Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J .:
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its
Criminal Case No. 5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence), overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962,
along the MacArthur Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his
negligence and recklessness, the vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger
jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers.
Six of the latter suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three
other riders came out with serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days;
while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and
acquitted on December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
filed in the Court of First Instance the information in the case now before us, for serious physical
injuries, and damage to property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to
the same highway collision.
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash
the charges on the ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of
the Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash.
Unable to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the appellant twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not dismissing the information for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," in view of the
appellant's previous acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same
imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish
Supreme Court, and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the result of the same
vehicular accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered
only slight physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence.
In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court
of a charge of reckless driving barred a second information of damage to property through reckless
imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996,
dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a
collision between two automobiles was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries arising from the
same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959.
In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various offenses
charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing category, or that the
complainants were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439,
has this to say:1wph1. t
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos, como el hecho
culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante
del Tribunal Supremo. De acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que
atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y ademas daos, no respondera de dos delitos de
lesiones y uno de daos por imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain (footnotes 2 and 3).
8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y ademas se
ocasionan daos, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando
deben apreciarse dos enorden a la responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a
consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno
de daos, como todos son consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por
separado, 2 abril 1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of
grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant, Jose
Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where
both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So
ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.