Task Forces” involving federal, state, and local law enforcement and the “use of all available law enforcement tools” in immigration enforcement.

Some state and local law enforcement agencies have refrained from participation in immigration enforcement because of concerns that arresting and holding people for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may be unconstitutional, may involve illegal racial profiling, and is terrifying to immigrants, to the point that they avoid the police even when they desperately need police protection or are witnesses to a crime, which reduces public safety for everyone.

Deadly Pursuits

Since Operation Lone Star began, approximately 95 percent of the pursuits in the counties it covers that involved the Department of Public Safety were initiated by a DPS officer, based on analysis of the department’s data. A federal agency initiated fewer than 2 percent of the pursuits. Officers initiated 80 percent of Operation Lone Star pursuits due to “traffic violations.” Nearly all traffic violations were categorized as traffic misdemeanors in the department’s data.

A Human Rights Watch analysis of news articles published since March 2021 shows that at least 106 people have reportedly been killed and at least 301 people have been injured in vehicle pursuits conducted by Texas state troopers and local law enforcement in counties participating in Operation Lone Star (“OLS counties”) since the program began in 2021, some of them children. Ten of those reportedly killed and twenty of the injured were bystanders.

Department of Public Safety Director Steve McCraw, who has since retired, told the New York Times in 2023 that the department allowed officers to use discretion when pursuing vehicles and authorized a range of other tools to stop vehicles. McCraw said that not giving chase would “reward Mexican cartels.”

The department’s data suggest that, since Operation Lone Star began, nearly 300 pursuits have resulted in at least 1 person sustaining injuries, about 5 percent of all pursuits in OLS counties. Over half—54 percent—of the department’s vehicle pursuits causing injuries statewide have been in OLS counties, even though these counties only hold 15 percent of the state population.

Over 28 percent of pursuits in OLS counties that caused injuries injured at least 1 bystander. These counties also have outsized proportions of pursuits with injuries, accounting for 57 percent of pursuits with injuries to bystanders and 42 percent of pursuits with injuries to law enforcement officers in the state.

In November 2023, in one of the two most deadly vehicle pursuits in Texas since Operation Lone Star began, eight people were killed after a car suspected of carrying migrants crashed into another vehicle following a pursuit by Zavala County Sheriff’s deputies, according to USA Today. Zavala is an OLS county. The dead included a driver, four suspected migrants, and two bystanders. In the second very deadly pursuit, in 2021, eight people also died.

In October 2024, a DPS pursuit in El Paso ended in the death of Wendy J. Rodriguez, 44, a mother who was killed on her way to work, when a 17-year-old US citizen crashed into her vehicle after being pursued by DPS troopers, according to the El Paso Times.

Based on the data analyzed, about 16 percent of pursuits in OLS counties have resulted in some amount of property damage. About 650 pursuits resulted in less than $10,000 in property damage, 186 pursuits resulted in $10,000 to $50,000 in property damage, 13 pursuits resulted in $50,000 to $100,000 in property damage, and 5 pursuits resulted in over $100,000 in property damage.

More Pursuits in Operation Lone Star Counties

Operation Lone Star has resulted in a massive increase in the number of pursuits involving the Department of Public Safety, based on analysis of data through August 2024. The 50 percent increase in pursuits from 2021 through 2023 occurred entirely within OLS counties.

Since Operation Lone Star began, approximately 95 percent of the pursuits in OLS counties that involved Department of Public Safety officials were initiated by a DPS officer. Media reports and previous Human Rights Watch investigations make clear that other agencies are sometimes involved. For 80 percent of Operation Lone Star pursuits, DPS reported a misdemeanor traffic violation as the ostensible justification for the pursuit.

When controlling for population size, OLS counties have always had higher rates of pursuits than other Texas counties. Prior to the implementation of Operation Lone Star, future OLS counties had pursuit rates 3 to 5 times higher than other counties. This ratio has skyrocketed, with such pursuits over 10 times higher in OLS counties than in others, and during some months over 20 times higher.

Even during 2024, when pursuits slightly decreased, rates in OLS counties were nearly eight times higher than in other counties. The counties with the highest number of pursuits are Hidalgo and El Paso. Beginning in late 2022, DPS pursuits surged in El Paso County and then began decreasing in late 2023. Even with the decrease, as of late 2024 El Paso County still had the most pursuits of all counties.

According to a report from the El Paso County Attorney’s office, El Paso County experienced more than a 725 percent increase in DPS pursuits between 2022 and 2023, the year the program was implemented in the county.

David Stout, the El Paso county commissioner, told Human Rights Watch that he began sounding the alarm about vehicle pursuits in 2023, and that the Commissioners Court directed the El Paso County Attorney to hire an expert to study the issue. The expert found in the resulting report that the DPS pursuit policy does not appropriately restrict pursuits and fails to prioritize public safety because it does not prioritize alternatives to pursuits.

The expert also noted that the International Association of Chiefs of Police states: “The decision to pursue must be based on the pursuing officer’s determination that the immediate danger to the officer, the suspect, and the public created by the pursuit is less than the immediate or potential danger to the public should the suspect remain at large.” The association also lists various criteria the officer should consider, including the seriousness of the offense and risk factors like physical location and population density—including whether the pursuit would take place in a residential neighborhood, school zone, or business district—and weather and road conditions. The report further says that the department’s policy inappropriately places sole decision-making responsibility on the officer involved, lacks needed reporting and review requirements, and allows pursuits in particularly dangerous areas.

El Paso County has encouraged the Department of Public Safety to require officers to engage in pursuit alternatives, prohibit dangerous techniques, mandate public reporting on pursuits, and prioritize public safety by reducing pursuits, particularly in sensitive areas.

Pursuits Increasingly Out of Line with National Standards

Across the United States, police departments have adopted restrictions on when law enforcement can engage in a vehicle pursuit.

Some, such as the Houston Police Department, have adopted policies restricting the use of vehicle pursuits. Such restrictions reflect growing recognition that pursuits lead to a “high risk of loss of life, serious personal injury, and serious property damage,” according to a 2022 complaint filed with the Department of Justice by advocacy groups. In fact, when releasing the Houston Police Department’s new vehicle pursuit policy in September 2023, Houston Police Chief Troy Finner told the media: “We should not pursue every vehicle that flees from us. We don’t have to give up the search for the suspect when we give up the pursuit.”

In January, New York City ordered police officers to initiate a vehicle pursuit only for the most serious and violent crimes and to no longer engage in high-speed chases for traffic violations or other low-level offenses, precisely because there had been too many dangerous and deadly crashes resulting from pursuits.

Abdoulaye Maïga, Malian minister of territorial administration, speaks at the COP27 UN Climate Summit, November 8, 2022, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.

(Nairobi) – The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights should take urgent action to stop the Malian junta’s crackdown on the political opposition and dissent, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to African Union officials. The Commission should give immediate attention to the cases of several political figures who are or were presumed forcibly disappeared by the Malian authorities or have been detained for politically motivated reasons. 

“The Commission should request an invitation from the Malian government to visit the country at the earliest possible opportunity,” said Allan Ngari, Africa advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Such a visit would send a clear message to the authorities that the Commission takes the enforced disappearance of leading political figures and the respect for the rights of other Malian political opponents and activists as matters of the utmost seriousness.” 

Since it took power in a 2021 coup, Mali’s military junta has been on a relentless assault against the political opposition, peaceful dissent, civil society, and the media, shrinking the country’s civic and political space. The authorities have dissolved political and civil society organizations, forcibly disappeared political figures and whistleblowers, arbitrarily arrested journalists and political opponents, and forced scores into exile. 

According to credible sources interviewed by Human Rights Watch, on February 5, 2025, Daouda Magassa was abducted by men in civilian clothes in Bamako, Mali’s capital. Magassa is a critic of the military junta and a member of the Coordination of Movements, Associations and Supporters of Imam Mahmoud Dicko (Coordination des mouvements, associations et sympathisants de l'imam Mahmoud Dicko, CMAS), a political organization that has been calling for presidential elections as part of restoring civilian democratic rule in Mali. 

Magassa’s family and colleagues have not had contact with him and the authorities have failed to officially respond to their requests for information. On February 11, Radio France Internationale reported that Magassa was being held at the National Agency for State Security (Agence nationale de la Sécurité d'État, ANSE), the Malian intelligence services. 

In March 2024, the government dissolved the CMAS, accusing it of “destabilization and threat to public security.” Magassa’s enforced disappearance comes as the group’s supporters have been calling for the return of Mahmoud Dicko, head of the CMAS and an influential religious figure, who left Mali for Algeria in December 2024. 

On December 28, 2024, at least two men in civilian clothes, claiming to be gendarmes, abducted Ibrahim Nabi Togola, the president of the opposition party New Vision for Mali (Nouvelle vision pour le Mali, NVPM) and a critic of the military junta, off a street in Bamako. A witness said he was beaten before being taken away in a truck without license plate. The night before, Togola and other political leaders had cancelled a news conference for the next day to announce a new opposition coalition, out of fear of arrest or other repressive government actions. 

Togola’s whereabouts remained unknown until February 10, though relatives and colleagues said that the authorities had not responded to their or their lawyers’ inquiries. 

In June 2024, Human Rights Watch documented that gendarmes had arrested 12 members of the country’s main opposition coalition, known as the March 31 Declaration’s Opposition Platform (Plateforme d'opposition de la Déclaration du 31 mars). One of those arrested, Mohamed Ali Bathily, a lawyer and former minister, was released on June 21. The 11 others face charges and were released on bail. 

Lawyers and members of political parties told Human Rights Watch that at least 11 people are currently detained across Mali for politically motivated reasons. Among them are three members of the opposition party African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et l’Indépendance, SADI) who were arrested in June 2023 in Bamako for exposing military abuses. In October 2024, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ordered the Malian authorities to release the three men, but their lawyers said they remain in prison. 

On November 13, 2024, men in civilian clothes arrested Issa Kaou N’Djim, a political commentator, in Bamako, after he made critical remarks about the military rulers in Burkina Faso during a show aired on local television station Joliba TV News. N’Djim was sentenced to two years in prison and Mali’s national communications regulator withdrew the license of Joliba TV News. 

On January 2, 2025, security forces arrested opposition member Seydina Touré in Segou, central Mali. He is charged with “incitement to public disorder” and “attempting to discredit the state,” among other charges. His trial is scheduled for March 7. 

“What we see is either a complete denial of any legal procedures or the flagrant misuse of the law for political ends,” said a leading member of the SADI party. “By disappearing or arbitrarily arresting outspoken political opponents and activists, the government aims at crashing all forms of dissent.” 

Mali is party to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Enforced disappearances are defined as the arrest or detention of a person by state officials or their agents followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or to reveal the person’s situation or whereabouts. Families of people who have been forcibly disappeared live with the uncertainty of not knowing whether their loved ones are safe and their conditions in captivity. Forcibly disappeared people are vulnerable to a wide range of abuses, including life threatening. 

Mali is also party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), which guarantees the right to liberty, security, and freedom from arbitrary detention, the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and the right to express and disseminate opinions within the law. 

“The junta in Mali has gone to extreme lengths to stifle the political opposition and any forms of criticism,” Ngari said. “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights should press the Malian authorities to abide by their human rights obligations, to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights to freedoms of expression, opinion, and association.” 

Yemeni soldiers loyal to the Houthis ride a truck as they patrol in Sanaa, Yemen, August 27, 2023.

Houthi forces attacked several civilian homes and other civilian infrastructure in Yemen between January 5 and 12, 2025, in search of armed men, Human Rights Watch said today.

The attacks in Hankat al-Massoud, a village in al-Bayda governorate in northern Yemen that is under Houthi control, killed several people and injured dozens of others. The Houthi forces also arrested hundreds of people from the small village and are holding many without charge. The Houthis’ attacks may amount to war crimes.

“The Houthis have shown little limit to the harm they cause for Yemeni civilians,” said Niku Jafarnia, Yemen and Bahrain researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Houthis’ repeated attacks against civilians under their control should be independently investigated, and the international community should take more serious steps to ensure accountability and enhance the protection of Yemeni civilians.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed four people, including the family member of one of the victims, and two human rights defenders who have been following the situation. Researchers verified videos and photographs posted on Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube, and analyzed high- and low-resolution satellite imagery.

The military operation was carried out search of armed men who had, according to the Houthis’ Interior Ministry, attacked a security force patrol and another checkpoint in the governorate, killing and injuring soldiers.

People interviewed said that the Houthis used drones, armored vehicles, rockets, small arms, and light weapons to attack civilians and civilian objects. Human Rights Watch was able to visually verify the Houthis’ use of small arms and light weapons in the attacks.

Mohammed, whose last name is withheld for his security, said that his uncle, whom he described as a civilian, was killed in his home during an attack. “They took away his body and refused to release it,” he said. He knew of five other people who were also killed in the attacks. Human Rights Watch was unable to verify their deaths. SAM for Human Rights, a Yemeni human rights group, reported that 15 people had been killed in the attacks.

Mohammed also said that he had learned from family and friends in the area that “people's homes were looted by Houthi forces, including large amounts of money, gold, and personal weapons.”

A human rights activist from the area said that he had gathered information from residents that the Houthis had destroyed civilian homes and attacked civilians in the village. He said that dozens of families had been displaced due to the attacks. SAM for Human Rights documented the destruction of 10 houses, the burning of a mosque and a religious school, along with looting and the arbitrary detention of hundreds of civilians.

Human Rights Watch geolocated a video posted to X on January 11 showing dozens of men and a pick-up truck moving east on the road out of the village. The person recording the video says that the Houthis are fleeing the village. Gunfire can be heard in the distance.

Researchers also verified videos and photographs posted online that showed men wearing camouflage uniforms and carrying rifles setting fire to a two-story building. Researchers analyzed high-resolution satellite imagery captured on January 18 over Hankat al-Massoud showing a burn scar on the building’s roof. A second building approximately 220 meters southeast of the two-story building shows signs of heavy damage.

SAM for Human Rights and people interviewed said that the Houthis imposed a four-day siege on the village, during which they did not allow food or medicine to enter the area. Since January 5, the Houthis have also intermittently cut and restricted internet and telecommunications access to the area.

The Houthis control the Ministry of Telecommunication and Information Technology in Sanaa and have frequently cut and restricted telecommunications services to areas under their control in light of protests and other events. The Houthis’ blocking of and restrictions on internet and telecommunications has made it challenging for human rights organizations to gather information on the ongoing violations from residents.

The activist said that it was hard to get the names of those who had been injured and killed due to the telecommunications blackout. He said that even when the blackout is not in place, it had been difficult to get information as people have been too frightened to talk on their phones about what has been happening in the area.

On January 15, the Houthis’ Interior Ministry announced in a statement that “the security campaign in the Hanka al-Masoud area of al-Quraishyah district successfully cleared the area of the criminal ISIS elements gathered there… the security campaign resulted in the arrest of dozens of ISIS criminal elements and the killing of several others.” Human Rights Watch, however, has not found any evidence that those who were killed, injured, or arrested were Islamic State (ISIS) members, or that ISIS elements exist in the village.

Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure are war crimes.

Throughout the more than nine-year conflict in Yemen, the Houthis have consistently attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure. On March 19, 2024, Houthi authorities demolished a house with explosives in Rada’a in al-Bayda governorate, killing nine civilians – all members of one family, including children – and injuring at least seven more. The attack also destroyed the house that was targeted, and “severely damaged” five other homes in its vicinity.

The Houthis admitted that their forces committed abuses during the March 19, 2024, attacks. The Interior Ministry spokesperson described the attack as “An irresponsible reaction involving the excessive and illegal use of force.” Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the Houthis’ leader, expressed his condolences in a televised speech and directed the respective authorities to investigate and provide reparation for the affected families, which they ultimately did, according to two people who spoke with Human Rights Watch.

In 2021, Human Rights Watch documented the Houthis’ indiscriminate firing of artillery and ballistic missiles into populated areas of Yemen’s Marib governorate, resulting in civilian casualties, including women and children, and causing a new wave of civilian displacement.

“The Houthis have time and time again shown their willingness to kill and arbitrarily detain Yemenis living in areas they control,” Jafarnia said. “Statements and apologies will never make up for the loss of civilian life, and the Houthis should immediately end attacks on civilians, release all the detainees, fully lift the media blackout of al-Bayda, and provide reparations to the victims and their families.”

Security around the Supreme Court in Dhaka, Bangladesh, February 8, 2025.

(New York) – The interim government in Bangladesh should ensure that security forces act with neutrality and respect the rule of law to prosecute political violence, Human Rights Watch said today. A United Nations report has found that law enforcement agencies, including the police, border guards, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and intelligence agencies, had engaged in serious human rights violations to contain the protests that in August 2024 led to the ouster of the former repressive government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

An interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has pledged security sector reform. However, it has deployed security forces, including the military, for “Operation Devil Hunt,” arresting nearly 2,000 people, mostly supporters of Hasina’s deposed Awami League government.

“Bangladesh is politically polarised after decades of repression by the Awami League government, but the authorities should not repeat mistakes of the past and should instead ensure impartial rule of law,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “As the United Nations has said, the interim government should focus on urgent reforms to the political system and economic governance.”

The UN report found that the violations included extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate firing, and mass arrests and torture, and it estimated that up to 1,400 people were killed between July 1 and August 15, the vast majority shot by Bangladesh’s security forces. The report described “a disturbing picture” in which “accountability and justice are essential for national healing.”

The recent violence began as Sheikh Hasina announced that she would address her supporters online on February 7, while in exile in India. This announcement led to a furious protest by students and others that had forced her to step down, including by attacking properties belonging to her family or party leaders. They also demolished the home of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who led the independence war against Pakistan. The home had been turned into a memorial museum.

Operation Devil Hunt was launched after a clash between Awami League members and student protesters on February 8. Awami League supporters, in an attempt to block a group of students from attacking the home of a former minister, caused serious injuries. The interim government said that the security operation would target groups “linked to the fallen autocratic regime,” describing them as “devils.” 

The interim government has criticized Hasina for inciting violence and has asked India to extradite her to face trial. Yunus has also called for calm, saying: “Respecting the rule of law is what differentiates the new Bangladesh we are working together to build from the old Bangladesh under the fascist regime.”

However, the government should also recognize that the right to peaceful assembly and protest, even by supporters of the former authoritarian government, is a fundamental right protected under international law, Human Rights Watch said. International human rights standards provide that law enforcement agencies should protect and facilitate that right and should apply nonviolent means as much as possible before resorting to the use of force.

The Yunus government has an important task of ensuring order. It should consider bringing a consensus resolution at the upcoming UN Human Rights Council session in March to request technical assistance, further investigations, and monitoring and reporting by UN-backed human rights experts. The resolution should also acknowledge the tyranny of the previous administration and recognize positive human rights steps taken by the interim government.

“Bangladeshis are angry over the repression by the Hasina administration and they deserve justice and accountability, but it has to be a rights-respecting manner,” Ganguly said. “All crimes, including mob violence, should be punished, but when authority figures characterize opponents as the ‘devil,’ it can fuel abuses by security forces that have never faced accountability.”

Former Niger President Mohamed Bazoum at the Elysee Palace in Paris, February 16, 2023.

Niger’s junta has detained former Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum and his wife  at the presidential palace in the capital, Niamey, since the military coup in July 2023.

This month the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, an independent expert body that investigates cases of deprivation of liberty, found that the detention of Bazoum and his wife was arbitrary in violation of international human rights law, and called for their immediate release.

This was not the first time that international bodies have recognized the illegality of Bazoum’s detention. In September 2023, Bazoum filed a case concerning his family’s detention with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice, a regional court that has jurisdiction across several West African countries. The court ruled in December 2023 that Bazoum and his family were arbitrarily detained and called for their release.

In April 2024, Niger’s junta initiated legal proceedings against Bazoum to lift his presidential immunity so he could be prosecuted for alleged crimes committed during his presidency. In June, a court obliged following a proceeding that failed to meet basic due process and international fair trial standards. With immunity removed, the junta announced its intention to prosecute Bazoum for high treason.

The miscarriage of justice against Bazoum falls in line with a military junta that has cracked down on the political opposition and the media, has expanded repressive measures to crush dissent, and has restricted oversight of the human rights situation across Niger.

The authorities have arbitrarily detained at least 30 officials from the ousted government, denying them due process and fair trial rights. Last October, they stripped nine people linked to Bazoum of their Nigerien nationality, depriving them of legal and social protections. In December, they arrested civil society activist Moussa Tchangari and charged him with “infringing on national defense.” His trial has yet to start. And earlier this month, authorities ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross to leave the country without providing any explanations, raising renewed concerns about the monitoring of  detention facilities.

Bazoum should not be arbitrarily detained. Niger’s junta should cooperate with the UN Working Group and release him, his wife, and all those who are being detained for politically motivated reasons.

President Donald Trump signs an executive order in the Oval Office at the White House, Washington, DC, February 10, 2025.

US President Donald Trump issued an executive order on February 6 authorizing sanctions on International Criminal Court (ICC) officials and others supporting the court’s work. The ICC’s prosecutor, Karim Khan, was the first individual targeted with these sanctions.

Trump’s action was met with immediate expressions of support for the court from around the globe. Seventy-nine ICC member countries issued a statement reaffirming their “unwavering support” for the court, highlighting how sanctions could undermine the court’s mandate, and committing to ensure the court can continue its crucial work. Some countries also individually defended the court. Germany’s Foreign Minister noted that the ICC’s inability to continue its work would be one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “greatest joys.”

A few countries unsurprisingly took a different position. Kremlin officials reportedly welcomed the sanctions, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked Trump for taking the step.

The ICC is currently investigating serious crimes in Ukraine and Palestine that implicate Russian and Israeli officials respectively. The court’s prosecutor also has ongoing investigations related to Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sudan, Libya, and Venezuela, among other countries.

United Nations officials and human rights experts, as well as the European Union Commission and European Councilpresidents, spoke out in support of the court. Likewise, civil society groups around the world denounced Trump’s executive order.

The ICC itself responded swiftly, condemning the sanctions and declaring that it stood firmly by its prosecutor and staff, and pledged to continue its work.

While the pushback against the sanctions is an important endorsement of global justice, more needs to be done. A number of ICC member countries, including Australia, Japan, and EU members Italy, Czechia, and Hungary, did not sign the joint statement. Hungary even signaled that it may reassess its ICC membership. All ICC members that have not yet spoken out for the court should still do so. The EU High Representative’s silence to date has been deafening, particularly in light of her predecessor’s quick reaction to the 2020 ICC sanctions during Trump’s first term.

ICC members should also act to safeguard the ICC’s vital mandate. This includes putting in place measures to mitigate the effects of the sanctions on the court and its operations. Countries’ words need to be backed by action. Justice for victims of grave abuses now and in the future depends on it.

Protesters outside the Department of Justice denounce the filing of terrorist financing cases against activists and demand that the Marcos administration stop using the FATF's "grey list" to target civil society, Manila, Philippines, January 22, 2025.

(Manila) – Philippine authorities are filing baseless terrorism-financing charges against civil society groups and activists, apparently to be removed from the “grey list” of a global terrorism financing and money laundering watchdog, Human Rights Watch said today. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) visited the Philippines in January 2025 to determine whether the country can be removed from the organization’s list of countries subject to increased monitoring.

Philippine authorities have been exploiting the organization’s grey-listing to harass organizations and activists in a surge of terrorism financing cases. Many charges have been based on scant evidence that the courts have dismissed. The authorities appear to be increasing prosecutions so that the task force would remove the Philippines from its grey list, while disregarding its guidance that aims to protect nonprofit organizations. Being grey-listed could mean, among other impacts, difficulty in accessing international financial markets and reputational damage for the Philippines.

“Philippine authorities appear to be stepping up terrorism financing prosecutions to get off of FATF’s ‘grey list’ and its potential financial cost,” said Bryony Lau, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “This seems to be the government’s latest bad reason to bring baseless charges against civil society groups and activists in violation of their rights.”

The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body established in 1989, works with regional bodies and member countries to tackle money laundering, terrorist financing, and other threats to the global financial system through monitoring and by issuing recommendations. The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, an associate member of FATF that reviews compliance with the recommendations in the region.

The organization’s Recommendation 8 on nonprofit organizations requires national authorities to take a “risk-based approach” to address nonprofit organizations potentially being abused for terrorism financing. In October 2023, FATF revised the recommendation, acknowledging that “misapplication and misinterpretation … had led countries to apply disproportionate measures” to nonprofits.

In 2021, FATF put the Philippines on its “grey list” for deficiencies in its money laundering and terrorism financing measures. To be removed from the “grey list,” Philippine authorities need to implement an action plan of key reforms. Among the eight areas for reform are demonstrating an increase in terrorism financing cases and taking appropriate measures regarding nonprofits without harming legitimate activity. At its October 2024 plenary, the task force determined that the Philippine government had made sufficient progress for an “on-site assessment,” which occurred in January.

The Philippines in 2012 enacted a law on terrorism financing, the Terrorism Financing and Prevention and Suppression Act. However, the Asia/Pacific Group in a 2019 report found that despite the law, Philippine authorities had not prosecuted anyone for financing terrorism.

In 2020, congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, which has an overbroad definition of terrorism and granted expansive executive powers to the governmental Anti-Terrorism Council to designate organizations and individuals as terrorists. The council can in turn recommend that the Anti-Money Laundering Council should freeze bank accounts.

Following grey-listing by FAFT in 2021, the Philippine government ramped-up its filing of terrorism financing cases. The 2023-2027 national strategy on money laundering and terrorism financing prioritized increasing capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism financing. Philippine government officials saidthese steps could take the country off the “grey list” by early 2025.

The Philippine government has successfully prosecuted some terrorism financing cases. In 2024, courts convicted individuals allegedly linked to violent extremist groups in the southern Philippines.

Most other terrorism financing cases, however, appear to have involved individuals and organizations that the Philippine government accuses of having links to the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the New People’s Army. Those charged include workers and activists with civil society groups, clergy, and journalists.

Many of these cases suggest that Philippine authorities are relying on accounts from alleged former rebels; the same flimsy evidence that the military and the police have long used in politically motivated prosecutions of leftist human rights, environmental, and Indigenous activists, religious workers, journalists, and others.

For decades, successive Philippine administrations have used “red-tagging” – accusing people of being members or sympathizers of the communist insurgency – as part of its counter-insurgency campaign, violating their basic rights and putting them at risk of physical harm. Individuals recently charged with terrorism financing told Human Rights Watch that the authorities had previously subjected them to red-tagging, surveillance, and online harassment.

The National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers, which often represents red-tagging victims, has accused the Philippine Justice Department of “weaponization of terror laws to unjustly target activists and civil society organizations” to satisfy FATF’s requirements. In August 2024, United Nations human rights experts expressed alarm over the targeting of civil society organizations and activists, reiterating that “any rights limitations in the name of the fight against terrorism and the financing of terrorism must meet the objective criteria of proportionality, necessity, legality and non-discrimination under international law.”

In May 2024, the Justice Department filed terrorism financing charges against the Community Empowerment and Resource Network (Cernet), a humanitarian group based in Cebu province, and 27 staff and council members, and a labor leader included in the case for unspecified reasons. The Anti-Money Laundering Council froze their bank accounts. A Cernet employee said the case was based entirely on a single allegation that the group had given cash to the New People’s Army in 2012.

In October 2024, police filed terrorism financing charges against three officials from Kaduami, a humanitarian group that has worked with farmers and fisherfolk in the northern Philippines for over 40 years. Kaduami filed complaints that the charges were spurred by the government’s efforts to exit FATF’s grey list.

In January, police arrested two community workers from Paghidaet sa Kauswagan Development Group (PDG) in the Negros region in the central Philippines on terrorism financing charges. Amnesty International reported that the charges were based on the testimony of one witness, a former Communist Party member.

Philippine courts have convicted someindividuals for allegedly financing the communist movement, but judges have dismissed many other terrorism financing cases against organizations and activists for lack of probable cause. Courts recently cleared of terrorism financing charges the activists Fritz Labiano and Paul Tagle in Quezon province, and Jazmin Jerusalem, the executive director of the Leyte Center for Development.

Filing baseless terrorism financing charges and freezing assets have disrupted legitimate activities of civil society groups, Human Rights Watch said. Cernet was forced to suspend certain programs and activities after the bank freeze cut off support for more than 200 organizations it helps in the central Philippines. Cernet currently focuses its attention and remaining resources on providing legal support to the 27 accused. Kaduami officials, meanwhile, expect their bank accounts to be frozen at any time.

FATF and its regional member countries – especially those such as Australia, which provides technical assistance to the Philippines on terrorism financing – should ensure that measures targeting civil society are proportionate to identified risks. The task force’s Recommendation 8 states that national authorities should engage with nonprofits in managing terrorism financing risks. Philippine activists told Human Rights Watch that neither FATF nor the government had ever engaged with or consulted them, including in risk assessments of the nonprofit sector.

“FATF should not stay silent while the government is misusing its terrorism financing recommendations to harass civil society groups and activists,” Lau said. “The task force has genuine concerns about terrorism financing in the Philippines, and it should urge the government to address these issues while respecting international human rights law.”

A family collects water lilies from Boeung Tamok lake to sell at the market, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 14, 2025.

Today, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a session exploring reforms of global economic rules to better align with human rights. Specifically, experts discussed developing indicators to measure progress other than Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The shortfalls of measuring a country’s headway using GDP is an issue of rising importance on global agendas and was a clear recommendation in the 2024 Pact for the Future, a UN declaration that pledges action on numerous issues.

The UN secretary-general stated in 2023 that “GDP does not account for human well-being, environmental sustainability, unpaid household services, such as care work, and the biased distributional dimensions of economic activity” and “fails to capture the human and environmental destruction of some economic activities.”

One of the panel’s experts, UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Olivier de Schutter outlined human rights parameters to develop indicators beyond GDP in his June 2024 report to the Human Rights Council.

Developing indicators beyond GDP is not just a technical question: the indicators would reflect choices about how economies should be structured to best enable people and societies to thrive. Human rights should be at the core of these choices. They can strengthen new indicators by bringing legitimacy, helping states when balancing complex issues and interests, and adding transparency and accountability.

In a statement presented during the panel, Human Rights Watch emphasized that a human rights approach to these indicators requires taking account of:

Human Rights Watch urges governments to move towards human rights economies by meaningfully integrating human rights into their discussions on the development of indicators beyond GDP. They should also work with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs as they implement the Pact for the Future, which has a commitment to develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond GDP.

Civil protection officials, left, load a family's belongings on a truck to move from the island of Gardi Sugdub, located off Panama's Caribbean coast, to Nuevo Carti on the mainland, June 5, 2024.

At a meeting last week in Panama City with Human Rights Watch, government officials from Panama’s Ministry of Environment said they are drafting a climate adaptation decree, expected to be adopted by the end of April. The decree will lay the legal foundation for a national protocol on planned relocation in the coming year.

In 2024, Panama’s previous administration held intersectoral consultations to begin creating a national approach, but it did not lead to one. The current administration’s work to finalize this decree, which includes reporting on climate-displaced people in Panama, is a promising sign that the government recognizes the need for a coordinated, rights-based approach to planned relocation as a climate adaptation solution of last resort.

At the meeting, Panamanian officials acknowledged the mounting challenges that climate change poses for Indigenous coastal communities like Gardi Sugdub and Ukupa in Guna Yala. But for any relocation policy to be effective, the voices of those most impacted should shape its design and implementation.

In Panama, this means that affected communities like Gardi Sugdub and Ukupa should be at the adaptation decree’s negotiation table from the outset. The Gardi Sugdub community’s experience highlights important lessons learned, and underscores the risks of delays and inadequate consultation; mistakes that should not be repeated.

Developing a national protocol for planned relocation is a critical step toward protecting the human rights of communities at the frontlines of the climate crisis and should be a priority for Panama’s new administration.

This is true for coastal countries all around the world. As rising seas and worsening storms continue to threaten homes and livelihoods, the window for policy development is closing fast. Hundreds of communities worldwide have already relocated or are relocating in the face of rising sea levels, floods, and other disasters that are likely to intensify as climate change accelerates.

Panama’s commitment to developing a relocation protocol is welcome progress. Now the government should move swiftly. Families in Ukupa are living in limbo and cannot afford prolonged uncertainty. By expediting the process and ensuring community leadership, Panama can set an example regionally and globally for planned relocation approaches that prioritize human rights.