I don’t exactly disagree with what Tim Duy, Calculated Risk, and Dean Baker are saying about the decision to explicitly back Fannie and Freddie. But I think it adds to our understanding if you think of Fannie and Freddie as being, in effect, in the same business as the Fed these days.
That is, if you think about what the Fed is doing when it engages in “quantitative easing” — expanding its balance sheet by buying unconventional assets — you realize that it’s part of a broader provision of credit to the private sector by governmental or quasi-governmental agencies, which are ultimately financed or at least backstopped by public debt.
Why do this? Part of what depressed the economy during the financial crisis was a widening spread between government debt and private borrowing costs — not just in things like the TED spread, but also in mortgage rates:
This spread was narrowed thanks to a combination of Fed actions and the expansion of Fannie-Freddie lending.
And the administration very much wants to keep this kind of intervention going. You can argue that some other policy — inflation targeting by the Fed, expanded fiscal stimulus, whatever — would be better. But none of these things seem politically possible. Keeping Fannie and Freddie fully engaged in the mortgage-support business is one of the few tools available to prop up a still very weak economy. And so they’re doing it.
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