A sneaking suspicion

So now the whole rationale for the plan is “price discovery”: we’re going to throw lots of taxpayer funds into the pot because that will let us find the true values of troubled assets, which are higher than the fire sale prices out there, and so balance sheet will improve, confidence will return, etc, etc..

So I just did a Nexis search trying to find out when Paulson and Bernanke started talking about price discovery, which we’re now told are at the core of the plan’s logic. And the answer is …

Yesterday.

I can’t find any use of the term, or even a hint of the argument, until yesterday’s Senate hearings.

One possible explanation. It wasn’t until yesterday that they realized that it would actually be necessary to explain themselves.

But there’s another possible explanation, which I find terrifyingly plausible: the plan came first, and all this stuff about price discovery is an after-the-fact rationalization, invented when people started asking questions.

It has seemed very strange to me that such a supposedly crucial economic program would be based on such an exotic argument. My sneaking suspicion is that they started with a determination to throw money at the financial industry, and everything else is just an excuse.

Comments are no longer being accepted.

And once we start throwing, we can throw some more. Bill Gross of Pimco is saying another 500 billion is needed.

How many times do you think they will belly up to the bar?

Did I hear this right, that our “value watchdogs” have “put their foot down” by insisting on taking warrants? Is anyone else out there crying over this?

Warrants are the right to become a common stockholder, exercisable for a fixed or formula price. In other words they are stock options that carry no right to participate in dividends, no right to block them, and no say in anything the issuer does until exercised.

Tell me I didn’t hear Jack Reid, in a single speech, demand that We The People come out ahead of the common stockholders of any bailed out company, then insist on getting warrants. Anyone who knew the first thing about warrants would have stumbled over these words. They don’t hang together.

If I were Hank Paulson, I’d have broken out in laughter. But then investment bankers get as far as they do by suppressing their laughter in a roomful of rubes. (That’s what the executive washroom is for.) Paulson looks to have found the mother of all rubes: us, through our representatives in Congress.

I’d have held out for preferred stock and opened with a bid for governance provisions atop a dividend preference. Then we’d have not only a preference but control over the sick institutions pending recoupment. And if they said no dice we’d know they are just malingering — not really sick but just out for another societal heist.

The RFC got preferred stock with board seats and more. We’re being hosed, folks, and we don’t even know it.

David Rubenstein, Ph.D. September 25, 2008 · 6:01 pm

Cuts in the Federal Funds Rate and the emergency funding provided by the Fed since August 2007 have not prevented a liquidity problem from turning into a solvency problem.

If this $700 billion bailout package is tied to increased regulation of the “shadow banking system”, increased capital requirements for potential losses, and most importantly, a preferred position on future appreciation of the toxic assets, then the bailout will be worth the price.

Lending and normal banking activity must be restore. The lessons of the Great Depression are clear. It just wasn’t Wall Street’s speculative behavior, but bad policies by the Fed and the Hoover Administration turned a recession into a long lasting and deep depression.

Congress must take the time to carefully craft a bailout plan. Anything less would risk a continuation of problems. Hopefully, the Congress legislation will prevent the Treasury from buying the toxic assets. Rather, the legislation should should recapitalize the banks, keep the assets on the bank’s balance sheet and allow the American taxpayers to gain from the restoration of value for these assets.

Finally, the legislation should provide for bankruptcy law changes which allow homeowners to renegotiate the value of their mortgages to affordable standards. This will help to restrain the further collapse of housing prices.

David Rubenstein, Ph.D.
Bauer College of Business
University of Houston

Is it any wonder at all that people don’t trust anyone in government??

Dr. Krugman,

Here’s a mildly unnerving article (which is somewhat of a feat considering the last two weeks’ events) – an Army battalion is being permanently deployed to Northcom – that’s us, the US. It appears that future protesters (& their surrounding locales) are potential lab rats for the Army’s new crowd control techniques & tools.

//www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/09/24/army/

And it appears that the natives are restless already, although with good reason (the links below are covering various aspects of the bailout protests/demonstrations taking place throughout the country).

//money.cnn.com/2008/09/25/news/economy/bailout_protests/index.htm
//www.dailykos.com/story/2008/9/24/93411/8879
//truemajority.wiredforchange.com/event/distributedEventCalendar.jsp

Any chance you’d want to address this in your NYT column or blog?

Frighteningly plausible. A spokesman for the Treasury Dept. has admitted the figure – $700,000,000,000.00 results from a decision simply to ask for “a really big sum of money”. In other words, as much as they thought they could get with 7 chosen for luck.

Paulson spent a life in the financial industry and Bernanke spent a life studying it – so of course they believe it is the center of the US economy. Your suspicion is entirely too plausible.

What do you think of Galbraith’s proposal – remove the limits on FDIC insurance, put $500B in its pot, and let the market shake itself out – we’ll acquire all the assets of the failed companies and can sell them off to recoup some of the payouts?

Another proposal is that the government simply buys up all the bad mortgages, which is said to cost less. But, would this cure all the irregular investment vehicles built up around them?

Your opinion would be appreciated.

Speaking of sneaking suspicions:

Is this monster gift to banks and Wall St. the last giveaway of Bush to his “base”?

What a gift! They made plenty causing the loss, now in correcting it they get even more. (to the extent they actually can fix it).

$700b is six full years of Iraq war funding. Its a HUGE amount of money and may not be enough.

With this Administration, no fraud is too big to attempt. Is this their crowning theft from America?
BG

What is the New York Times DOING!!!
they should get 10 people onto sorting out the flames from the rest of us PRONTO.

Your blog should be a clearing house for ideas on what to do and instead 3 people are posted one week late.

Its a scandal.
Your blog should be of pivotal importance and instead its asleep. With you Prof. one of the MOST enlightened economists, responding to us, preferably in almost real time.

Im off to Calculated Risk……….

If there is something akin to “price discovery,” the competence to discern it has an existing seat: in the servicing function.

Every securitization appoints a servicer charged with seeing to the securitized assets, keeping them productive and distributing their earnings among the tranches. In mortgage securitizations, the servicer is supposed to keep the bundled mortgages productive (the function local banks used to perform).

Prospectuses and disclosure statements typically identify a “servicing risk,” the chance that the servicer won’t be up to snuff. The risk of a collapsed housing bubble remained effectively off-the-charts, out of the rating agencies’ (and investors’) ken. But if Congress did things to help fix the environment in which the underlying asset has worth, the problem of price would reduce to a servicing task, and rather than “discovery,” price would emerge from real activity on the servicer’s part that rehabilitated the asset.

Fix the bankruptcy laws to allow restructuring of mortgages on primary homes; declare a moratorium on foreclosures. In short, make workouts feasible. In Wall Street terms, this would set the task for servicers. In Main Street terms, it would put people back into their homes. The fix would have external effects as other homes rose in value. Ideally, from Wall Street’s standpoint, the improvements would meet on a curve that boosted the prices of their paper.

If the servicers needed a stick alongside these carrots, laws could be enacted imposing additional duties on them. They could meet these obligations by hiring workout specialists with local know-how as needed, letting the bondholders eat the costs, which is only fair since it was always in the basic bargain.

Unfortunately, a bottom-up solution goes against the Reaganesque mindset that “trickle up” economics is un-American. It can also be termed Marxist, promoting a radical doctrine, the homeowner theory of bundled mortgage value, against the fetishism that paper has intrinsic worth. But, more broadly speaking, it is antiphilosophical if you start from Russell’s quip that philosophy holds out the advantages of theft over honest toil.

Now where else do I remember this administration coming up with a rationale for action after the fact? Oh, yes the invasion of Iraq.

Who ever thought Richard Shelby R-Alabama would be my hero?

This should be paid for by
1. Shareholders 80% haircut minimum
2. Bond holders 20% haircut minimum
3. Taxpayers recapitalize and take ownership stake to be sold off in 10 years maximum.

Democrats should be calling their Reps and Senators and say, “Don’t sell me out. If you do, I’m voting for Ralph Nader.”

Republicans should do the same, but substitute “Ron Paul”

Otherwise prepare yourself for runaway inflation. Also try not to act surprised when they come back for more money.

I realize this will seem like a crackpot remark, but isn’t the crowd proposing this bailout the same crew that wanted to privatize Social Security? Couldn’t the 700 extra large be put into a fund that purchases blue chip equities, and then use this to insure Social Security’s solvency?

I could see Henry Paulson come up with a plan like this, but could Ben Bernanke be so desperate as to approve and defend such a plan that, until Congress demanded sensible changes, was so foolishly irrational?

I have a suggestion to run by Paul Krugman.

Couldn’t this bail-out be funded by something like a 2% transfer fee (let’s not call it a tax) on high-level bundled investment packages? I’m not sure at what part of the transaction, but something that would not affect the average mortgage buyer.

Considering the billions of dollars traded each day, this would go a long way to pay for the billions necessary to reign in the market.

I haven’t seen anything like this suggested anywhere.

You mean the “facts were being fixed around the policy?”

Bingo! To think something so huge was a surprise, after all we’ve seen… You had it right with the “starving the beast” theory. Oh, it’s cunning, very cunning.

The toxic mortgage loans should remain with the banks that allowed and actually encouraged this to happen, then the Feds should loan the banks up to the requested amounts at 8% interest, a better deal than what Buffet offered to Goldman Sachs. This gives the taxpayers a break. Next, tell the banks to knock off all leverage, and no more mortgage bundling or passing off mortgages to other institutions/buyers. The leadership at the Treasury and the SEC have totally failed to be proactive on the bailout – they want less regulation and no oversight, just throw $700 Billion at the problem. This is a national disgrace! Treasury Secretary Paulson, and SEC Chairman Chris Cox should be fired for having regulators that have not regulated. They have known about this since 2004 and choose to do nothing about it. If you follow their logic on the bailout… REWARD THE GUILTY AND PUNNISH THE INNOCENT [Taxpayers].

I have a sugestion how we could find the money to bail us out without adding on more taxes on the people who least can affort it. Forbes 400 listed 400 billionaires plus and did not have room for another 57. Tax these billionaires one million appeace. I’m sure they wouldn’t miss the money and I’m sure that some of them are a little ashamed of one or more of their millions.

Enlightening reporting. Shouldn’t Naomi Klein get some due for researching and publicizing the template radical conservative reform tactic currently being employed by P&B?

On the con, er…the prospect of commandeering more of citizens’ money and reallocating it to the speculative..er, financial industry (The conservative theory says this will benefit us all, because an unaccountable financial industry is the font of all human functioning. This time, it will really trickle down. Surely. *cough* This. Time.):

Paulson & Bernake’s ad-hoc pseudo-theory of “price discovery” in the case of housing is pure bunk, though it doubtlessly strokes the fantasies of the millions of owners who gambled on infinitely-soaring housing prices in a country in which 4/5 of the population has not seen a real income increase in 30 years.

If home prices were to fall to be commensurate with people’s incomes or history they would have to fall double what they have fallen so far. Let us recall that vast piles of money were not made on increasing home values in the real estate rush. Money was made on speculation. Bubbles pop. Why shouldn’t a good chunk of the monetary gains from imaginary value be lost once the collective fantasizing is over? Shouldn’t we be discouraging speculation?

I guess, given there is nowhere really productive and private to put all the money that the superrich have amassed, turning our backs on speculation might make us face the prospect of reducing growth in affluent countries, which we ideologically cannot do.

OK. I know the story: Speculation that enriches elites at massive cost to everyone else is socially beneficial. And double plus good. And while huge profits are privatized, any costs incurred must be socialized.

This is an oppressive, unimpressive, and unsustainable old political-economic program. And it is going really terribly.

We’re destroying ourselves, under the hoof of a blindly self-serving ideology, conservatism, implemented in a country with too many institutionalized as well as cultural safeguards against non-elites participating in governance. Has this terrible convergence now completely corrupted all leadership in the US? Can Dems resist where they’ve failed to resist or innovate before? Who will they listen to? Economists from Chicago? Doomed. We are doomed.

The supposed “graft” and “corruption” of the 19th century–which more or less consisted of pensions paid to soldiers and their wives, and working class immigrants with “too much” municipal power–has absolutely nothing on this new, fresh hell our Glorious Leaders are burying us in.

I am not an economist, neither am I an american. So I am completely unqualified to evaluate my idea.

A common mortgage arrangement in many parts of the world, I believe including the US, is the wrap. Under this arrangement a private individual acts as both mortgageer and mortgagee. They buy a property under a standard mortgage from a bank, and then sell the property to another party to whom they provide a private mortgage to allow them to purchase it.

Why shouldn’t the federal government provide certainty to the junk-mortgage paper that is out there by providing a scheme to convert foreclosing mortgages into wraps with the government offering reasonable terms to the houseowners, and with the government refinancing these loans as the financial markets stabilize. We would also then find ourselves in the position to accurately identify rogue lenders (any lender with an excessive foreclosure rate post-wrap was clearly negligent), and to cut them out of the chain. Effectively (if not in fact) converting at a discounted rate, to allow for the risk arbitrage, failed mortgages to rogue lenders into T-bills held by the exposed insurers.

The result is to provide a solid floor to the value of this junk debt, protecting the market; while letting the rogue lenders fail, and the conversion discount protects against moral-hazard.

With the debt secured, any of the ‘too-large-to-fail’ that remain insolvent aren’t in trouble because of liquidity, and so the Paulson plan would only have helped them if it actually did constitute a massive giveaway; so they should be rescued by reserve via debt and/or equity recapitalization.

I would be very interested to know why something like this isn’t preferable to throwing 1 trillion dollars at a 100 trillion dollar problem, and hoping for a miracle?

When one starts with the premise that Bush and Cheney (and their gang of right-wing thieves) entered the White House almost eight years ago to cement in place a “permanent Republican majority,” then every criminal act, every skirting of the rules, every subversion of our Constitution and every no-bid, no-oversight, no-accountability contract awarded crony Republican companies and individuals makes sense, in a warped and twisted, un-American and anti-democracy kind of way.

This $700 Billion++ no-bid, no-oversight, no-accountability Wall Street bail-out is just the latest example of this nefarious neo-con scheme.

Wall Street executives, who more than likely vote Republican, have backed and bankrolled much of this neo-con scheme, this neo-fascist takeover of our government, so Bush and Cheney seek to reward them, and only them, for their unswerving loyalty to “the cause.” Thus, corporate executive salary caps are not part of their nefarious “rob the poor, reward the rich” neo-con equation or game plan.

Kathleen, Winter Haven, FL September 26, 2008 · 6:38 am

“Price discovery”? We homeowners out here can help the planners with this. Just ask us. For example, the house across the street here is a victim of foreclosure. Original sale price, $190,000. Current asking price, $109,000. No takers and it’s been sitting there at that price for 4 months. If this nice little house hasn’t sold at the current “fire sale” price, could its “true value” be even less?

This is the question everyone in my neighborhood is asking and is generating a lot of rage about this so-called bailout.

Indeed, the Paulson plan has a thrown-together air about it. The original three-page plan was merely “Give me $700 billion and ask no questions.” As times goes by, it becomes clear that Paulson and Bernanke did not give any details because they didn’t have any. They had made the proposal without thinking through (except in very general terms) what they were actually going to do with the money.

Since then, all of their explanations have been designed to justify overpaying for toxic assets and making sure the institutions and those who own them and run them do not suffer, thus their opposition to restrictions on executive pay, to requiring equity options, and especially to paying something resembling market value for the questionable assets.

It would appear that they want to overpay so that the institutions will not have to take big write-downs and possibly go under for lack of capital. I infer that they think that the values of the assets carried on the books of the banks are still grossly overstated, an inference supported by the immediate write-down of $30 billion of WaMU assets when JP Morgan Chase took over.

Their intent is not just to bail out the financial system, it is to bail out the people who created the problem. Phrases like “price discovery”, “value if held to maturity”, etc., are no more than rationalizations for covert subsidies to the institutions. As you point out, the phrases have an ad hoc ring about them because Paulson and Bernanke never thought they would actually have to provide and justify any detail.

I think they’re playing JP Morgan at the dike – single-handedly stopping the panic through massive buying to “restore faith”.

JP Morgan’s plan succeeded in stopping the 1907 panic – but that was a liquidity crisis in pre-Federal Reserve days. The assets were worth more than their selling point, but panic selling was artificially depressing the market.

The bankers tried this again in 1929, when various bankers tried to stabilize the markets through large stock purchases. Unfortunately, they tried it at a point when the assets were still overvalued – so the plan failed and the bankers all lost their money.

Today is much more like 1929 – the mortgage-based securities are grossly overvalued. These securities were based on housing values always going up. Until the average citizen can afford the average home (plus commute costs in these days of $4 gas), housing prices will fall and foreclosures will march on. This means that the the mortgage-based securities are worth only a fraction of their face value.

Paulsen’s thus does nothing to protect the financial system, it merely allows the banks to stay solvent during the upcoming collapse by forcing taxpayers and the federal government into bankruptcy