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Key findings of two reports, both published on 11 May, on the bomb attacks in London on 7 July 2005, in which four suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured hundreds of others:
PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
The 45-page parliamentary intelligence and security committee report found:
If MI5 and MI6 had had more resources, the chances of stopping the attack could have been higher
MI5 had come across two of the bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, on the peripheries of other investigations
But information on the pair was limited, so MI5 "understandably" decided to concentrate on other priorities
Tanweer and Khan had both visited Pakistan, where it was "likely" they had contact with al-Qaeda figures, and some operational training
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The blasts were caused by home-made organic peroxide-based devices - dangerous to manufacture but not requiring a great deal of expertise
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After the attacks, MI5 found it had Germaine Lindsay's phone number, and a number registered to "Sidique Khan"
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No intelligence indicates that there was a fifth or further bombers; media claims that a "mastermind" left the UK the day before the attacks have been discounted
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The degree of al-Qaeda involvement remains unclear and under investigation
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There was no prior warning of the attacks from any foreign intelligence
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The threat from al-Qaeda remains, and Iraq continues to act as a motivation and focus for terrorist activity in the UK
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Three other terrorist plots have been thwarted since 7 July
�Actions since 7 July, including the setting-up of new MI5 and MI6 stations at home and abroad, show more could have been done sooner
It was "not unreasonable" to lower the threat level from severe general to substantial ahead of 7 July, in May 2005
The system of threat levels and alert states needs to be clearer and more useful, with better public information
A belief that suicide attacks would not become the norm could have affected the alertness of the authorities
Even with more "intrusive activity" from MI5 and MI6, it is highly unlikely that all attacks will be stopped
The "home-grown" threat and the radicalisation of Britons may not have been fully understood by officials
The threat is as likely to come from those who appear part of society, with jobs and children, as those from poor backgrounds, and from many ethnicities
Collaboration between agencies such as police, intelligence and security has improved both at home and abroad
Although improved, collaboration between agencies such as MI5, MI6 and the police must improve further
Whether the plan to merge police forces goes ahead or not, more should be done on strategic, national issues such as counter-terrorism - but policing must not be removed from its local roots
At present, there is not believed to be a group with both the intent and the capability to attack the UK, but the threat level remains "substantial"
HOME OFFICE 'NARRATIVE'
Among details in the 40-page official government report or "narrative" on the events of 7 July, were:
It is not known when the four suicide bombers first developed the idea of an attack in the UK
But a visit by suspected ringleader Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer to Pakistan from late 2004 to early 2005 may have been important
The bombs were made with readily available materials and needed "little expertise" to manufacture
The group was motivated by "fierce antagonism to perceived injustices by the West against Muslims"
At about 0830 on 7 July, four men matching their descriptions were seen in London hugging
They appeared "happy, even euphoric"; they then split up
After three bombs went off on three Tube trains, Hasib Hussain appeared at King's Cross station; he tried in vain to contact the others by mobile phone, and bought a battery and visited a McDonald's outlet
Hussain appeared relaxed and unhurried; he then got on a number 30 bus which later exploded
The backgrounds of the four men appear largely unexceptional
It is not known how or when Khan developed his extreme views; by 2001 he was serious about religion, but he criticised the 11 September attacks in the US; some noticed a change of character in 2002
Shehzad Tanweer was very religious but those around him observed no sign this had turned to extremism
Germaine Lindsay was a convert to Islam and strongly influenced by known extremist preacher Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal, now in prison
Hasib Hussain undertook a Hajj visit to Saudi Arabia in 2002; after this, he began wearing traditional clothing
Some time after this he wrote "Al Qaida No Limits" on his RE schoolbook; he saw the 11 September attackers as martyrs
Khan, Tanweer and Hussain's social life was based around a mosque, club, gym and Islamic bookshop in Beeston
Lindsay and Khan may have met in Huddersfield
In May 2005, the group rented a house in the student area of Leeds, and turned it into a "bomb-making factory"
Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay probably visited London on one reconnoitring visit, in June 2005
The attacks are estimated to have cost the bombers less than �8,000; they seem to have been self-financed
The behaviour of three of the bombers ahead of 7 July appeared broadly normal
Lindsay was behaving erratically and possibly criminally before, but not in a way to suggest terrorist intentions
There is no firm evidence as to whether there was any al-Qaeda support
But the target and type of attack are typical of al-Qaeda and those inspired by its ideologies
Police are still investigating the attacks - they have 12,500 statements; 26,000 exhibits of which more than 5,000 are being forensically examined; 142 computers; and more than 6,000 hours of CCTV footage
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